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Abstract 
This thesis examines the hypothesis that 'The conflict between animal 
advocates and animal users is far more than a matter of contrasting tastes or 
interests. Opposing world views, concepts of identity, ideas of community, are 
all at stake' (Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 7). It is based on a year of anthropological 
fieldwork with a group of animal rights activists. The aim of the study is to 
develop an understanding of how these activists construct and experience 
community and a personal and shared identity which reflects their own world 
view which is in contestation with that of mass society, whilst remaining part of 
mass society. Analysis of activists' life histories and their discourse and practice 
highlights the activists attempts to negotiate a discrete identity of themselves 
through a sense of community in their interactions with mass society, using 
animals to think themselves authentically human. 
This analysis contextualises Levi-Strauss's proposition that 'animals are 
good to think' within post-industrial Britain and links the activists's search for 
difference to an existential angst created by the conditions of contemporary life. 
Ever expanding communications in the post-industrial world present individuals 
with many opportunities for expressing identities of differing kinds in differing 
situations, but animal rights activists exhibit a need for structure and constancy 
in the formation of identity. They are reacting against a world where the constant 
and knowable appear redundant. The narratives and actions of the activists are 
investigated highlighting the areas of community, personal and shared identity 
and world view by analysis of their processes of rejection, reformation, 
construction and competency in their search for an authentic sense of identity 
predicated upon their own model of authentic humanness. It is contextualised 
. within a background of the continuing discourse over the condition of humanity 
beginning with the periods of industrialisation and urbanisation of modem Britain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The conflict between animal advocates and animal users is far more 
than a matter of contrasting tastes or interests. Opposing world 
views, concepts of identity, ideas of community, are all at stake 
(Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 7). 
Aim And Structure 
This thesis is an exploration of the above statement by 
sociologists Jasper and Nelkin, which they proposed after their examination 
of the growth of the Animal Rights Movement in America; The animal rights 
crusade: The growth of a moral protest (1992). 
Jasper and Nelkin's suggestion, whilst informed by close examination 
of historical and Contemporary literature, used little empirical support provided 
by animal rights activists themselves. The empirical evidence they did use 
was a survey they conducted of protestors at two demonstrations in support 
of animal rights for World Laboratory Animal Day in 1988 at New York 
University and at Berkeley (Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 38, 67). I felt it would be 
useful to test their hypothesis with reference to contemporary British animal 
rights activists by undertaking a more detailed qualitative study within an 
anthropological framework. Traditionally anthropological analyses have 
concentrated on how members of small scale societies use animals to think 
themselves human in opposition to 'other animals' and human 'others', but 
very little attention has been given to the meaning of animals in 
contemporary British thought in the structuring of human identity. 
This thesis will explore how a group of contemporary Animal Rights 
Activists uses animals to think, create and construct an identity based on its 
own model of what I will call authentic humanness through Community; and 
how a culture is in turn produced through the Community's interaction with 
'others', resulting from their own creations and constructions of 'difference'. 
The thesis is for the main part an exploration of animal rights discourse 
which will be explored partially through the examination of the activists 
behaviour. 
The study is based on research conducted with Animal Rights activists 
at a protest site in Yorkshire where they conducted a weekly 'vigil' for calves 
being exported for the veal trade. In addition to attendance at this site over 
the Winter of 1995 and Spring of 1996, the research is based on 
autobiographical accounts of involvement in activism and my attendance at 
other protest sites where I conducted many semi-structured interviews or 
'guided conversations' and carried out the chief activity of the anthropologist, 
that of 'hanging about'. 
For the purpose of clarity the thesis is divided into two sections, Parts 
I and II. This section, Part I, consists of an introduction to the study and an 
overview of the theoretical framework and methodology, it then moves on to 
an examination of the historical and philosophical background to the growth 
of the animal protection movement as a whole, Part II will cover the 
ethnographic study. 
The theoretical framework I propose draws on issues from the study 
of anthropology about how human beings think themselves human using 
animals to think. 
Chapter 2 is a description of the philosophical processes which 
contributed to the development of the animal protection movement and the 
definition of the authentically Human in different periods in recent British 
history. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the social processes which 
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produced the philosophising and illustrates the roots of the contemporary 
movement and a new model of the authentically human. Chapter 4 examines 
some theoretical analyses of the emergence of new human identities and 
groups in contemporary society and the relevance of history to these groups, 
in particular to the contemporary animal rights movement. 
Part" of the thesis commences with Chapter 5 wherein I examine the 
concept of community and illustrate one animal rights campaign as an 
expression and experience of community. Together with this is an 
examination of the social structure of the Animal Rights group that I worked 
with and an exploration of the ritualistic aspects of the vigil as an expression 
of community. I will be discussing the construct of community prior to 
di~cussing the construction of the Animal Rights identity. During the process 
of research it became obvious that most activists did not share pre-existing 
social networks and had to turn to the community for guidance in the 
construction of a new personal and social identity. Chapter 6 examines the 
point of reformation and entry into the community, the beginnings of the 
construction of an Animal Rights identity and a sense of belonging mediated 
through processes of immersion and discard (expressed through pollution 
avoidance strategies). Chapter 7 is an analysis of Becoming, Belonging and 
Competency through the use of material culture. I will use ethnographic 
evidence to illustrate the processual nature of these efforts. As Turner 
(1974) points out: 
the besetting quality of human society, seen processually, is 
the capacity of inoividuais to stand at times aside from the 
models, patterns, and paradigms for behavior and thinking, 
which as children they are conditioned into accepting, and in 
rare cases, to innovate new patterns themselves or to assent 
to innovation (Turner, 1974, 14-15). 
We shall examine the processes involved in the rejection of one 
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world view to the building of another through an existential choice or what 
Anthony Giddens (1991) refers to as a 'fateful moment'. Such 'fateful 
moments' are normally prompted by what Jasper and Nelkin (1992) would 
call a 'moral shock'. We shall then proceed to examine the methods they 
employ in the construction of an identity which reflects this change, which is 
both informed by the community's expectations and in turn actively becomes 
a constituent part in the maintenance of the community, directed towards the 
creation of their own model of the authentically human. 
As Lionel Trilling suggests, 'authenticity is implicitly a polemical 
concept, fulfilling its nature by dealing aggressively with received and 
habitual opinion .. .' (Trilling 1971, 94). Throughout this thesis, the polemical 
concept of authenticity is vividly illustrated by the actions and rhetoric 
employed by the activists in the construction of human authenticity. The 
concept of Humanity is generally constructed through a polemic directed at 
what we are conceived not to be. Clifford Geertz pOints out that no matter 
what else the study of anthropology highlights it is convinced of the fact that 
the condition of Humanity is not uniform or constant, concepts of Humanity 
are a production of ' ... time, place, and circumstances, of studies and 
professions, transient fashions and temporary opinions' (Geertz 1973, 35). 
Geertz contends, following Max Weber, that Humanity, ' ... is ... suspended 
in webs of significance he himself has spun' (Geertz 1973, 5). That the 
strands of this web are constructed in time, by place, circumstances, studies 
and professions is amply illustrated by the intellectual and social backgrounds 
which inform both the historical and contemporary debates concerning human 
treatment of animals, debates which reveal that 'It was as a comment on 
human nature that the concept of 'animality' was devised' (Thomas 1983, 41). 
Throughout this thesis the term 'animal' refers to all non-human species. In 
order to preserve their anonymity, all my informants have been given 
pseudonyms. 
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1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Thinking with Animals 
In 1962, in a response to the functionalist school of thought in 
anthropology, the structuralist anthropologist Levi-Strauss, proposed that 
animals in totemism are 'chosen not because they are 'good to eat' but 
because they are 'good to think' (Levi-Strauss 1966(b), 89). Levi-Strauss 
considered that what differentiates the human species from other animal 
species is its ability to make rules, use symbols and categorise. The human 
animal communicates symbolically and metaphorically and in conjunction with 
the structures of language conveys meaning through this. It was his 
contention that there is a polarity between nature and culture evident in the 
social behaviour of human societies which predisposed human beings to use 
the natural world to define themselves as 'we' in opposition to the 'other'. 
The 'other' is inevitably perceived as less than fully Human. 
In his study of La Pensee Sauvage (The Savage Mind) (1966 (a)), 
Levi-Strauss explores this theme using evidence from 'traditional' societies 
and proposes that human beings have evolved categorising structures in the 
brain which reflect language structures, that in their turn facilitate the 
expression of these categorizing structures through symbolic thought. 
Human beings use symbolic thought in becoming self-aware through the use 
of metaphors that enable them to compare and contrast themselves with 
others. It was Levi-Strauss's study of Totemism, conducted amongst 
societies with a naturalistic world view in which the categories of the natural 
world dominated metaphorical thought, that led to his famous proposition 
that not only are animals good to eat, but also 'animals are good to think' 
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(Levi Strauss 1966(b) , 89). 
Various explorations of this hypothesis have subsequently taken place 
within the world of anthropology. Anthropological examinations of Levi-
Strauss' proposition were originally carried out with reference to those 
cultures that are far removed from our own. Mary Douglas, following Levi-
Strauss, explored the symbolic use of animals in the structuring of human 
thought and social life within Lele society (Douglas 1969). Ralph Bulmer's 
ethnographic examination of 'Why is the Cassowary not a Bird', was carried 
out in the New Guinea Highlands amongst the Karam people. He explored 
the anomalous situation in which the Cassowary bird is not classified as a bird 
within Karam society, concluding that 'The cassowary is not a bird because 
it enjoys a unique relationship in Karam thought to man' (Bulmer 1967, 25). 
Stanley Tambiah (1969) examined the relationship between dietary taboos 
involving animal flesh among Thais and how animals were classified in 
relation to human marriage and sex rules. This led him to confirm Levi-
Strauss's proposition that, although Thai society was not totemic, 
nevertheless, animals 'represent a systematic mode of thought that 
corresponds to other systematized conceptual systems in the society' 
(Tambiah 1969, 458). 
Both T ambiah and Bulmer explore the classificatory positions of 
animals in relationship to human societies, such ideas were introduced by 
Levi-Strauss in his discussion of metonymical and metaphorical animals in 
relation to French society. Levi-Strauss had originally proposed a polarity 
between nature and culture used in the definition of humanity and 'self and 
'other, but in his discussion of French attitudes to animals he introduces 
further graduations of this. This idea was initially expressed by Edmund 
Leach (1964) in an analysis of Western attitudes to animals. Leach 
contends that; 
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I n social classifications it is not sufficient to have a 
discrimination me/it, we/they; we also need a graduated scale 
close/far, more like melless like me (Leach 1964, 166). 
Roy Willis (1974) explored the theory that Human attitudes to animals 
could 'be used as a key to 'read off certain otherwise inaccessible 
information about the way human beings conceived of themselves and the 
ultimate meaning of their own lives'(Willis 1974, 7), but this once again was 
restricted to an analysis of three African societies. Apart from an essay by 
Richard Tapper (1988) and a book by Nick Fiddes (1991) there appears to· 
be a paucity of anthropological research exploring contemporary thought in 
relation to animals in post-industrial Britain. Tapper (1988) explores totemic 
thought cross-culturally and Nick Fiddes (1991) explores the role of meat in 
Britain as a symbol of human dominance over nature. 
The question of whether in British society 'animals are good to think' 
appears to have been left for the main part to philosophers such as Mary 
Midgley (1983, 1988, 1993) and social historians such as Keith Thomas 
(1983), Harriet Ritvo (1987, 1994), Keith Tester (1991) and art historian 
Steve Baker (1993). Mary Midgley notes, when we think of the animal 'it 
names a class to which we all belong' but also 'one to which we do not 
belong, and whose characteristic properties can be used to supply a foil, a 
dramatic contrast lighting up the Human image' (Midgley 1988 :36). Both 
philosophers and social historians lean heavily upon anthropological theory \ 
in their analyses of human attitudes to animals and definitions of 'humanity' 
in Britain, but as Steve Baker points out; 
anthropologists have continued to choose, almost without 
exception, to explore the topiC only in relation to societies and 
cultures other than their own (Baker 1993, ix) 
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This study of a small group of British animal rights activists and their 
attempts to think themselves authentically human through 'thinking with 
animals' is a small contribution to a field which although the 'stuff of 
anthropology has been sadly neglected by anthropologists studying post 
industrial Britain 1. 
The thesis combines philosophy, social history, and an analysis of the 
culture produced by animal rights activists within an anthropological 
framework. 
1.3 Fieldwork 
1.3.1 Placing the Study 
The Animal Rights Movement is part of the larger Animal Protection 
Movement which involves animal welfarists and animal rightists and directs 
itself towards seeking out the ill-treatment of animals in many aspects of life 
and striving to stop this. Its most visible efforts towards the protection of 
animals manifest themselves in the form of organised protests which 
materialise at many sites and in many different styles. In order to set up my 
study I had first to find a group. From my own knowledge I was aware that 
an animal rights group had been very active in the town where I once lived. 
They had quite a high profile at the time I was living there where they 
frequently protested against a large chemical testing laboratory which used 
iMost of the background reading which was done in preparation for undertaking the 
study centred around research done in the United States with American animal rights 
activists, simply because of the lack of information about animal rights activists in this 
country. I, however, chose to concentrate on British animal rights activists without 
placing the study in a comparative framework by reference to those American groups 
or other European groups. I chose to do this because I had no access to primary 
data from those groups as my fieldwork was confined to Britain. 
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various animals, including primates. I therefore, proceeded to 'Spatown', a 
prosperous North of England town to see if I could make contact with the 
group. It was my intention to study the Testing Laboratories Action Group. 
Although I was aware that animal rights activists are rather suspicious 
of people asking questions, in part because the media have tended to 
categorise them as extremists, I took the decision to conduct the research 
in an overt fashion. Not for me the intrepid covert operation which can be 
interpreted as spying and end in accusations of betrayal. My decision paid 
off, although it could have gone in a different direction, I could have met with 
rejection which would have delayed the commencement of my research, but 
instead I found that making an initial contact was relatively easy. 
I introduced myself to the owner of a local health food shop as a post-
graduate student in anthropology who was interested in animal rights activists 
and he gave me my first contact names, Mike and Bill. I made initial contact 
with Bill. 
Bill, although willing to talk to me briefly, unfortunately did not want 
to be associated with grass roots animal rights activists as he now worked as 
a local representative for Compassion in World Farming. He had been very 
active in local groups in the past and was a close friend of Mike, but because 
Compassion in World Farming seeks to be known as a 'respectable' 
institution and grass roots activists are felt to be labelled as extremists, he 
had cut his ties. He felt that Mike would be a better contact for me to make. 
I duly made contact with Mike. We met at a.vegetarian restaurant and later 
I accompanied him to his home where he told me about his involvement in 
animal rights issues. 
Mike informed me that although the Testing Laboratories Action Group 
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was still in existence, the focus of protest at the moment was an anti-live 
exports campaign. Mike was at the time a well known local animal rights 
activist and perhaps conforms to what most people expect an animal rights 
activist to be. When I met him he had just been released from hospital after 
a suicide attempt and was anxious to talk about his life. I talked with him in 
his house which was in a very poor state. Mike was forty-seven when I 
interviewed him and had been long-term unemployed by choice for many 
years. He had spent most of his adult life rescuing animals and protesting 
through both peaceful and violent means for the rights of animals. He was 
surrounded by dogs that he was trying to home, most of whom were very 
elderly and very poorly and urinated freely over the carpet while we talked 
and he went in and out answering telephone calls in a highly conspiratorial 
manner. 
Mike told me about his life as an activist and said he wanted to talk as 
'it was all over' for him, he did not want to keep on fighting for animals as he 
felt he was up against a brick wall. Mike freely admitted to past violence 
towards property and plans to 'get his own back' on people he felt had 
betrayed him. He wanted to talk, but he said animal rights was now in the 
past for him and gave me the names and telephone numbers of other people 
who might help me and my introduction to Sandy and Alan came through this. 
When I eventually did come to know Sandy and Alan, Sandy told me that 
Mike, although known for violence in the past, was probably trying to test me 
out as he had told her 'I think I've scared her off. 
He had not, and subsequently I came to discover that although the 
militant animal liberationist alienated from society is one part of the animal 
rights movement, it is not representative of the whole. I mention him here as 
he does represent a small minority within a minority, but also because he was 
instrumental in allowing me to set up my study. He was also active in the 
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setting up of the protest group against the Testing Laboratories in Spatown 
and the protest at Heathcliff. Shortly after my interview with him he 
disappeared as he was being sought by the police and I later learned that 
he was working with a militant animal liberationist group in another town. 
Sandy became my key informant. She had taken over the running of 
the Testing Laboratories Action Group, but was at the moment more actively 
engaged in the anti-live export campaign. This study was conducted at the 
site of a protest that the participants termed a vigil which took place once a 
week. The site was a village in the North of England where both animal 
rights activists and those concerned with animal welfare gathered to protest 
against the shipment of veal calves to Europe. The location of the vigil was 
outside the gates of a farm which was a staging post for the animals on that 
journey. 
1.3.2 Some Considerations of Method 
The animal rights movement has successfully managed to engage 
mass society in a debate over our treatment of non human animals and as I 
will discuss in a later chapter, membership of their various organisations has 
been increasing since the late 1960s. In Britain, however, little interest in 
the movement has been shown by social scientists. This situation was also 
reflected in the United States until the late 1980s. . Harold A. Herzog 
comments on this at the commencement of his research paper "The 
Movement is my Life' The Psychology of Animal Rights Activism" (Herzog, 
1993:104). Herzog points out that it is only since the late 1980s that basic 
demographic information about activists in the United States has become 
available (Herzog, 1993: 104) and that there was still little known regarding 
what attracts people to the movement and the results on lifestyle of 
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involvement. 
There is still a dearth of research attention directed at animal rights 
activists in Britain. Apart from ideological texts and historical overviews of 
the general animal protection movement there is very little academic attention 
paid to the movement in this country. As a result of this, whilst my primary 
data comes through my own research with British activists, the secondary 
data have been extracted from studies centred on American research. 
Pious (1991) studied activists attending a demonstration in 
Washington DC and his findings were that the activists displayed a variety of 
lifestyles and viewpoints which did not conform to any particular stereotype. 
Herzog (1993; Galvin and Herzog 1992) concluded that activists underwent 
a transformative process which they compared to a religious conversion 
which changed their fundamental belief systems and their lifestyle. Sperling 
(1988) drew parallels between the Victorian antivivisectionist movement and 
the contemporary movement as responses to changing technological and 
scientific developments, and as with Keith Tester (1993) in this country, 
. concluded that animal rights activism was not promoted by concern for 
animals, but that animals are symbols of something else. As Shapiro (1994) 
points out these are not mutually exclusive and animal rights activism can 
combine I '" the animal as a symbol and as an object of concern .. .' (Shapiro 
1994, 147). 
The conclusion reached by Jasper & Nelkin in 1992 that; 
The conflict between animal advocates and animal users is far 
more than a matter of contrasting tastes or interests. Opposing 
world views, concepts of identity, ideas of community, are all at 
stake (Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 7). 
did, however, provide an interesting and testable hypothesis through which 
12 
a researcher could reach some answers as to how and why people become 
involved in the animal rights movement. An exploration could then be 
undertaken of to what extent their membership influences their concept of 
their own identity, their world view and if ideas of community are involved 
how this is constructed. The usefulness of using Jasper and Nelkin's 
statement as a methodological tool emerged from my observations of the 
group during the research process. 
The Approach 
Approaching the problem of research design, the perspective I have 
adopted in the collection of data is a qualitative one which seeks to examine 
and comprehend individual conceptions of the world (8ell, J. 1993:6) and 
from this the effect on their individual life course and their interactions with 
others. 
The method of data collection which was chosen was a combination 
of traditional anthropological participant-observation and life history analysis. 
As Johnston and Klandermans (1995) point out research into social 
movements carried out through participant-observation leads to the 
identification of 'key narratives' due to the 'immersion in group activities' 
which the researcher experiences and observes (Johnston & Klandermans, 
1995: 18). The method of participant observation is particularly useful when 
researching groups who seem to be 'at odds' with mass society and whose 
behaviour can seem inexplicable to those outside the group. As Erving 
Goffman observed in his study of behaviour in an asylum: 
'It is my belief, that any group of persons, primitives, pilots or 
patients, develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, 
reasonable, and normal once you get close to it ... '(Goffman, 
1961 :7) 
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Whilst the method of participant observation is believed to render more 
in-depth information than other methodologies, it is limited to the study of 
smaller groups or communities and because of this can be considered to be 
only representative of that small group. However, whilst this is not a 
comparative study, the findings which I will be discussing correlate well with 
the American studies, some of which were based on a quantitative paradigm 
ego Jasper and Nelkin 1992. 
Using participant observation in conjunction with life-history analysis 
enables the researcher to isolate several themes for further examination 
which highlight what has recently emerged about membership of new social 
movements, and that is ' ... their embedded ness in the everyday lives of the 
adherents' (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995: 18). This embededdness I 
describe as lived-inness and the processes which contribute to this have a 
major impact on personal and shared identity. The life-histories used in 
conjunction with observation of activities and the narratives which emerged 
at protest sites allowed me to link the cognitive processes to the social 
processes which both contribute to the building of identity and community. 
The use of life-history places the emphasis of the research on the 
individual's understandings and interpretations of their own behaviour 
(McNeill, 1990: 86). The merit of the use of life-history is that each story 
plays a role in the creation of a portrait of the social life and times of the 
group being studied and enables the researcher to test what may theoretically 
be known about groups against the practice (McNeill, 1990:86). The life-
histories consisted of biographical details compiled by the activists 
themselves. These life-histories do not cover the whole of the duration of the 
individual's lives, but are limited to their animal rights activities. This idea 
was one that was used to great effect by T erkel (1977) in his study of the 
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working lives of Americans, Working (1977). This book was subtitled 
'People talk about what they do all day and how they feel about what they do'. 
This study of animal rights activists details a discourse that activists have 
both with themselves and with mass society about what they are and are not. 
The data were collected in a number of ways. I regularly attended the 
vigil over a period of three months and observed the ritualistic nature of the 
proceedings on twelve occasions. During this time I conducted unstructured 
interviews or 'guided conversations' with a number of people who attended 
at various times. These 'guided conversations' allowed me to ensure that the 
themes I wished to explore were discussed. In total I conducted around forty 
five interviews with these 'floating' participants. I also attended a British 
Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUA V) 'Walk for Animals' and walked 
the course with participants engaging them in conversations about animal 
rights activism, resulting in another fifteen informal conversational interviews. 
Patrick McNeill (1990: 77) makes the point that a researcher is 
similar to any new member of a group, but what makes them different is that 
they are not only seeking acceptance as a member of the group, but also 
cataloguing their observations in order to write a description of the group's 
way of life, and in order to do this must keep meticulous and detailed notes 
of their observations and impressions. At the initial outset of the research 
my note taking, was confined to my observations of the actions and 
conversations between the activists at the protest site, following the advice 
of Polsky (1967): 'Initially, keep your eyes and ears open, but keep your 
mouth shut' (Polsky 1967 cited in McNeill, 1990: 77). As I had been 
completely open about my reasons for being present, this was acceptable to 
the activists, but later in the research period during 'guided conversations' I 
kept my notes to the minimum, being aware that to be seen constantly taking 
copious notes might affect the behaviour of the group and their answers and 
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that given the nature of the group's activities I might be in danger of being 
viewed as a potential threat. 
My method was to write basic notes and memorise conversational 
details which I would write up into my research notes as soon as possible, 
usually at the end of the day and whilst they were fresh in my mind. 
During the many hours with Sandy, my main informant, in 
conversation about her life as an activist and on shopping expeditions under 
her guidance, she allowed me to openly take notes, I think because we were 
of a similar age and because I had also had the experience of being a single 
mother bringing up a young daughter alone at one point in my life. 
I also attended three other protests against a chemical testing 
laboratory and met up with the same people who attended the live-export 
protests. In addition I had the experience of attending a 'home visit' where 
activists had found out where the Chief Executive of a chemical testing 
laboratory lived and visited him, setting up a demonstration outside his house, 
which I have detailed below. In all a period of a year was spent at different 
sites and in conversation with activists. Because of the nature of their 
activities and the perception of mass society of their activities expressed 
through the popular press I found that participants were reluctant to have 
interviews taped and the presence of a tape recorder at the protest site was 
not acceptable. 
The heart of the research is, however, the life-histories written by the 
core group, in which they relay their experiences in their own words. 
Protestors' attendance at the site ebbed and flowed as it was a lengthy 
protest, lasting for more than a year. The informants for this study were this 
core group of protestors who regularly attended this and other protest sites 
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and who considered themselves to be animal rights activists rather than 
people simply concerned with the welfare of the animals. At the 
commencement of the research I handed out twenty five notebooks and 
invited people to recount their involvement in the animal rights movement in 
an autobiographical form within the books. The participants were given 
guidelines inside the notebooks of what I thought were the important 
questions which would allow them to express their involvement in a cogent 
way, without asking them to write a complete life history. The guidelines are 
presented in Appendix 2. 
By the end of the research period the eleven core members presented 
within this text had completed their life-histories and returned them to me. 
The emergence of the core group grew through their own efforts. Each of 
the activists here attended regularly at the site where I was researching and 
in their endeavours to present their own views allowed me to interview them 
in depth. Each week they would ask me to explain what was required and 
what I intended to do with the information and through this process I was able 
to talk to them about their views and lives in a more meaningful way than just 
simply reading the completed life-histories. In this way I was able to produce 
a piece of qualitative research through which the multiple layers of identity 
could be examined. 
Having solved the immediate and pressing problem of being 
introduced to a group, another of the problems which concerned me in the 
conduct of my research was that of the negotiation of an appropriate role. 
Whilst I was not an animal rights activist I had to negotiate a role which would 
enable me to strike up some sort of rapport with the activists which would 
facilitate an acceptance of my presence and the collection of meaningful data 
for the study. As I had been completely open about the reasons for my 
presence the role which I adopted for myself initially conforms to Gold's 
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(1958) description of a 'participant-as-observer, actively involved in the group, 
but they know the researcher is not really one of them' (Gold, 1958: 72). As 
the research progressed, however, my role processed through the 
classifications of Gans (1962). Initially I was an observer; later I participated 
in a way determined by the research; and thirdly I processed to the role of 
'real' participant; reverting back to that of an observer analysing my own 
actions whilst a 'real' participant. The process of research is not always 
driven by the researcher, but sometimes by the researched. 
This realisation confronted me on several occasions during the course 
of this study and on two notable occasions a role was created for me by the 
activists themselves which led to a degree of acceptance. 
Activists are frequently suspicious of people asking too many 
questions. Having received a letter from one of my informants inviting me to 
attend a march which would culminate in a rally outside the commercial 
testing laboratory in Spatown, a desire to further my research easily 
persuaded me to attend. When I arrived at the protest site, there were only 
a few people who had been able to make it. This is a classic example of 
animal rights disorganisation, as was commented on at the time, but all those 
involved took it in their stride and decided to review their tactics. With only 
twenty people, a march appeared futile so it was decided that we would all 
drive to the laboratories and rally outside. I picked up some stragglers in my 
car on the way and followed the vans the rest were in. At this point I was a 
little worried as no-one I knew was there, but when I mentioned I had been 
attending the vigil at Victoria Farms, no-one seemed to question my 
presence, but no-one seemed willing to converse in any meaningful way or 
seemed prepared to answer many questions. 
I was not only worried by the fact that I knew no-one, but also that the 
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individuals attending this protest were those that are commonly viewed to be 
involved in all types of protest. The men had dreadlocks or shaved heads 
and earrings, all dressed in black and some with hoods, which are useful 
when cameras are around. The women were also in the main typically 'new 
age' style dressers, which I am not. Although, as I have mentioned, no-one 
seemed to question my presence, some of the younger men seemed a little 
suspicious of me. One young man, who kept his hood up and his head down 
all the time, quite openly rebuffed any overtures of friendliness from me. But 
women in makeup and 'smart' clothes have their uses, which I was about to 
find out. 
On arrival outside the laboratories, the usual banners and placards 
were set up demarcating the social space which we were to occupy. The 
police were already there and met us with their usual request for a named 
person as organiser and set out the rules which they expected us to follow. 
Shortly after our arrival, the television cameras arrived and it was at this point 
that I was given an indication of the uses that women in makeup and 'smart' 
clothes can be put to. The television interviewer was looking for a 
spokesperson and the group asked me if I would like to do it. I explained the 
capacity that I was there in and how I felt that this would be an inappropriate 
thing for me to do. Another of the group took on this role, again a woman, 
dressed in casual clothes, but older and not 'new age' in her style. This 
woman, Beatrice, was closely involved in the organisation of this protest and 
others all over the country. After an hour or so standing around outside the 
laboratories, with no sign of life inside, I asked Beatrice what the group 
intended to do, as what we were doing at the moment seemed so ineffective. 
She agreed with me and proposed that we should do a 'home visit'. 
By this time, someone who was familiar to me had arrived. The man 
I had in fact occasionally travelled to the farm protest site with and one of my 
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main informants, Alan. Alan explained to me what a 'home visit' was. This 
is a fairly recent development in the tactics of the this group and involves 
following someone considered to· be an animal abuser, such as a 
vivisectionist or as in this case the Managing Director of the laboratories, and 
finding out where they live and targeting them at home. 
The protest at the farm had taken this form, because the farm was the 
home of the owner and this was where the animals were transported to. In 
this case they were taking their protest to a private home., where neighbours 
in the community had no idea what line of work the man was engaged in. 
They were just about to find out. Alan had made it his business to follow the 
Managing Director and find out where he lived, so armed with his address we 
set out to confront him at home. We fully expected to be followed by the 
unmarked police car which had been parked beside the police van outside 
the laboratories, but when we got to our destination, there was no sign of it. 
They must have thought that we had lost heart and gone home. 
When we reached our destination, I had arrived fractionally later than 
the rest, who were discussing tactics when I got out of my car and on 
approaching them heard them say What we need is someone respectable 
looking'. As one, all eyes turned to me and Beatrice said You'll do'. I asked 
her what she wanted me to do, and she explained that they needed someone 
to draw him out of his house and asked me if I would go and knock on his 
door and ask him to engage in a discussion with us over the animal 
experiments going on in the laboratories. I realised that if I did not do this, 
then I would lose face with them and this might get around to my other 
informants and as we are always being exhorted as students of anthropology 
to 'see things from the native's point of view', this would perhaps facilitate that 
process. I agreed. I had to go alone as the others stayed in the background 
so that he would not see them. And so I set off on one of the longest walks 
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of my life, to do what in my every day life I would never do, knock on a 
complete stranger's door and challenge the morality with which he leads his 
life. I was given strength and courage, however, when the recalcitrant young 
man shouted 'Respect' as I left on my journey. 
When I reached the door I rang the bell and a feeling of complete 
relief entered my body, when my sixth sense let me know that there was 
nobody there. Encouraged by this feeling I began to bang on the door and 
look through the letter box. By this time everyone else had joined me and 
was congratulating me on my 'bravery'. Filled with a feeling of acceptance, 
I felt that I could now join in with events more and the result was that I 
performed a tiny 'action', but one which illuminated a feeling which I had 
written about, but not experienced. As part of this thesis, I had been 
describing the vigil at the protest site as a ritualistic happening involving 
Leach's ideas of the removal of the individual from ordinary life and space 
and its accompanying codes of conduct and rules and Turner's concepts of 
liminality and anti-structure, communitas and the 'transformative experience'. 
It was, however, the events of this afternoon which led to my own experience 
of them, rather than as a mere observer of others' experience. 
As, John Smith, the Managing Director, had probably pre-empted our 
decision to make a 'home visit' and planned to stay out for the rest of the day, 
we were all feeling slightly cheated. However, we set up the banners and 
placards outside his house. Shortly after this, the police arrived and were 
asked what had kept you so long'. It was then that I seemed to come to the 
fore. I was holding a banner, but at that moment was slipping in and out of 
identities and when the policeman began to talk to me, I was not aware that 
he was. At that moment I was Sue O'Neill student, not Sue O'Neill part of an 
animal rights protest. It was then that the policeman began to get rather 
annoyed with me. He was asking me to behave properly and getting no 
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response. Both he and my fellow protestors interpreted this as silent 
defiance, whilst I was wondering why he was asking ME to behave myself. 
The policeman gave up in exasperation, whilst my fellows seemed to admire 
this stand I appeared to be making. Surprisingly, instead of staying to 
supervise our behaviour, the police then simply drove off and left us to it. 
Basking in the sunshine of my fellows approval, I then began to feel 
completely removed from normal life, and after consultation with them, began 
to construct a notice to suspend across Mr Smith's windows. After 
suggestions from them such- as writing 'You are a B******' on the notice, I 
persuaded them that perhaps this was not a good idea, because we were not 
here to have a one-sided conversation with him and it might upset his 
perfectly innocent neighbours. I asked them what they wanted from this visit 
as they could not converse with him and one thing they decided they wanted 
to do was to expose how he made his living to his neighbours. And so we 
decided that the appropriate wording should be 'JOHN SMITH ANIMAL 
TORTURER LIVES HERE'. We then suspended the notice attached to the 
drainpipes at each side of his house. Some neighbours did come out to see 
what was going on and the activists told them how Mr Smith earned his living. 
The neighbours were extraordinarily tolerant of all this going on outside their 
houses and after they were told about the animal research at the laboratories 
wished the activists good luck. The activists in their turn decided to set up 
for the afternoon and spent the rest of their time food sharing and chatting. 
The experience of communitas and the empowerment felt by 
individuals involved in ritual then came clearly home to me. I did indeed feel 
a profound affiliation with my fellows, communitas, and the sense of power 
which this created. This had indeed been a transformative experience, one 
which I still carry with me and as a result of my perceived willingness to give 
back a little to the community in return for their CCH>peration I found that many 
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of the participants felt willing to help me with my research if they could. 
Fol:owing Bosk (1979) I realized that 'The privilege of being an observer is a 
gift presented to the researcher by his host and subjects' (Bosk, 1979 cited 
in McNeill, P. 1990: 71) and as we know gift giving requires reciprocity. 
On the second occasion where I was given a role by the ac~ivists it 
was in a much more 'junior' position. I usually attended the protest site at the 
farm from the early evening until around 10pm. On one occasion when I 
knew that a contingent of activists from Brightlingsea would be arriving I felt· 
that I would like to arrive much earlier in order to watch the dynamic of the 
two separate groups coming together. As a result I arrived at the protest site 
at around 10.00am one very cold November morning. I had not at that time 
had any great experience of protesting for long periods of time in the open air 
and as a result I had misjudged both the food and clothing requirements of 
such an endeavour. I also had to borrow a writing implement at one point in 
the day, an event which had surprising· implications for my research. 
I travelled alone to the site and upon my arrival found that no-one I 
really knew was there, but I did see some familiar faces including a middle 
aged lady who was a constant attender, but never willing to talk. From 
snippets of overheard conversation over the weeks and months, however, I 
did know that she was a Significant member of this group and of many other 
animal rights groups and travelled large distances each week to attend 
protest sites. As the day wore on I wandered from person to person 
overhearing conversations and trying to strike them up, but on this day no-
one was interested and so I was just writing down observations. The day 
drudged on relentlessly and although the Brightlingsea protesters had arrived 
and were bringing colour to a grey day for the protestors, for this research 
student things were not going well. The day became colder and colder and 
writing became more difficult as I had no gloves and although I had on what 
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I thought was a suitable jacket it was as sadly inadequate as I felt myself to 
be. By 3.00pm I was a sad pathetic frozen figure stamping my feet to keep 
warm and with no-one to talk to. It was around that time that a woman I had 
seen often, but had never spoken to, approached me. 
The reason she had approached me was that the group had recently 
had a piece written about them in the local newspaper which had commented 
on the peacefulness of the recent protests and the commitment of the 
activists. She had mistakenly thought I was a reporter and that I had been 
the one to submit the piece. I corrected her and told her what I was doing 
and how I usually travelled with Alan or Sandy, but had decided to do it alone 
today. 
For whatever reason, perhaps the good report in the newspaper or the 
feeling that I was a harmless idiot, she suddenly decided to take me under 
her wing. Although at first this took the form of having a great laugh with the 
others at my expense. 'Would you look at what she's got on to come out 
here - she's going blue!' she called to the others who joined in with similar 
banter. But then that moment came that famous anthropologists talk about -
a sort of acceptance. They decided that I did not have the correct clothing 
for the look of an activist and decided to transform me. I suddenly found that 
instead of my flimsy coat I had been donated several others which they 
draped over me and in addition topped me off with a colourful hat covered 
in animal rights badges. I was then paraded around for everyone's approval 
including the watching police who also thought this highly amusing. Then this 
lady who was only about ten years older than me, said' Now listen to your 
Ma, I know best'. She then took me around the perimeter of the farm as far 
as we could go and told me about her feelings for the animals and her 
numerous animal rights activities. 
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When we made our way back to the main entrance of the farm where 
the majority of protestors were positioned she introduced me to several other 
protestors, including some Brightlingsea protestors who included an elderly 
lady of sixty-eight who was a very enthusiastic supporter of the protest 
against live exports. She invited me to her van for a cup of tea and 
something to eat. As I was aware of the dietary taboos of the animal rights 
movement I declined the ham sandwich she offered me and chose cheese. 
At this point I also noticed that the other protestors did not join us. The close 
proximity of the ham sandwich was sufficient to deter them. This incident 
illuminated for me the idea that groups who gather around an idea from an 
outsider's point of view appear to be homogeneous when in reality within 
groups there is great heterogeneity. This lady whilst actively protesting 
against the live export of animals was willing to eat them and from this point 
of view could be classified as a supporter of this particular cause, but not a 
member of the animal rights community. She was accepted by the rest of 
the group as a supporter, but not acceptable enough to share food with or for 
them to even be in the presence of her food. 
Whist I was writing down my observations of this phenomenon a 
second incident occurred which illuminated more of my research. My pen ran 
out of ink and the lady offered me one of hers which belonged to her 
husband. I accepted the pen and then left the van to continue with my 
observations and questions. Whilst I was talking to another group of 
protestors one of the young men said 'That's a bookies pen! " and sure 
enough it was. Another of the taboos of the movement is that of the use of 
animals for sport, but at that point I had neither realised that this was a pen 
from a bookmaker's shop or that this was a taboo. I hurriedly explained the 
fact that it was not my pen and they explained their point of view. 
This incident, together with my treatment over not being prepared for 
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the day, was brought vividly back to me when I was analysing another of the 
themes which will be explored in the ethnographic section of this thesis, the 
vital component of identity which is competence. My own incompetence had 
proved to be an asset on this occasion in the negotiation of a role within the 
group. I may have been introduced as a researcher, but the glaring gaps in 
my practical knowledge had removed any perceived threat that I may have 
presented and I was transformed by them into an 'apprentice' and one who 
they perceived could be made use of by the group in negotiations with both 
mass society and with their opponents. 
Jasper and Nelkin (1992) categorised individuals involved in the 
animal protection movement as welfarists, pragmatists and fundamentalists. 
The informants for this study generally belonged to the category of 
'fundamentalist' and felt that human beings should not 'use animals for their 
own pleasures or interests, regardless of the benefits' (Jasper and Nelkin 
1992, 9). The core group was defined by its involvement from the beginning 
of the protest at Heathcliff and its consistent attendance. A profile of the 
core group and their involvement with animal rights issues is outlined in 
Appendix 1 and a diary of a year of protest is recorded within Box 5.1 in 
Chapter 5. As noted before, in order to preserve their anonymity, all my 
informants have been given pseudonyms. The name of the farm and the 
name of the protest group are also both fictions to give a greater degree of 
anonymity. 
The group has in fact undergone several changes of name, but for my 
purposes they are to be known as Live Exports Opponents. The farm is 
Victoria Farms and the village is Heathcliff. None of the group lives in the 
village of Heathcliff which is set in the agricultural heart of the North of 
England. The members of the group are urbanite in nature whose main 
contact with rural life is an ongoing polemic against what they perceive as 
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the uncivilised practices of cruelty and the avarice hidden beneath the 
peaceful pastoral veneer. However, some of the group had enjoyed a rural 
childhood which may have affected their views of animals. Most of the group 
also support an antivivisection group in a local town, which I shall call 
Spatown, where one of the largest chemical testing laboratories in Europe is 
sited. I shall call this group the Testing Action Group. 
The analysis of the data centres upon the examination of the 
narratives which the core group have constructed about their lives. 
narratives are a primary embodiment of our understanding of 
the world, of experience, and ultimately of ourselves. Narrative 
emplotment appears to yield a form of understanding of human 
experience, both individual and collective, that is not directly 
amenable to other forms of exposition or analysis (Kerby 1991, 
3) 
Persons not only have memories, histories, but also take 
certain attitudes toward them. We notice change - that things 
and acquaintances are not as they once were (Kerby 1991, 36) 
The process of narrative allows individuals to contextualise their lives. 
Central to the construction of the animal rightist's identity is a point of 
reformation, the beginning of a particular narrative. Jasper & Poulsen (1995) 
refer to the recruitment of animal rights activists as being through a 'moral 
shock'. Giddens would term these 'fateful moments', moments which require 
the individual to confront existential questions ( Giddens 1991, 203). After 
experiencing a 'moral shock', the individual is confronted with the questions 
'How shall I live my life?', 'Should I change how I live my life?'. For Turner 
(1974) this would be a liminoid experience, the opportunity to step outside the 
norms of everyday life. If the answer is the abandonment of one lifestyle and 
the taking up of another, it is also part of the ongoing narrative of the self and 
ultimately of a community. 
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Carrithers (1992) points to narrative thinking as the means of 
interpreting and predicting the intentions of others, the present conditions of 
social life within a landscape of the past and a predicted future. This allows 
us to mediate our actions and responses to situations. These responses will 
be culturally and historically specific and supply us with an orientation within 
which we can act in a way which makes sense in our particular life 'story'. 
For Douglas (1996) this involves cognitive choices and thought styles which, 
when conjoined with the similar thought styles of others, form though- worlds 
or communities. This involves Carrithers' notion of the ability of human 
beings to mind read the thoughts of others and the stories of others in a 
logical way. The human ability to mind read is one that was investigated 
originally by Schutz who termed it a 'scheme of interpretation' (Schutz 1972, 
86). This 'mind reading' is illustrated by Cohen's theory that community exists 
in the minds of its members who 'make, or believe they make, a similar sense 
of things' (Cohen 1985, 16). At the point of reformation, the animal rights 
activist engages with others whose thinking they believe is similar to their 
own, in the construction of both a personal and shared social identity. 
In so far as it is dominated by the core perspectives of 
modernity, the project of the self remains one of control, guided 
only by a morality of 'authenticity' (Giddens 1991, 225) 
Social life within the context of the post-industrial era presents 
individuals with multiple choices of how to live their lives. Some people are 
content to answer the existential questions thrown up by contemporary 
conditions by a superficial multiple self. Others have a desire for the 
constant, essential and knowable. As Giddens points out: 
Some individuals find it psychologically difficult or impossible to 
accept the existence of diverse, mutually conflicting authorities. 
They find that the freedom to choose is a burden and they seek 
solace in more overarching systems of authority ... an authority 
whose rules and provisions cover most aspects of his life 
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(Giddens 1991,196). 
It is at this point that 'authenticity' becomes central. Members of the 
animal rights community are not part of a geographically located community, 
but a relational community of meaning. Traditional face-to-face communities, 
in order to protect the integrity of the community, engage in the mutual 
monitoring of individual behaviour. Within relational communities, the self is 
the preeminent medium for monitoring behaviour to protect the integrity of the 
individual and the community. Whilst in relational communities the 
opportunities for face-to-face mutual monitoring of behaviour can only be 
engaged in under the circumstances of ritual activity. In order to maintain its 
own integrity and authenticity the self must continually engage in a process 
of eliminating any dissonance between the self and the community. 
Narrative exegesis allows us to examine these processes 
consolidating context, behaviour and emotions in a holistic fashion. Through 
attendance at the protest sites and observing and listening to the narratives 
that they told each other and me, in conjunction with an analysis of their 
autobiographical narratives, I was able to isolate several themes that seemed 
to be common to all of the core group. These included the point at which 
their world views began to change, the discarding of the material objects 
which had supported their previous world view, the rebuilding of the material 
world to support their new world view and the gaining of competence in 
personal and shared identity through community and individual control. 
1.3.3 Animal Rights Activists in 1995: Live Exports Opponents 
The core group which I studied were very different indeed from Mike, 
my first contact. Alan and John are both employed engineers, Tom a retired 
naturopath and Jack a scientist. Mary, Victoria, Priscilla and Anna are office 
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workers, Kit a retired teacher. Sandy was a nurse and now runs her own 
business. Joan is a teacher. None of these informants agreed with violent 
methods and felt peaceful protest was the way forward, although some did 
admit to understanding why others committed violent acts. Whilst I attended 
the protest site, in addition to the core group, people would drift in one week 
and not the next, but of all the people that I chatted to, I only came across 
one other person who could loosely be described as alienated from society, 
unless being an undergraduate is a condition of alienation. As can be seen 
from the Profile (Appendix 1), all were members of many different animal 
rights and animal welfare organisations and this multiple membership will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. 
In their quest for the authentically human all of the participants in this 
study had chosen to find 'solace in ... an authority whose rules and provisions 
cover most aspects' (Giddens 1991, 196) of their lives, the authority of the 
Animal Rights ideology, one of the chief expressions of this being the 
adoption of vegetarianism or veganism. All of the core group were either 
vegetarian or vegan and conformed to the Vegetarian Society and Vegan 
Society definitions of these states. 
Throughout this thesis I will use the Vegetarian Society and Vegan 
Society's own definitions. A vegetarian is a 'person who eats no fish, flesh 
or fowl' and avoids 'the by-products of slaughter' (Vegetarian Society) and 
veganism is defined as 'a way of living which seeks to exclude, as far as 
possible and practical, all forms of exploitation of and cruelty to, 
animals for food, clothing or any other purpose. In dietary terms it 
refers to the practice of dispensing with all animal produce - including 
meat, fish, poultry, eggs, animal milks, honey, and their derivatives' 
(Vegan Society). 
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My core research group consisted of eleven animal rights 
activists, seven women and four men, a ratio which mirrors the greater 
presence of women in the movement generally (Pious 1991; Jasper & Nelkin 
1992; Jamison & Lunch 1992). None of the activists was known to me 
before the commencement of the study. My interest in this subject is a 
product of intellectual curiousity rather than any involvement with the animal 
protection movement and in my conversations with activists and the analysis 
of their autobiographies I have tried to maintain an 'objective' view. 
All of my informants volunteered to complete autobiographies and all 
considered themselves to be concerned with animal rights rather than, or as 
well as, animal welfare. 
These are some of the protagonists engaged in the present day 
polemic surrounding their definition and construction of their own model of 
human authenticity, but before moving on to examine this in detail I feel it 
necessary to introduce the philosophical background of the characters in this 
social procession in Chapter 2. 
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2 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY AND TRADITIONS INVOLVED IN THE 
PURSUIT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE 'ANIMAL' AND THE SEARCH FOR 
THE 'AUTHENTICALLY HUMAN' 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Levi-Strauss denies the importance of history within the world of 
metaphorical and symbolic thought, and proposes that the structured 
categories of the human mind are universal, determined by the structure of 
human cognition and uninfluenced by changes in material existence. But as 
can be seen in the following overview of the history of philosophical thought 
and social life with regard to animals and what it is to be truly or authentically 
human, the importance of certain symbols and metaphors ascends and 
descends in response to the conditions of material existence. 
Marshall Sahlins (1976) following Levi-Strauss, discusses the culture 
of Western Socjety and La Pensee Bourgeoise (The Middle Class Mind) as 
equally structured and dominated by metaphor and symbol as the cultures of 
small-scale societies. Western culture also 'incorporates historical 
perturbations as structural permutations' (Sahlins 1976, 220). The 
implication of this appears to be that historical changes in material existence 
do not influence structured symbolic and metaphorical thought. In Islands 
of History (1985) Sahlins attempts to reconcile history and the structural 
method and argues that whilst historical events are symbolic reproductions 
of culture, structured symbolic thought can be reordered by people so that 
cultural change can be precipitated by historical events (Sahlins 1985). 
In what follows we see such changes in symbolic thought produced 
by changes in material existence. For some people, using 'animals to think' 
brought animals from an oppositional polarity to being part of a continuum 
with human beings. Using 'animals to think' has reordered the structured 
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categories of certain people's modes of thought replacing the oppositional 
animal with oppositional humans who represent the 'other'. By creating a 
discourse around their relationships with animals people have created 
gradations between the opposition categories 'animal' and 'human' leading 
to perceptions of others being less authentically human than themselves. 
2.2 Thinking with Animals in Industrial Britain 
I wish to introduce the concept of how industrialised Britons have used 
'animals to think' by giving an overview of the historical and philosophical 
backgrounds which have dominated the relationship between human beings 
and other animals in modern Britain. These processes have led to the 
evolution of a group of people who are involved with the construction of a 
particular identity, a community of meaning for that identity to operate within 
and a distinctive culture produced through a dialectic engaged in by 
themselves with themselves. This produces a cultural polemic against the 
received wisdom of the larger community. 
The debate over the status and rights of animals in Britain could 
be perceived as recent and of a secular nature. What I hope to show here 
is that far from being new, the participants in the contemporary debate over 
'animal rights' and the search for a definition of the authentically human, are 
following in a longstanding tradition of debate over our relationships with 
other animals and what constitutes the authentic human being. Present day 
concerns and attitudes can only be understood by reference to the past. In 
recent history this concern has found expression from the Enlightenment 
onwards, through both secular thinkers and the Non-Conformist Christian 
tradition which questioned orthodox interpretations of the Bible. Continuing 
on from the 1960s and 1970s, these questions are again being addressed by 
clerical thinkers such as Andrew Linzey as well as secular thinkers like Peter 
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Singer. But considerations of the authentically human and how we should 
behave towards non-human animals predate these events. 
Considering animals is an ancient preoccupation that appears to 
concern, among other things, what we think about ourselves and how we 
define ourselves in opposition to 'others'. The historical episodes that are 
reviewed in this chapter clearly reflect Levi-Strauss's proposition that 'animals 
are good to think', but also show that the state of being authentically human 
is one that is constantly reviewed and revised. 
The difference between animals and humans can be construed as 
obvious in outward physical appearance and social activity. However the 
human species in all places at all times makes strenuous efforts to 
differentiate itself from other animals and construct and maintain a human 
identity. These efforts manifest themselves for example as rules for social 
conduct and food taboos. Human beings are, nevertheless, animals and 
Keith Tester proposes that 'animal rights is one way in which the ambiguity 
can be confronted and reconciled' (Tester 1991, 88). To enable us to 
differentiate between ourselves and animals, whilst facilitating contact with 
them, human beings have had to construct both symbolic categories and 
physical gradations of distance between animals and humanity. As noted 
before, Edmund Leach has proposed, that to reduce social classifications 
to simple polarities is insufficient, a scale of graduations of difference and 
similarity is required (Leach 1964, 166). 
This type of classification is highlighted in the historical debates over 
cruelty and kindness to animals where closeness and distance to the human 
species became central to the various discourses. 
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2.3 Conceptualizing Humanity in History 
At its core, the historical debate appears to involve two different but 
related strands of thought. On the one hand there is a need for improvement 
in our treatment of other species, based on their difference from us, and a 
recognition of human uniqueness. This imposes a moral duty on humanity, 
as 'moral animals' to recognize the 'other' animal's' claim to right treatment 
from us. Humanity can recognize these duties and behave accordingly, 
because of culture and social knowledge, which the thereby unequal 'other 
animal' does not possess. 
On the other hand, there is a plea to notice the similarities between 
us and other species which demands that we do not continue the practices 
of ill usage, on the basis of organic similarity. Once again, whilst recognizing 
that the human species is an animal, this view contends that humans are a 
different sort of animal. This argument contends that humanity is a naturally 
moral species which has been corrupted by culture and society, as opposed 
to the previous argument that viewed culture and society as the source of 
morality. From this viewpoint, a recognition of kinship with 'other animals' 
and a rejection of Society's present ill-treatment of them will elevate humanity 
to a purer 'natural' state from which we have 'fallen' and enable us to regain 
and live by our 'natural' ~orality. I am indebted to Keith Tester, who has 
elaborately drawn out these two threads of thought in his work Animals & 
SOciety: The humanity of animal rights. These themes are taken up in great 
detail by Tester who uses his own analytical models of the 'Demand for 
Difference' and the 'Demand for Similitude' in his analysis of human 
involvement in animal rights issues (Tester 1991,88). 
Both arguments stress human uniqueness and argue that, to be 
properly moral human beings, we must allow animals a right to justice. In 
35 
essence, it would appear from both sides of the argument that to define us 
as authentically human and to protect our human status we must remove 
ourselves from the animal and remove the animal from ourselves. In either 
case, we must not behave like them. 'Our animal nature exists already as 
a Trojan horse within the human gates. Only constant vigilance can stop it 
playing an active part in human life (Midgley 1988, 35). For members of the 
contemporary animal rights movement these concerns translate themselves 
into practices. These practices are an attempt to remove all traces of animal 
use or oppression from their lives in the construction of their own model of the 
authentically human being. 
Historically the themes which have preoccupied those concerned with 
the subject of human and animal definition, and the relationships between 
these categories, have been those of the human capacities for reason, 
language, and the ability to suffer pain and experience pleasure. The debate 
also involves classification, although not always overtly. What is human/what 
is an animal and what do we dolwhat do we not do as proper human beings? 
Who are we as authentically human beings and who are the others who are 
not as we? The answers to these questions demonstrate unstable 
classifications in different historical conditions. 
Richard Tapper contends that in urban industrial society animals are 
marginalized and in contemporary Western society all that remain are 'the 
animals of the mind' (Tapper 1988, 56). In modern British history it was the 
process of transition to an urban industrial society from a predominantly rural 
one that was the social background to the lengthy debate over animals, from 
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. During this period, as animals 
became more marginalized from human social experience, they appeared to 
become conflated in the minds of certain members of society, with human 
'Others' namely the emergent new industrial working class. In order to 
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elucidate this point, I propose to journey through the philosophical debate 
over the issues of humanity and animality in the following section and then 
turn my attention to the social and cultural backgrounds which inform and 
activate these discussions in the next chapter. 
2.4 The Philosophical Debate 
Where has the modern Western debate over the status of the animal 
and any consequent rights, sprung from? For many people the discussion 
over animal rights began with the publication of Peter Singer's Animal 
Liberation in 1975. Singer'however, was treading a furrow already ploughed 
two hundred years before, the ground for which had been prepared in 
antiquity. Some of the thematic strands of the debate introduced by such 
thinkers as Aristotle and Pythagoras in Ancient Greece and Plutarch in 
Ancient Rome have been reiterated from then on until the present day 
(Sorabji 1993,2). As my concerns here are with modern Britain, I can only 
acknowledge that the debates over animals capabilities for reason, speech 
and the ability to suffer pain and pleasure were addressed in the Greek world 
by Aristotle, and the Stoics who stressed the superiority and uniqueness of 
humanity and removed animals from the moral community. These views 
were opposed by Pythagorean and Platonist views, but the importance of this 
debate for my purposes is that it was Aristotelian and Stoic views which were 
adopted into pre-Christian and Christian thought, a thought style which still 
dominates today in Western attitudes to animals (Sorabji 1993, 8 Singer 
1975 189). 
Ideas of human uniqueness, and the perceived lack of reason and 
speech in animals were carried on into Christian attitudes, together with 
ancient Hebrew biblical notions of humanity's superiority to animals and the 
granting of dominion to man over animals by God, as exemplified in the 
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creation story a common motif in Judeo-Christian culture (Sorabji 1993, 8; 
Singer 1975, 186; White 1967, 1205). 
2.4.1 The Traditional Christian World View 
Genesis 1 :26-28 grants dominion over the earth and its inhabitants to 
humanity and Genesis 9:2-3 allows humanity to satisfy their needs through 
the use and killing of animals without guilt. Powerful Christian figures such 
as Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas reinforced these attitudes 'It matters 
not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to 
man's power' (St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, II cited in Singer 
1975, 195). Contemporary theologian and animal rights activist, Andrew 
Linzey contends that the legacy of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas has 
'helped to support years of indifference and wantonness towards animal life' 
(Linzey 1987, 28). Professor John Passmore contends that the Hebrew 
interpretation and later the Christian interpretation, stem from humanity's 
concern to explain an ambivalent relationship with the natural world. 
Humanity's unique achievement in domesticating other species implied 
human superiority of capability and reason, but our own violence towards 
these other species reveals a baser nature. The biblical Fall of Man can be 
referred to as a justification for this brutality. If it were not for the Fall, human 
beings 'would have been vegetarians, they would not have had to live by 
violence ... ' (Passmore 1974, 7). Genesis is a charter that allows human 
beings to forgive themselves, by portraying violence towards other animals 
as a quest for subsistence. For animal rights activists, however, this appears 
to be part of their own punishment for breaking faith with God. 
The absence of guilt or moral questioning over the use of animals, held 
in place by a consensual acceptance of this divinely appointed dominion, 
began to be questioned by some Western thinkers from the seventeenth 
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century onwards (Maehle 1994, 81). Christians, who so far in this discussion, 
have stood J3ccused as representing the ideological buttress upon which the 
exploitation of animals has been supported, entered into the debate in 
several defences of animals and defences of human treatment of them. 
During the seventeenth century, the Christian interpretation of the 
Bible regarding the treatment of animals as part of humanity's God-given 
dominion still prevailed. It was during this century that 'the most painful 
outcome of Christian doctrine emerged' (Singer 1975, 200). The seventeenth 
century saw the publication of Rene Descartes' 'Discourse de la Methode' 
(1637), which theorised that human beings and animals could be compared 
to machines or automata. The response to Descartes theory was to propel 
a moral debate which continues to the present day. 
Descartes pointed out two differences apparent to him between 
humans and animals. Following in the steps of Aristotle and Aquinas, 
Descartes opined that animals had no form of speech and no reason (and for 
him, therefore, no souls). 'In contrast to the human body, the bodies of 
animals were supposed to operate without the guidance of a non-corporeal 
principle' (Maehle 194, 86). According to Peter Singer, what persuaded 
Descartes to this view was the fact that whilst he was a modern thinker, he 
was also a Christian. As a result of this, whilst his theory was influenced by 
'the new science of mechanics' (Singer 1975, 200), and was based on 
mechanistic principles, his Christian principles prevented him from attacking 
the uniqueness of humanity. Conceiving of human beings as only another 
part of the material world, governed by mere mechanistic principles, would be 
to diminish our position in God's hierarchical creation, to that of the animal. 
Descartes, therefore, constructed a theory which protected the notion 
of human uniqueness. In essence he protected humanity's uniqueness by 
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equating the possession of a soul to consciousness. He contended that 
neither of these attributes had their origins in the material world, but were part 
of the spiritual world, God-given and unique to humanity. The result of his 
theory was that as a soul was unique to man and consciousness was part of 
that soul, then animals did not have consciousness and, therefore, did not 
feel pain. They were merely automata (Singer 1975, 200). Descartes had 
described the process of blood circulation, (only then recently discovered by 
William Harvey) and the suggestion that animals were without souls or 
sensation provided an opportunity for budding vivisectors to use animals 
without guilt in order to observe the phenomenon of circulation (Maehle 1994, 
87). The actions of the vivisectors prompted a debate that proceeded into 
the eighteenth century, the themes of which involved the capacity for animal 
speech, animal feeling and the possession of an immortal animal soul 
(Maehle 1994, 87). 
2.4.2 The Enlightenment and Onwards with the Emergence of 
Diverse World Views 
Prominent protagonists in the debate during the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were middle and upper class people 
educated in a Christian tradition, many of whom were clerics. The eighteenth 
century produced a revolution in human thought. The Rights of Man by Tom 
Paine, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman by Mary Woolstencraft, the 
Declaration of Independence, the Fragment on Government, The Wealth of 
Nations and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, were all published 
during this revolutionary century (Passmore 1974, 115; Turner 1980, 10-11). 
In their company came several pleas for justice for animals. Although the 
Catholic position on the usage of animals remained that of Aquinas, certain 
Protestant and Non-Conformist thinkers entered into the debate over the 
morality of killing animals and inflicting unnecessary cruelty upon them. The 
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Reverend John Hildrop and the Reverend Humphrey Primatt, both used 
Proverbs 12.10 to argue for care and respect for animal life (Maehle 1994, 
83). Maehle contends that writers such as Hildrop heralded discussions on 
animal welfare which were based on animal consciousness (Maehle 1994, 
88). 
James Turner cites the year 1776 as 'that revolutionary annus 
mirabilis' in which the Reverend Humphrey Primatt's Dissertation on the Duty 
of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals was published, as a turning 
point in the consideration of the treatment of animals. In Turner's view 
Humphrey Primatt revolutionised thinking about animals by negating all 
previous discussions of reason and speech as criteria admissible in the 
debate, and replaced them with notions of animal sentiency (Turner 1980, 
11 ). 
Pain is pain, whether it be inflicted on man or on beast; and the 
creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, being sensible 
of the misery of it while it lasts, suffers Evil' (Primatt 1992, 21). 
Primatt coupled animals' potential capacity to suffer pain and to feel 
pleasure, with the notion that they were God's creations. It was thus 
irreverential to God to inflict cruelty upon them and there was a duty upon 
humanity to show mercy. By the use of biblical exegesis Primatt also 
confronted Christians who did not respect and care for animals in the 
polemical language of accusations of heresy and atheism and of a failure to 
understand the gospel of Christ. 
For, indeed a cruel Christian is a monster of ingratitude, a 
scandal to his profession and beareth the name of Christ in 
vain: and in vain will he plead the mercies of God in Christ 
Jesus, when he appeareth before the God of universal nature 
(Primatt 1992, 126) 
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The popular concept of the 'Great Chain of Being' also coloured the 
debate. Although hierarchical and anthropocentric in its nature, the notion of 
a 'Great Chain of Being' implied a varying degree of relatedness and similarity 
between different beings. Writers such as Hildrop and Primatt used this 
connection in the Great Chain to advance the notion of animal sensation and 
the compassion due to suffering beings who, although they may not have had 
the same intellectual capacities as ourselves, were involved in a type of 
mutual kinship. The proposal of an animal soul and a kinship created by the 
'Great Chain' were attempts to breach the gap between human and animal 
created by Cartesian thought (Maehle 1994, 89). 
During the eighteenth century the defence of animals based on the 
possession of a soul and a place in the 'Great Chain of Being' was taken up 
frequently, but the question of dominion over them, granted by God, was not 
challenged. However, a debate about animals' natural right to justice which 
began in the seventeenth century was continued into the eighteenth(Maehle 
1994, 89). Following in the tradition of the Stoics, Augustine and Aquinas, 
the school of natural right in the seventeenth century had based their 
exclusion of animals from the moral community on the grounds that as 
animals lacked reason, they could not enter into contractual obligations and 
therefore did not have a claim to natural right or justice from humanity 
(Juchem 1940 cited in Maehle 1994, 90). The British philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes, also argued that, as animals lacked reason and speech they could 
not form a contract with human beings and this barred them from any claim 
to rights. However, the Scottish philosopher David Hume, in his Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) put forward a view of indirect 
obligations to animals. He also excluded animals from a contractual moral 
community, due to their inequality to humans, but proposed that we 'should 
be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures' 
(Hume 1964, IV, 185 cited in Maehle 1994,91). The notion that natural right 
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was the province of humanity, and animals were excluded from it, was not 
challenged until the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
Frances Hutcheson, another Scottish philosopher, in his System of 
Moral Philosophy (1755) proposed that animals had a right not to suffer at the 
hands of humanity, as long as this did not interfere with human need (Maehle 
1994,92). 
2.4.3 Humanity - Morally Moulded by Society? 
Another strand to the eighteenth century debate was that indulgence 
in cruelty to animals could corrupt and brutalise humans (Maehle 1994, 83-
84). This view was supported by Immanuel Kant (Maehle 1994, 91; Singer 
1975, 203). Humphrey Primatt, whilst believing that inflicting cruelty upon 
animals was morally damaging to humanity, turned away from the notion of 
encouraging merciful benevolence towards animals for the sake of one's own 
humanity, and instead condemned cruelty because of the suffering 
experienced by the victim of the cruelty, the animal (Primatt 1992). 
The seventeenth and eighteenth century view of the biblical granting 
of dominion was a view that humanity had been granted stewardship over 
God's creation, with a responsibility of care (Maehle 1994, 84-85). This was 
not challenged by Primatt, who considered that animals were subordinate to 
humans. In removing reason from his criteria of whether animals had rights, 
Primatt's method reflected his belief that humanity was superior to animals 
through the possession of reason and a soul. Linzey points out that in 
Primatt's view, animal suffering was in fact worse than human suffering, 
because they had no immortal soul. 'If animals are not to be recompensed 
with an eternal life, how much more difficult must it be to justify their temporal 
sufferings' (Linzey 1987, 57). As animals are without reason, then Primatt 
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proposed they could not perform immoral acts, nor understand or endure 
physical pain as a punishment (Primatt 1992, 97-100). Primatt's methodology 
reinforced human superiority, but granted the animal the right to freedom from 
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cruelty from its superiors (Turner 1980, 12). 
In introducing sentiency as a criterion for the extension of compassion 
to animals, Primatt introduced a criterion which was to be taken up by other 
thinkers. Primatt dismissed notions of difference or similarity in physical 
appearance and the absence of reason as criteria from excluding animals 
from rights to respect and care and denied humanity's natural right to ill use 
animals, as both had been created by God (Maehle 1994, 98). But as noted 
before, whilst Primatt maintained that both humans and animals were sentient 
beings and as such both could experience suffering, he continued a tradition 
of human superiority, based on a lack of reason in the animal, and maintained 
the discrete classifications of Human and Animal. 
This line of reasoning preceded the more well known founder of the 
utilitarian movement Jeremy Bentham. Bentham too, dismissed rationality 
and speech as criteria for the acquisition of rights and replaced these with the 
capacity to suffer. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (1789), he proposed; 
The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can 
they talk? But Can they suffer? (Bentham [1789] 
1960,412) 
Singer contends that whilst Bentham uses the term 'rights' elsewhere 
in the passage from which this quotation is taken, that what is meant is 
equality, as in later passages Bentham refers to rights as 'nonsense' ( Singer 
1975, 8). 'He talked of moral rights as a shorthand way of referring to 
protections that people and animals morally ought to have ... on the basis of 
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the possibilities for suffering and happiness' (Singer 1975, 8). Central to 
Bentham's philosophy were the capacities to feel pain and pleasure, and 
utility he expressed as 'that property in any object whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness ... or ... to prevent 
the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose 
interest is considered' (Bentham [1789] 1968-84,11.1: 11-12 cited in Maehle 
1994, 91). 
Bentham did not restrict the pursuit of utility to human beings, but also 
contended that animals had interests in the pursuit of utility. Bentham 
appears to have negated difference between Human and Animal on the basis 
of the common pursuit of utility by both, and their common capacity to suffer, 
making them 'morally comparable' (Tester 1991, 97). 
Tester, however, contends that what Bentham is actually doing is 
asking a question that only Bentham and like minded humans can answer. 
Bentham is thereby, stressing the difference between Human and Animal, 
subordinating 'animals to the benevolence of those humans who 'know best" 
, like himself (Tester 1991, 97). The Human has knowledge and the animal 
has not, the Human can act upon that knowledge to improve himself, the 
animal cannot. Human and animal are sentient, and therefore similar, but the 
Human has knowledge and a society, giving the Human the ability to become 
different from the animal and to morally improve. 'Bentham wanted to 
embrace animals whilst exterminating animality' (Tester 1991, 98). 
Both Bentham and Kant reflected a growing concern during the 
eighteenth century over the status of humanity. Bentham sought to 
differentiate Human from animal by superiority of knowledge, both moral and 
social. The avoidance of cruelty to animals was an indirect obligation due to 
that superior knowledge and defined for Bentham what was authentically 
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human. Kant, developed his concept of indirect obligations to animals 
because of the detrimental effect on human behaviour towards other humans, 
which cruelty to animals may encourage. Bentham also strongly and actively 
opposed slavery and equated the oppression of the slaves with that of 
animals (Passmore 1974, 114) 
For Bentham, Kant and Primatt, then, social knowledge and the ability 
to overcome the animal part of humanity, differentiated Human from Animal, 
making the human unique. For these thinkers the authentic human being 
is a social being - apart from Nature and moulded by Culture. For another set 
of thinkers, led by the philosopher Rousseau, it was society and culture that 
had polluted the true nature of humanity and corrupted our relationship with 
animals. 
2.4.4 Humanity - 'Naturally' Moral? 
During the early eighteenth century Rousseau presented his definition 
of the authentically human as 'Man' the 'Noble Savage' corrupted by society 
into becoming cruel and selfish (Tester 1991,125). For Rousseau, humanity 
was organically similar to animals and both were sentient, but animals were 
without reason or free will. The inability to understand natural law or justice, 
however, in his view should not exclude animals from natural right: 
It seems, in fact, that if I am obliged to refrain from doing any 
harm to my neighbour, it is less because he is a re~sonable 
being than because he is a sentient one; and a quality which is 
common to beast and man ought to give the former the right 
not to be uselessly ill-treated by the latter (Rousseau 1984, 71 
cited in Tester 1991, 131). 
For Rousseau, humanity in a natural state was good, and culture and 
society corrupted this nature. His concept of the authentically human as the 
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'Noble Savage' was eagerly adopted by certain individuals such as Joseph 
Ritson and John Oswald who have heavily contributed to the history of 
Animal Rights activism. These thinkers were disillusioned by society and 
argued for revolution. Joseph Ritson an eighteenth century pamphleteer, 
John Oswald a Scottish soldier who had been influenced in India by Hindu 
beliefs and who fought for the French Revolution and Percy Bysshe Shelley 
the radical Romantic poet were greatly influenced by Rousseau's theory. 
It is with these thinkers that we see the appearance of one of the most 
important aspects of contemporary Animal Rights, the concept of 
vegetarianism or the 'natural diet' as a source of moral evolution and 
enactment of civilization in producing the authentically human. 
Tester contends that the protagonists such as Bentham, Primatt and 
Kant who defined the properly human as different from animals, as cultural 
and knowledgeable social beings, were those most involved with society and 
moulding humanity into proper habits. Those who defined the properly 
human as similar to animals, and culture and society as the pollutants which 
corrupt true human nature, were intellectuals who had turned their back on 
society such as Rousseau, Ritson and Shelley who rejected urban life (Tester 
1991,145) 
Whilst both discourses are manifestly involved with the treatment of 
non-human animals by human beings, latently common to them both is the 
pursuit of a definition of the authentically human. In examining the 
philosophical roots of the animal rights movement, we discover a search for 
a definition of what it is to be authentically human, informed by utilitarianism 
and notions of brotherly love amongst humanity extended to encompass other 
species. The 'rights' expressed in the debate, so far, were those of a right of 
the animal to compassion from Humanity, such compassion being a 
necessary ingredient for human authenticity. This compassion was based 
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upon utilitarian claims which recognized animals as sentient but unequal in 
comparison to humanity. 
Animal Rights, in short, included only the enjoyment of possible 
pleasure and freedom from unnecessary pain. Moreover, they 
always remained subject to the superior rights of people 
(Turner 1980,131-132) 
The discourse over whether the rights of animals could be considered 
as equal to the rights of human beings did not appear until the late 
nineteenth century. 
2.4.5 The Appearance of the Contemporary 'Animal Rights' Debate 
None of the previous debates fully concentrated on animal rights per 
se, only on what is Human in opposition to what is animal and what that 
means with reference to our relationships with animals. The issue of animal 
'rights' appeared at the end of the nineteenth century with the appearance of 
Henry Salt's book Animal Rights in Relation to Social Progress which 
gathered up the threads of the previous traditions into an all encompassing 
theory (Tester 1991 149-1"50). In 1894 Henry Salt took up the concepts 
expressed in the eighteenth century and from these constructed a new theory 
of animal rights (Maehle 1994, 100-101). Salt 'preached neither petting nor 
persecution, but benevolent neutrality. Let animals lead their own, natural 
lives rather than act out human wishes (Turner 1980, 136). 
Tester proposes that Salt was transformed from the life and wortd view 
of a typical Victorian gentleman when; 'He began to see with the alien eye of 
the anthropologist' (Tester 1991, 151). What provoked this transformation 
is unclear, but Salt a master at Eton did hold amongst his social circle, 
George Bernard Shaw, a noted vegetarian and Salt's wife, Kate Joynes was 
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an avid admirer of Shaw. She was also an exponent of the simple life which 
allowed one to keep 'in touch with the countryside and true human 
sensibilities' (Tester 1993, 151). Salt's wife's attempts to keep in touch with 
'true human sensibilities' or what I would term.the authentically human may 
have affected Salt's own views. In his own words over the years he had 
accepted the social order in England 'as part of the natural order' (Salt 1921: 
8-9), until his own 'fateful moment' or 'moral shock', which Tester proposes 
presumably arrived when he was at the dinner table (Tester 1991: 150). 
Salt's autobiography of his life in England Seventy Years Among 
Savages, reveals what Tester sees as an anthropological view, but this title 
also reflects the effect of having one's world view totally changed. Once 
civilized Eton masters become revealed as uncivilized due to their blood diet, 
their unauthenticity is revealed and Salt's search for the authentically human 
begins. 
Thus gradually the conviction had been forced on me that we 
Eton masters, however irreproachable our surroundings, were 
but cannibals in cap and gown - almost literally cannibals, as 
devouring the flesh and blood of the higher non-human animals 
so closely akin to us (Salt 1921, 64) 
Salt resigned from Eton in 1884 and retired from the world to live in 
simplicity. In 1888 he published a monograph on Shelley publicly supporting 
his views on the 'natural diet'. By 1894 Salt had produced a theory for the 
rights of animals which usurped the exalted place of humanity and reconciled 
the contradictions revealed in previous discourses. (Tester 1991: 151) 
For Salt, human relationships with animals were dominated by 'that 
old anthropocentric superstition which pictures Man as the centre of the 
universe, and separate from the inferior animals ... by a deep intervening gulf 
(Salt [1894] 1980, 13). Salt sought to breach this gulf by persuading human 
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beings to recognise a kinship with other animals contending that 'the basis of 
any real morality must be the sense of Kinship between all living beings' (Salt 
1935, viii). 
Salt proposed that, humans and animals were essentially the same, 
each were sentient, each had individual inherent value. Humanity may be the 
moral animal, but as such is no more morally relevant than any other living 
creature. Salt dismissed the discrete categories of 'Human' and 'Animal' and 
in the language of his times, referred to animals as the 'lower races'. Central 
to humanity's disregard for the moral relevancy of animals, for Salt, was the 
use of language which objectified them; 'the common use of such terms as 
'brute-beast, 'livestock' etc., which implicitly deny to the lower races that 
intelligent individuality which is most undoubtedly possessed by them' (Salt 
1980, 17). 
Salt took the two opposing arguments put forward in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century and reconciled them. Salt, in effect, 
condemned all social relationships with other animals unless it was on an 
equalitarian basis (Salt 1980). This he based on his view that all living 
creatures have an individual and inherent value and are therefore morally 
relevant. Following the tradition of Bentham and Kant, he also echoed the 
view that the ill usage of animals by humanity would lead to an ill usage of 
our fellow humans. Whilst abhorring the killing of animals for human food, 
Salt also viewed 'sports' such as hunting as a rehearsal for the abominations 
of war and in reviewing the carnage of the First World War commented: 
As long as man kills the lower races for food or sport, he will 
be ready to kill his own race for enmity. It is not this bloodshed 
or that bloodshed, that must cease, but all needless bloodshed 
- all wanton infliction of pain or death upon our fellow beings 
(Salt cited in Adams 1990, 126). 
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Henry Salt in his search for the authentically human, produced a 
theory that emphasized a compassion for all things. Thinking, as Levi-
Strauss would put it, with animals, he constructed a model for the 
authentically human, which has been taken up by contemporary philosophers. 
In the main unread other than by the intellectuals of his day, Henry Salt, is 
now recognized as the father of contemporary animal rights by the present 
day philosophers Tom Regan, Peter Singer and Andrew Linzey and has been 
republished. In Chapter 4 I will discuss how the discovery of Salt's works 
helped to authenticate the intellectual stance of the present day animal rights 
philosophers. 
2.4.6 The Contemporary Debate 
Henry Salt's text, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social 
Progress was first published in 1894 and after a long silence on the subject 
by intellectuals, it again began to be discussed in learned circles during the 
nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies. Peter Singer's book Animal 
Liberation was published in 1975, its popularity leading to it being reprinted 
in 1990 and 1995. Following Bentham in a utilitarian tradition, Singer avoids 
any notion of rights and prefers a principle of equality. 'The principle of the 
equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality 
among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings' 
(Singer 1975, 5). Singer proposes that this principle of equality be extended 
to non-human animals based on the possession of interests, interests based 
on sentience. 'The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is, ... not only 
necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has interests - at an 
absolute minimum, an interest in not suffering' (Singer 1975, 8). 
Following Bentham, Singer claims that this is the sole criterion which 
can be judged to be authentic. He contends that criteria such as physical 
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appearance or intellectual capacities are irrelevant. As the use of skin colour 
as a criterion for moral relevance is racist, so for Singer to discriminate 
against animals because of physical appearance is 'speciesist' (Singer 1975, 
9). Again, following both Bentham and Salt, Singer declares 'all animals are 
equal', but we can see that there is an animal more equal than others, the 
human moral animal. Because animals are unable to protest for themselves, 
the authentic human being must refrain from all exploitation of animals and 
must become an advocate for them. Singer's book is a searing indictment of 
human uses of animals in both laboratories and factory farms and combines 
ethical philosophy with expose and a 'call to arms'. Whilst Singer does not 
explicitly condemn pet keeping as Salt did, his condemnation of it is implicit 
in the preface of the book. (Singer 1975, ii). 
Singer's "Animal Liberation" was followed by the publication of 
American philosopher Tom Regan's book The Case for Animal Rights in 
1984. Whereas Singer's book can be read both as a philosophical work and 
a handbook for action, Regan's book is a far more profound examination of 
the question and criticises Singer's utilitarian argument. In Regan's view the 
utilitarian position is one that, whilst taking account of individual sentient 
beings' preference not to suffer, subsumes it to the preference of the many. 
This position overrides the preference of the individual not to suffer, which 
removes protection from that individual. Regan concentrates on the defence 
of the individual. Regan's view is a 'rights' view based on intrinsic individual 
value, not a utilitarian one. All life that has preferences, sentience, emotions, 
goals and an identity over time has an intrinsic value (Regan 1984, 264). 
Regan addresses reason and, like the Stoics, Hobbes and Primatt 
before him, concedes that animals are not moral agents, like human beings. 
They cannot enter into contractual obligations with humanity, they are moral 
patients, in need of moral guardians, as are some human beings, who we do 
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not exclude from the moral community, such as infants, coma victims, the 
mentally ill and disadvantaged. 
Following Salt and in opposition to previous thinkers such as Bentham, 
therefore, he considers animals are not of less inherent value than human 
beings, as human beings can be both a moral agent and a moral patient. To 
cause harm to any subject of a life whether a moral agent or a moral patient 
'causally detracts from their individual welfare' (Regan 1984, 243). Regan 
agrees with Singer that human beings are animals, and 'all animals are 
equal', but he bases it on inherent value, not preferences. 'All animals are 
equal, when the notions of 'animal' and 'equality' are properly understood, 
'animal' referring to all (terrestrial, at least) moral agents and patients, and 
'equality' referring to their equal possession of inherent value. Inherent value 
is thus a categorical concept' (Regan 1984, 240). 
Like Singer, Regan eschews meat eating, animal experimentation or 
using animals towards any human ends, because this denies their inherent 
value (Regan 1984, 350-351). Again we find the authentically human being 
leaves animals alone, because to do otherwise means entering into an 
unequal relationship with them which pollutes the authentically human. 
Andrew Linzey, the last member of the triumvirate of present day 
animal rights philosophy, published Christianity and the Rights of Animals in 
1987 and attempts to answer accusations from such sources as Peter Singer 
(1975) and Lynn White Jr (1967), that Christianity has neglected any 
responsibilities for the welfare of animals and been so heavily responsible for 
the oppression of the natural world, as to threaten the whole eco-system 
(Linzey 1987, 23). Linzey does not deny traditional Christianity's past, but 
attributes it to a misguided view of the Bible. Following in the tradition of 
Humphrey Primatt, Linzey uses biblical exegesis to promote his view that 
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under Christianity, animals should be due certain rights. 
Linzey agrees that past and present Christian teaching has been 
anthropocentric and dwelt largely on the relationships among human beings 
and the relationship between humanity and God. Interpretations of biblical 
'Dominion' have been hierarchical, with humanity in a position of absolute 
power over nature. The traditional notion of 'Dominion' is rejected by Linzey 
who contends that what is meant is 'Stewardship' , which involves 
responsibility. Where Dominion has been stressed, Linzey contends that 
God's covenant with humanity and the natural world has been neglected. 
This covenant allows for Spirit 'which is the basis of all life' (Linzey 1987,31). 
For Linzey, humanity has no rights over animals only duties, and animals 
have the right to live in freedom filled with God's Spirit. (Linzey 1987, 29). 
Linzey takes a viewpoint shared with Regan, that animals should not be 
harmed because of their individual intrinsic value. 'All creatures, large and 
small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient have worth' 
(Linzey 1987, 9). For Linzey respect for animal rights involves all of the 
behavioural actions expected from the Singer and Regan views. He 
condemns pet keeping, meat eating, experimentation and any exploitative 
social contact with animals. To indulge in these practices damages our 
status as the moral animal or the authentically human being. 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
Singer, Regan and Linzey are the pre-eminent intellectual advocates 
for animal rights of the present day in Britain at least. Interestingly, the 
substance of their arguments contains nothing persuasive enough actually to 
change the dominant views of mass society in our relationships with animals. 
The themes which occupied the eighteenth and nineteenth century are 
repeated in the present. The question to address here is why these themes 
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have arisen in a cyclical way. The debates over animals contributed to the 
birth, in the nineteenth century of the American humane movement (Maehle 
1994, 100), and the debates when set in the social and cultural constructs of 
their times, clearly demonstrate that 'animals are good to think'. In the next 
Chapter I will be addressing the social and cultural background which 
informed the discussions of humanity and animality during the periods 
covered in the previous discussion, and prompted the protagonists to think 
as they did. 
As I noted above Clifford Geertz points out that no matter what else 
the study of anthropology highlights it is convinced of the fact that the 
condition of humanity is not uniform, concepts of humanity are a production 
of ' ... time, place, and circumstances, of studies and professions, transient 
fashions and temporary opinions' (Geertz 1973, 35). Geertz's contention, 
following Max Weber that humanity , ... is ... suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun.' (Geertz 1973, 5). That the strands of this 
web are informed by time, place, circumstances, studies and professions are 
amply illustrated by the social background which informed the philosophical 
debates. 
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3.1 Introduction 
3 
CULTURAL WARFARE 
The philosophical debates over cruelty and kindness to animals and 
,whether animals had any claim to rights were closely related to the changes 
taking place in Western European human society resulting from changes in 
the economic production of peoples' lives. The ever increasing pace of 
industrialization and urbanisation and a changing social order heavily 
influenced the emergence and influence of the debates. In the year 1700, 
three quarters of the people in Britain were rural dwellers, only 13% of the 
population lived in towns with over 5,000 inhabitants. By 1800 the proportion 
living in towns was 25%(Thomas 1983, 243). By 1881 70.2% of the 
population of England and Wales lived in towns (Best 1971, 24). 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the town had been 
considered the home of the civilized and sophisticated and the country that 
of the uncouth. By the mid- eighteenth century, the country and the natural 
world had begun to be idealized in the minds of urbanites and its virtues 
expounded by poets like Shelley, Burns and Pope. Removal from traditional 
agricultural production and an increasingly industrial and capital economic 
base, which necessitated a concentration of the human population in towns, 
also saw the rise of a new 'class' of people, prepared to engag'e in a battle for 
cultural supremacy. 
3.2 The Rise of the Pensee Bourgeoises 
In the native conception, the economy is an arena of pragmatic 
action. And society is the formal outcome. The main relations 
of class and politics, as well as the conceptions men entertain 
of nature and of themselves, are generated by this rational 
pursuit of material happiness (Sahlins 1976, 167) 
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thinking with animals' in the cultural complexity of Western 
societies needs to be related to the historical processes of 
class formation and conflict, cultural hegemony and resistance, 
as well as to a discussion of the material experiences behind 
the production, reproduction and change of such cognitive 
systems over time (Lofgren 1985, 186) 
In the pursuit of material happiness, people transform their worlds. 
Keith Thomas, in his discussion of 'Man and the Natural World', contends that 
to understand present day environmental concerns in Britain and concerns 
over humanity's relationship with other animals 'we must go back to the early 
modern period' (Thomas 1983, 15) where the social world was in 
transformation. 'It is impossible to disentangle what the people of the past 
thought about plants and animals from what they thought about themselves' 
(Thomas 1983, 16). It was during the period 1500-1800 that changes in the 
social lives of people in Britain led to a re-evaluation of their attitudes to 
nature, to themselves and specifically to animals (Thomas 1983, 15). During 
this period we see the rise of what Sahlins terms the 'Pen see Bourgeoise' 
(The Middle Class Mind), the educated, urban male middle class capitalist, 
seeking a place in the social order and constructing a model of the 
authentically human which reflected their own cultural categories. 
Thomas considers that Lynn White Jnr's (1967) accusation that 
Christianity had brought about the rape of the natural world is an 
exaggeration. In reality it was the advent of capitalism and industrial society 
supported by a religious ideology that stressed humanity's God-given 
superiority, and the dominion give to humanity, which allowed the plunder of 
the planet (Thomas 1983, 23). The main protagonists in the debates over 
cruelty and kindness to animals during this period were drawn from an 
emergent middle class, in its nature both urban and intellectual. Orvar 
57 
Lofgren discusses the parallel rise of Sahlins's Pensee Bourgeoise in 
Sweden during the same period of social and cultural change and how 
'thinking with animals, ... reflected their culture-building, their self-
representation and their cultural warfare with other groups' (Lofgren 1985, 
186). 
Lofgren contends that the rise of the educated middle class male as 
the paradigm for the properly human and the middle class world view as a 
dominant world view in Europe, was not solely due to a changing mode of 
production and ideology, but was inextricably linked to the struggle of the new 
middle class to achieve political and· social supremacy over the feudal 
aristocracy and the lower classes. As Thomas points out 'it was almost 
impossible to reflect on animals' during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries 'without being distracted by the conflicting perceptions imposed by 
social class' (Thomas 1983, 184). 
The hunting pursuits of the aristocracy and its militaristic overtones 
were considered by the middle class professionals as decadent, time-wasting 
and expensive. The working classes saw such pastimes as symbolic of the 
privilege of aristocracy and the animals involved with such privilege, such as 
dogs and horses, frequently became the targets of cruelty by the working 
class in protest at their own conditions (Thomas 1983, 184). The leisure 
pastimes of the working classes such as bear-baiting were also viewed by the 
emergent capitalist middle-class as brutal and time-wasting in a world which 
the middle-classes were actively engaged in moulding, the world of urban 
industry. The entrepreneurial middle class began to engage itself with their 
own definition of the authentically human through its own discourse over 
cruelty and kindness to animals. 
Central to the eighteenth century European Enlightenment's 
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interpretation of history, was the notion of the rise of humanity over the 
natural world and other species which was intrinsically interwoven with ideas 
about 'civilization' (Thomas 1983, 28). In Britain, this had led to a jaundiced 
view of the animal world, as a mere foil to illuminate the brilliance of certain 
sections of humanity: 'It was as a comment on human nature that the concept 
of 'animality' was devised' (Thomas, 1983, 40). As Thomas points out, this 
had huge repercussions on the social relations between people (Thomas 
1983,41). 
For if the essence of humanity was defined as 
consisting in some specific quality, then it followed that 
any man who did not display that quality was subhuman, 
semi-animal (Thomas 1983, 41). 
Certain sections of humanity appeared, at this time, not to conform 
to the authentically human, the 'Negro', the Irish, children, young men of all 
classes, women, the mad, and particularly in Britain, the working class 
(Thomas 1983, 43). The definition of the authentically human at this time 
was personified by the educated, middle-class, middle-aged Englishman. 
The working class, devoid of education and living in abject poverty fell far 
below this definition, encouraging a classification of the poor as animal-like 
(Thomas 1983, 43). 
For the English sensibility at this time, high culture was central to 
humanity, those human groups who appeared devoid of this were consigned 
to the realm of animality. Thomas notes the eighteenth century London 
goldsmith who offered for sale 'silver padlocks for blacks or dogs' (Thomas 
1983, 45). The accoutrements of animal domestication were sold for the 
disciplining of women who transgressed male laws, bridles for the scold and 
halters for wives dispensed with at auction (see Thomas Hardy's novel The 
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Mayor of Casterbridge where the unfortunate wife and daughter are sold to 
a sailor by the future mayor in a moment of drunkenness). At all times, the 
poor were to be kept at bay and controlled (Thomas 1983, 45). 
In an attempt to establish the world view of the Pen see Bourgeoise 
as the dominant one, the middle class gentleman began to interest himself 
in structuring both the natural world and the social world into classifications 
which he himself constructed. Systems of classifying the 'natural' world were 
appropriated through the rise of new sciences created by the Pensee 
Bourgeoise and systems of classifying the social world were created by this 
new class whose image of the authentically human became a mirror image 
of themselves. 
3.2.1 Classification 
During the early Modem period, systems of classifying the natural 
world began to change. With the rise of the science of natural history, more 
detailed and less anthropocentric classifications began to develop. Although 
the perspectives of clerics and philosophers generally remained 
anthropocentric, the study of natural history began to erode these views, 
along with peoples' actual experiences of animals. 
It was the actual social relationships of people with animals which 
began to inform intellectual activity. At the beginning of the early modern 
. period, the agricultural worker was recognised as having a wide knowledge 
of the natural world and native systems of classification of that world that at 
its inception, the science of natural history depended upon. By the late 
seventeenth century, however, rural classifications of nature began to be 
dismissed as simply utilitarian and irrational (Thomas 1983, 70-80). 
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Rural knowledge having been appropriated by the scholarly middle 
class was transformed into classifications only accessible to the formally 
educated middle class. The nomenclature for use in the classification of 
plants and animals was also transformed from the native language to the 
scholar's language, Latin, using the Linnaean system of classification 
(Thomas 1983, 86). Thomas points out that by the end of the eighteenth 
century, communication regarding pests attacking crops had become 
impossible between rural workers and naturalists as they no longer spoke the 
same language and more than this, the rural worker's language was regarded 
as ignorant and ill-informed (Thomas 1983, 87). 
In addition to the appropriation and transformation of rural knowledge 
into 'sciences' accessible to only the educated middle class, Thomas points 
to another theme which threads its way through the middle-classes battle for 
dominance conducted through the naming of things: their project of moulding 
both the social and natural world into their own image of how it should be. 
The rural names for many plants and animals were considered to be too 
vulgar, many being based on human anatomy and bodily functions. Thus, 
they used Latin terminology and their own common names to suppress 
vulgarisms which revealed too much of the baser nature of the rural worker 
such as the evocative term 'bum-towel' for the long-tailed tit-mouse (Thomas 
1983, 85). To a certain extent they succeeded, but some terms for wild 
plants which Thomas contends were around in the seventeenth century were 
not completely expunged. The 'pissabed' (dandelion) is still referred to in 
contemporary Scotland and parts of Northern England as 'peethebed' and in 
France 'pisenlit'. 
We can thus see how middle class appropriation of the classifications 
of the natural world also involved classifying the social world, widening the 
gap between the uneducated rural dwellers and the educated urban middle 
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class. For the educated urban middle class the natural world was 
increasingly being seen through the science of natural history and latterly of 
zoology as independent of humanity and of value in its own right and no 
longer as a yardstick for the measure of humanity (Thomas 1983, 91). The 
development of science, technology and engineering throughout the 
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century had enabled human 
beings to perceive the natural world as manageable and under human 
control, removing human beings from its power and enabling human beings 
to take a more sentimental view of nature(Ritvo 1987, 3). 
Prior to this period, the separation of humanity and nature was 
demanded by the Church, but the reality of 'ordinary' peoples lives conflicted 
with this, and the reality of these people's lives left little room for 
sentimentality. Whilst domestic animals were kept either to eat or for work 
purposes, their proximity to humanity was much closer than is the case with 
modem husbandry. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe 
it was common practice for animals and humans to share the same 'Iong-
house', where people and animals slept under the same roof (Thomas 1983, 
95; Lofgren 1985, 187). James Turner points out that prior to 
industrialisation, people in the every day production of their lives were 
intimately involved with animals. They worked with, cared for and 
slaughtered animals for food, clothing and sport as part of the harsh realities 
of their lives (Turner 1980, 1). 
Even with the advent of urbanisation, the new town dwellers who had 
moved to the towns from rural areas to work in the new factories carried their 
rural habits with them and kept pigs and cows in the street, poultry and 
horses inside their houses (Thomas 1983, 95). Prior to urbanisation 
relationships between working people and their domestic animals was one of 
mutual symbiosis where the animals, whilst perhaps in the position of 
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servants, were part of a community involving themselves and human 
beings (Thomas 1983, 96). 
Up to the opening of the nineteenth century London's streets were full 
of dogs and horses engaged in working for human beings and crowds of 
human beings often mingled with flocks of sheep and herds of cattle on their 
way to Smithfield market (Ritvo 1994, 106). The suffering of these animals 
was highly visible and little regarded. Slaughterhouses had not been 
removed fully from the public gaze and no attempts to ease the painful end 
of the animals' lives were made. The pastimes of the working class involved 
various blood sports using domestic animals such as dog-fights and cock-
fights. Wild animals were used in baiting. The upper classes continued to 
hunt foxes and stags and wear out horses in steeplechasing (Ritvo 1994, 
106). It would appear that the philosophical debates of the previous century 
had little effect upon the lives of ordinary people or animals (Turner 1980, 15) 
As late as 1853, the English disregard for the sufferings of animals 
was reported upon and in 1868 Queen Victoria commented on the cruelty of 
her own subjects in their relationships with animals (Ritvo 1994, 107) 
However, by the end of that century kindness to animals had become known 
as a national trait (Ritvo 1994, 107). 
Why this should have become so, is often explained by the idea that 
industrialisation and urbanisation somehow promoted a new interest in the 
welfare of animals, perhaps due to a new sentimentality generated by the 
absence of animals in the cities and greater human control over nature. 
Whilst the notion of the 'Great Chain of Being' which was influential during the 
eighteenth century portrayed all forms of life as interconnected links in a 
chain, without a huge chasm between animals and human beings it was 
hierarchically ordered with humanity at its head, just below the angels. 
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Charles Darwin's Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, and 
Selection in Relation to Sex published in the mid-nineteenth century heavily 
influenced both professional and amateur scientists and his evolutionary 
theory which proposed human beings are animals became the subject of 
discussion amongst the 'chattering classes' of the time. When Darwin's 
theory combined with the long history of debates over compassion for 
animals, the already wavering belief in humanity's 'majestic isolation' was 
completely overthrown (Turner 1980, 6-7). On the Origin of Species (1859) 
removed the 'natural' hierarchy with humanity at the head and The Descent 
of Man. and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) proposed that not only was 
the human body animal in origin, but also the mind. (Ritvo 1987, 39). As a 
result of this a new era began where the educated middle class; 'As they sat 
by the fireside, examining fossils and stroking the dog ... could see that 
anthropocentrism was a myth' (Tester 1991,54). 
An alternative explanation may be found in the response of the new 
capitalist, educated middle class, whose re-ordering of material existence 
from the rural to the urban industrial resulted in the reordering of the symbolic 
world. For 'La Pensee Bourgeoise' the metaphorical animal rose to 
ascendance in the realm of symbolic thought. James Turner offers the 
explanation that the world of factory life was dominant in the city, the rural 
workers who had worked within the seasonally dominated natural world or 
who had worked as rural outworkers setting their own rhythm had now to 
work to the beat of the factory clock and machine (Turner 1980, 25). 
The continuation of the rural habits of living in close proximity with 
animals and enjoyment of traditional rural 'sports' within the urban 
environment may certainly have contributed to the middle class's view of the 
working class as animal like. More importantly the longevity of 'sports' such 
as bull baiting and the drunken behaviour which went hand-in-hand with the 
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'sport' threatened the efficient running of the factory system. Together with 
the longevity and perceived debauchery which accompanied sports such as 
bull baiting, rural sports had no physical space within the urban environment 
as the human population increased and buildings expanded (Turner 1980, 
27). 
With the growth in urbanisation animals which had supported the 
agrarian economy such as cows, sheep and pigs began to disappear from the 
urban landscape and working animals such as the dog and the horse also 
disappeared with increasing mechanisation. If, however, the relationship 
between humanity and the domestic animals who were their co-workers and 
their source of food, declined, another relationship with animals was on the 
rise. 
3.2.2 Pet Keeping 
Pet-keeping was increasingly becoming more and more popular 
(Thomas 1983, 104). Whilst the incidence of pet-keeping in Britain rose 
dramatically during the last two centuries and has been associated with 
urban living, Serpell (1986) and Tuan (1984) provide evidence of pet-keeping 
as a cross-cultural practice in many different cultural settings. So that whilst 
a rise in affluence and a retreat from nature in modern Britain goes partly to 
explain the rise of 'pet culture', the cross cultural evidence diminishes these 
factors as a full explanation. However, the increasing habit of keeping 
animals as 'pets' is considered to have influenced the increase in interest in 
and compassion towards animals and a growing 'sentimental 
anthropomorphism' of them in the Western mind (Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 17; 
Thomas 1983, 121). 
The arrival of certain favoured animals into the domestic sphere, 
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animals without a practical function, coincided with a change in the naming 
of animals, ever more frequently pets were given human names, which 
,stressed the intimacy between them and their human owners and increased 
their status within the human community. Jeremy Bentham was the owner 
of a cat called Sir John Lang born , whilst a close friend of Joseph Ritson 
named his dog, Ritson (Thomas 1983, 115). 
Levi-Strauss describes animals who are a part of human society in 
modem French culture, such as horses and dogs, as metonymical humans. 
Those animals, such as wild birds, who play no part in human society, but 
appear to have a developed social life which mirrors human social life, are 
classified as metaphorical human beings (Levi-Strauss 1966, 203-207). His 
contention is that the naming of things indicates how these things are 
classified in the human mind. Domestic animals, who are metonymical 
humans, cannot be given human names as their physical and social distance 
from humans is too near and the use of human names would blur the 
boundaries between human and animal. Metaphorical human beings, 
animals of the wild, however, can be given human names as they are so 
physically and socially distanced from ourselves. Whilst mirroring our own 
society, they provide us with a parallel society to use as a metaphorical 
referent. Hence, his contention is that domestic animals such as dogs cannot 
be given human names. This may be true for modern French society, but of 
course we know this to be untrue in British society where domestic pets are 
frequently given human names. 
In Britain, it was during the eighteenth century, that domestic animals 
ceased to be named after innate characteristics or attributes and began to 
be given human names. The giving of human names to certain domestic 
animals can be interpreted as the beginnings of a special intimate social 
relationship between human beings and certain animals that indicated a 
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blurring of the boundaries between human and animal. Pets became animals 
'more like me' (Leach 1964, 166). This heavily influenced all our relationships 
with animals and consequently our relations with each other as the definition 
of the authentically human increasingly became that of one who was kind to 
animals and betrayed no animal-like tendencies. 
Contrary to Levi-Strauss's theory, during the period of urbanisation and 
industrialisation in Britain, it was the metonymical which became the 
metaphorical. Pet keeping was the catalyst, according to Turner (1980) 
and Tester (1991). This is not the sole answer, however, because pet-
keeping in itself became part of the cultural battle of the new middle-class. 
Who were these pet keepers? Predominantly it was the urban middle 
class. Those who in their everyday lives had become removed from contact 
with most animals. During these times of increasing urbanisation and 
industrialization the 'urban middle class was the enthusiast for compassion 
and the protagonist for the Romantic view of nature' (Tester 1991, 55). 
Whilst sentimentalism grew, where a 'mythical' pastoral life became a symbol 
of a lost innocence, the pets of the middle class also became such a symbol. 
A familiarity with their pets' habits, in conjunction with a greater interest and 
knowledge of natural science led to a growing moral repugnance over the 
ill-usage of all animals within the world of the middle class and intellectuals. 
Love was not, however, the whole story (Ritvo 1987, 86) 
Social aspirations and a desire to mould the social world are reflected 
in the middle-class pre-occupation with pets, in particular dogs (Ritvo 1987, 
86). Prior to the emergence of the urban middle-classes, pet keeping 
amongst the aristocracy had been recorded since the Middle Ages and the 
British monarchy were well known for their love of their pet dogs(Ritvo 1987, 
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85). Outside the ranks of the aristocracy, pet keeping was relatively 
unknown until the eighteenth century and sentimental attachment to them 
was an upper class distinction up until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, but by the mid-nineteenth century the 'Victorian cult of pets was 
firmly established' (Ritvo 1987, 86) 
During this time we see the rise of the breeding and showing of dogs 
as an occupation of the urban professional and business middle class. For 
Ritvo these occupations reflected the middle class's desire to categorize the 
social world, for in these shows to establish breeds was 'a vision of a stable, 
hierarchical society, where rank was secure and individual merit, rather than 
just inherited position, appreciated' (Ritvo 1987, 84). Whilst not denying the 
sentimental attachment of the middle-classes to their pets, Ritvo points out 
that the keeping of useless decorative animals was an attempt to emulate the 
upper class and a great deal of money was to be made in the creation of 
breeds, the production of food for these pets and grooming apparatus for 
them. 
3.2.3 The Place of Legislation in Defining The Authentically Human 
As discussed previously, Lofgren points out that the new modern 
natural sciences which emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries must be viewed not only as an intellectual development, but part of 
a culture building process where a new ordering of the natural world was 
parallelled by a new order in the human social world. This had an impact on 
the distribution of knowledge, which was appropriated by the new middle 
class (Lofgren 1985, 193). The new science of zoology which had begun by 
examining exhibits in museums moved on to examining the interactions of the 
live animal, working with the rural peasant's folk knowledge and appropriating 
it and transforming this into 'science', eroding the belief in oral tradition and 
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replacing it with a written tradition accessible only to the middle class. 
The new scientists, however, did not simply classify animals as 
animals, the classifications were "impregnated with bourgeois values and 
parameters" (Lofgren 1985, 196). Animals were anthropomorphized and 
hierarchically ordered reflecting the middle class desire to place order into the 
human social world. The middle class also had an agenda for the re-
ordering of human society. In their cultural battle against the aristocracy and 
the lower classes, the new middle class modelled themselves in opposition 
to both these 'others'. 
The intellectual middle class were 'rational' and 'moral', those 
engaging in cruelty to animals, revealed their own animal nature 'Only people 
belonging to the lower stages of cultural development could live like animals' 
(Lofgren 1985, 198). The aristocracy and its privileges and militaristic 
tendencies were regarded as the remnants of feudalism, and the many 
discourses which took place over the morality of hunting were aimed at 
curbing a dissipated aristocracy (Thomas 1983, 184). The lower classes who 
had brought rural sports such as bull-baiting with them into the urban 
landscape, were similarly viewed as undesirable. During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the debates over kindness and cruelty to animals were 
inseparable from attempts to reform lower class habits into ones considered 
to be more suitable for industrial town workers; 
Love for the brute creation was frequently combined with 
distaste for the habits of the lower orders; and middle-class 
opinion was as outraged by the disorder which the animal 
sports created as by the cruelty involved (Thomas 1983, 186). 
In England this cultural battle propelled a discourse over bull-baiting, 
a rural pastime which had been brought into the town by the new industrial 
workers. Whilst rural life had been mythologised to represent a lost age of 
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innocence, the reality of the rural coming to town was frowned upon as a 
danger to the fabric of society. Political reformers, evangelical Christians and 
industrialists combined to rid England of this barbaric 'sport' (Turner 1980, 
21). The science of natural history which emerged in the eighteenth century 
had demonstrated the connections of humanity with the natural world and this 
knowledge had permeated through the educated population. By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century: 'No tolerably well read Englishman ... 
could escape the insinuation that he was uncomfortably close kin to his horse' 
(Turner 1980, 23). This extension of kinship and ultimately compassion 
influenced attitudes towards cruelty and kindness to animals, together with 
an uncomfortable perception that the unruly workers who attended bull-bating 
were 'a dark primitive horde' liable to be as brutal to each other as they were 
to animals (Turner 1980, 23). 
Even more influential than both these attitudes, was 'capital'. The new 
capitalists were eager to keep their costs down and their prOfits up. Blood 
sports such as bull baiting were not only undignified and cruel, but very 
lengthy affairs involving gambling and heavy drinking, threatened the 
industrial order and had to be curbed. Bills were brought to Parliament by 
Victorian worthies who shaped human destiny and involved themselves with 
the fate of animals as well. The first bill against bull baiting was moved by Sir 
William Wilberforce(1800), followed by an attempt by Baron Erskine (1809) 
and Richard Martin 'Humanity Dick' (1822). Wilberforce and Erskine failed, 
but Martin succeeded, with the backing of William Wilberforce and Thomas 
Fowell Buxton and resulted in the Acts to Prevent the Cruel Treatment of 
Cattle and the Cruelty to Animals Act which prohibited cruelty to domestic 
animals as the private property of their human owner. In 1822, Martin had 
learned the lesson that cruelty to animals was irrelevant to many MPs and in 
his speech to Parliament emphasized the unruliness of the urban workers 
who participated in such cruelty and the threat that this posed to human 
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society (Tester 1991,108-109; Turner 1980,39). The animals protected by 
this Act we~e mainly horses and cattle. 
The success of Martin's bill was due to two themes, one that cruelty 
to animals displayed a disregard for private property and another that 
inhumanity to our animal brothers may lead to inhumanity towards other 
humans. Martin, together with figures such as Wilberforce and Lord 
Shaftesbury were instrumental in the formation of a body to enforce the 
legislation (Gamer 1993, 41). The first animal protection agency came into 
being in 1824, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals which 
became the Royal Society for the. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1840. 
This charity became a favourite of the upper classes, used as it mainly was 
for policing the working class and its ambivalent attitude to vivisection was 
favoured by the 'scientific' and necessarily middle class community (Jasper 
& Nelkin 1992, 57). In 1835 a bill introduced by Joseph Pease extended the 
. protection of Martin's bill to other animals and resulted in cock fighting and 
any animal baiting being declared illegal (Garner 1993, 75). 
During the nineteenth century, although much debate continued over 
animal welfare, the last piece of legislation was the Cruelty to Animals Act of 
1876 for the regulation of vivisection laboratories. It was the question of 
vivisection which propelled a split in the RSPCA and a change in the Victorian 
heart and mind. Although the roots of the contemporary animal movement 
are frequently traced to philosophers and political activists, I feel that they 
lie in the Victorian mind, confused by a rapidly changing world, the loss of 
contact with nature and a bombardment of new knowledge. It is a hope 
frequently confounded that knowledge will promote kindness, but in the 
Victorian mind we can see its stirrings. 
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3.2.4 Compassion 
It is fascinating to note on the point of human authenticity that as late 
as the nineteenth century, children, together with women and the Negro were 
still not included within its sphere, however changes were to come. As the 
middle class and urbanisation had grown hand in hand, during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the family as a moral and nurturing unit 
separate from the flow of economic life and a place of privacy and intimacy 
also grew. The status of the child began to change, children had previously 
been used as workers or considered as property without status in the social 
world, very much like animals. This attitude began to change, to 
acknowledge that childhood was a morally and intellectually fragile stage of 
human life, with special needs for compassion and education (Jasper & 
Nelkin 1992, 14-15). Legislation to protect animals was used to prosecute 
a child cruelty case in America through the American SOciety for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals which led to the institution of the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children(Garner 1993, 41). In this 
case the sensitivity which had expanded to include domestic animals similarly 
facilitated the inclusion of the child into the moral community. 
James Turner hypothesises that the Victorian preoccupation with 
animals and their welfare to some extent arose from the increasing 
exploitation of human beings in the process of industrialisation and the 
proximity of their dehumanised working and living conditions. This he 
suggests disturbed a class of people who were their exploiters and a 
discourse over the discomfort of animals soothed troubled minds over the 
discomfort of human beings who were the source of their profits (Turner 
1980,36). Finsen & Finsen (1994) discuss Turner's hypothesis that 
sympathy for animals was a way of alleviating a concern for the poor which 
could not be expressed by the entrepreneurial classes, but conclude that 
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Turner overlooks the growth in the humanitarian movement at this 
time(Finsen & Finsen 1994, 25). 
Turner also points out that a greater awareness of pain may have 
contributed to the growth of compassion and empathy. In his view, 
compassion involves a recognition and rejection of pain both for ourselves 
and others. New technologies and scientific discoveries appeared to be 
controlling Nature. Pain which in the past was an inevitable part of life, now 
appeared capable of control, at least for some. New technologies and 
greater education had also increased communication· and knowledge of 
others which Turner contends contributed to the growth of empathy. This 
growth in empathy and revulsion from pain in Turner's view could not be 
allowed by the entrepreneurial class to extend to the working classes, and, 
therefore, coalesced in the concern for animals and in a rejection of 
vivisection (Turner 1980, 82-83). 
This growing revulsion from pain precipitated the first of the schisms 
in the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) which 
although repelled by vivisection was perceived to be too cautious in its 
opposition. A breakaway group formed the antivivisection Victoria Street 
Society in 1875 which later became the National AntiVivisection Society 
(NAVS) under the leadership of Francis Power Cobbe. Cobbe later split 
away from NAVS and founded the British Union Against Vivisection (BUAV) 
devoted to the abolition of all vivisection. The question of vivisection is one 
that highlights attitudes which split the animal protection movement today, the 
questions of welfare and abolition. 
The Victoria Street Society's ultimate aim was for the total abolition 
of vivisection, but it proceeded in 1875 to press for a bill to regulate its 
practices. This was met by opposition from the scientific community and the 
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Society was ultimately disappointed by the introduction of the Cruelty to 
Animals Act of 1876 which merely demanded that practitioners be licensed, 
places of experimentation to be registered and experiments where animals 
regained consciousness to require a certificate. Frances Cobbe 's reaction 
to this was that it merely protected the vivisectors from prosecution under 
earlier legislation (Turner 1980, 92). Vivisection represented, and still does 
to many, the worst of human excesses, as it was not carried out by the ill 
educated, but those who operated in the name of Science. The practitioners 
of vivisection did not have access to anaesthesia until the 1840s but even 
after that some did not use it in their experiments upon animals, which 
provoked a great sense of horror both amongst those who loved animals and 
those who did not. 
Martin Pernick (1985) discussing 'The Case of McGonigle's Foot' 
highlights the notion of a hierarchy of pain which presided in the mid-Victorian 
age in America which reflected the British attitude. Certain individuals were 
judged to suffer pain more acutely than others. Those within the truly human 
sphere who experienced pain and were perceived to require anaesthesia 
were the educated wealthy middle classes, those outside that sphere and 
therefore considered insensitive to pain were the poor and uneducated, the 
Irish and alcoholics who were classed with animals (Pernick 1985, 4, 148-
167). In 1862 although anaesthesia was available and cheap, the 
unfortunate McGonigle fell outside the sphere of the authentically human, 
being a drunken Irish immigrant who had broken his ankle. Due to his social 
status he was considered insensitive to pain and had his foot amputated 
without anaesthesia, dying from shock two days later (pernick 1985, 3-8). 
Animals together with their human counterparts, the lower social classes, 
were also considered to be immune to pain, but in Britain the anti-vivisection 
movement was pressing to change this. Already emerging was the sense 
that in their treatment of animals, human beings defined what they were and 
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could be (Turner 1980, 92) . 
... kindness to animals had become for many a sine qua non 
of civilization (Turner 1980, 78) 
In the Victorian mind vivisection threatened the status of 'humanity'. 
Science which had originally discovered and disseminated a theory of kinship 
between animals and humanity as a 'scientific fact', had contributed to a 
growth in concern for animal welfare and yet now 'scientists' were perceived 
as betrayers of that kinship. This led to the 'parting of the ways' of the pro-
animal lobby and Science (Turner 1980, 100). 
Scientists were now perceived not only to have betrayed the animals, 
but in doing so had lost the respect of many Victorians who had looked to 
Science as a means to 'moral evolution'. Science had encouraged an 
empathy with animals due to discoveries of evolutionary kinship and animal 
ability and sensibility and then betrayed it, Science had attacked religious 
belief and now appeared to offer nothing to replace that hope for moral 
progress. Darwin, although appalled by vivisection and pain, rejected the 
God who created the cruel world of the survival of the fittest. Others rejected 
science which appeared to them to break God's laws (Turner 1980, 87). In 
an attempt to redeem the future status of humanity the Victorian animal lobby 
began to spread a 'religion of the heart' in which compassion and sentiment 
and taking action against suffering renewed that hope (Turner 1980, 102). 
There is one further strand that contributed to the feeling of revulsion 
in Britain associated with vivisection, and that is its perceived 'un-Britishness'. 
Although vivisection had a long history, it was more frequently practised in 
Europe. In 1874 a French Physiologist, Magnon, demonstrated a vivisection 
experiment for the BMA, it was condemned by many doctors present as cruel, 
the meeting was disbanded and the Frenchman prosecuted, upon which he 
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fled from the country (Turner 1980, 89). This incident highlighted a fear of 
pollution by European ways that had began to grow in the eighteenth century. 
3.2.5 Revolution and the Threat of Vegetables . 
Reflecting on the cruelties of the working class towards animals, Mary 
Wollstonecraft commented that this was 'to revenge the insults that they are 
obliged to bear from their (*human) superiors' (Wollstonecraft 1792 cited in 
Thomas 1983, 50). Amongst the urban intellectual and entrepreneurial 
middle class, who sought to mould humanity to their particular cultural 
pattern, during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, was the abiding fear 
that the working populace's revenge may be turned towards them and the 
privileged orders of society. The French Revolution focussed the minds of 
many of the middle classes who feared that the conditions of the poor in 
Britain might lead to a revolution of our own. 
Coupled with a growth in compassion, the fear of revolution may have 
contributed to many of the social movements and reforms of the period. 
The women's suffrage movement and the anti-slavery movement began in 
the early nineteenth century, new labour laws were introduced to protect 
children and women, increased public education and housing and hospitals 
for the poor, reforms in the treatment of the mentally ill and penal reform all 
illustrate an increase in compassion (Turner 1980, 34-35) . It could also be 
considered that it reveals an unease about social conditions which if 
unaddressed could breed revolution. 
One sometimes gets the impression that the mere words 
'Socialism' and 'Communism' draw towards them with magnetic 
force every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-wearer, sex-
maniac, Quaker, 'Nature Cure' quack, pacifist, and feminist in 
England (Orwell 1937, 152) 
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The association between vegetarianism and social revolution is 
exemplified by the above quote and the association which began in the 
eighteenth century where prominent radicals espoused social change and 
vegetarianism continues on into our own time. In Britain the consumption of 
meat was historically and still is part of what Bourdieu (1977) would call our 
'habitus', a taken for granted principle that is not questioned by the majority 
of people. Ethical vegetarianism rejects this taken for granted principle and 
reflects a world view which repudiates mass society's concept of the natural 
order of the world and therein lies a threat to commonly held beliefs about 
ourselves and the society in which we live. 
The fear of a repetition of the events of the French Revolution in 1789 
overshadowed many of the discourses which took place on the conditions 
and behaviour of the poor at that time. But the French Revolution had also 
inspired others. Political radicalism and vegetarianism were harnessed 
together as vehicles for many thinkers disenchanted with society. For most 
of what Adams calls the Romantic vegetarians, followers of Rousseau, the 
French Revolution was viewed as one stepping stone to the reformation of 
the world, whilst the abolition of the meat diet was another (Adams 1990, 
112). Joseph Ritson's publisher Richard Phillips was a vegetarian and 
Republican, whilst Ritson himself in the 1770s took up the Jacobite cause 
and ended his life as a Jacobin (Turner 1980, 18). After the French 
Revolution he adopted the Republican calendar and insisted upon being 
called Citizen Ritson (Turner 1980, 18; Adams 1990, 112). 
The Scot, John Oswald, published the first secular protest against the 
'murder' of animals for food in 1791 (Turner 1980, 18). Oswald had been 
heavily influenced by Hinduism whilst serving as a soldier in India and 
believed in the transmigration of souls. On returning to England in the mid 
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1780s he began a career as a radical pamphleteer. Oswald greeted the 
revolution in France as a hope for the liberty of animals as well as people 
(Thomas 1983, 185). At the outbreak of the Revolution he travelled to 
France where he died fighting for the Revolution in 1793 at the battle of Pont-
de Ce (Adams 1990, 112; Turner 1980, 18). 
Ritson and Oswald were radical pamphleteers who brought the words 
of philosophy and revolution onto the streets. Adams points out that whilst 
the target of the middle class that wished to form humanity into a pattern 
defined by society, was the working class. The target of individuals such as 
Ritson, Oswald and Shelley was the upper class (Adams 1990, 112) these 
thinkers advocated a move away from the dominant cultural pattern. 
Throughout this history I have discussed the anxiety expressed over 
the treatment of animals throughout certain periods of history, the pre-
eminent philosophers and social reformers, but for most of these figures, 
vegetarianism was not an issue. Whilst preaching kindness, the killing of 
animals for food had not been considered as morally wrong by many who 
were active in promoting animal welfare. 
This attitude is still one that is present in the wider animal protection 
movement, but the animal rights activist does not adhere to this view. Animal 
rights activists follow the tradition of Rousseau's 'Noble Savage' and the 
Victorian 'religion of the heart', notions of moral progress, social revolution 
and a brotherly love which encompass animals within the moral community. 
The 'Noble Savage' according to Rousseau was biologically formed to 
be frugivorous and, therefore, taxonomically should be classified as such, and 
should eat food that was 'natural'. Meat is unnatural, it is a cultural product, 
part of a system that pollutes humanity and separates us from our true nature 
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(Tester 1991, 131). Rousseau's concept of the 'Noble Savage', as the 
authentically human, a state which has been corrupted by society, and his 
advocacy of the 'natural diet' (vegetarianism), was adopted eagerly by some 
English thinkers such as Joseph Ritson and the poet Shelley. 
Joseph Ritson published 'An Essay on Abstinence from Animal Food, 
as a Moral Duty' in 1802, and sought to prove humanity's similarity to animals 
and promote the need for human beings to take up the 'natural diet' for both 
their individual physical and moral well being and the benefit of society 
(Tester 1991, 133). Adams points out that Ritson endeavoured to negate the 
boundary between humans and animals, pointing to the similarities between 
human beings and vegetarian animals (Adams 1990, 102). Ritson also 
strove to emphasize the 'naturalness' of a vegetarian diet by using the 
evidence produced by explorers, of other human communities still living in a 
'natural' state. In essence, Ritson contended that humans and animals are 
the same, but culture hides that similarity and draws human beings away from 
their natural state. Ritson in the opening statement of his essay, came close 
to what Darwin would eventually say, for different reasons, 'Man ... in a state 
of nature, was, if not the real orang-utan ... at the present day, at least an 
animal of the same family' (Ritson 1802,14-14 cited in Tester 1991,133). 
For Ritson as well as Rousseau, human beings should be classified 
with the frugivores, and animals like humans, are sentient beings with 
interests in the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure. Ritson was 
also concerned with the effects of meat eating upon human beings and 
feared that those who indulged in it may turn eventually to cannibalism 
(Adams 1990, 103). Unfortunately he also identified meat eating as the sole 
causative factor of lunacy, and promptly defeated his argument, though 
unwittingly, when he as a vegetarian, succumbed to mental illness (Turner 
1980, 8). 
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Ritson, an atheist, dismissed any notions of humanity being in a state 
of nature before the biblical 'Fall' into corruption. Another atheist, the poet 
Shelley, however, wholeheartedly took up this notion, but rejected the biblical 
myth of Adam and Eve and located the 'Fall' within Greek mythology and the 
legend of Prometheus. Percy Bysshe Shelley and his wife Mary rejected 
meat eating and interpreted the actions of Prometheus as a revolt against 
autocracy, but also as the bringer of disease into the world, when the stolen 
fire was used to cook animal flesh. 
Whilst Joseph Ritson rejected the eating of meat due to an empathy 
with animal suffering, Shelley appeared more concerned with human bodily 
purity and health (Turner 1980, 17). Both these attitudes are apparent in 
present day attitudes to meat eating and often converge within the 
contemporary animal rights community. The adoption of vegetarianism at 
this time represented a turning away from the 'unnatural' and 'society' as 
symbolised by meat and a return to a more 'natural' state. The ingestion of 
meat involves the taking in of death and decay, meat is a cultural product 
whilst vegetables are natural and 'signify a double life; the life they 
demonstrated as they grew ... and the life they give humans' (Tester 1991, 
144). 
Human beings do not generally eat raw animal flesh. Levi-Strauss 
noted that the very act of cooking is a singularly human occupation whose 
transfonnative nature through fire 'brings about the cultural transformation of 
the raw' (Levi-Strauss 1970, 142). Thus through cooking flesh it becomes 
transformed from a piece of a dead animal into meat, a cultural object. Levi-
Strauss considers that the transformation of the raw to the cooked or from 
nature to culture is a universal practice by which human beings distinguish 
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themselves from other animals2. 
Fiddes proposes that in eating flesh, human beings place themselves 
above other animals and by cooking it also place themselves above other 
carnivores reinforcing human dominance over the natural world. 'Raw meat, 
dripping blood, is what is eaten by wild, carnivorous animals, not by civilised 
humans' (Fiddes 1991, 89). If the status of being human is expressed 
through meat eating and meat symbolically expresses the 'core values of 
modern western society: of power, of superiority ... of civilisation' (Fiddes 
1991, 93), then rejection of meat becomes a rejection of those core values. 
Whilst vegetables can be cooked, they are also eaten raw, animal flesh 
almost never is, meat is always a cultural product and as Fiddes suggests 
reflects cultural values. 
When in 1894 Henry Salt took up the concepts expressed in the 
eighteenth century and from these constructed a new theory of animal rights 
(Maehle 1994, 100-101), vegetarianism became central to his theory. Salt 
rejected the superiority of human beings over animals and human domination 
of nature and the social inequalities which industrialisation and urbanisation 
had highlighted and naturally following from this comes a rejection of those 
cultural objects which support such a view. 
Although vegetarianism had existed in the Middle Ages in Britain, in 
India and in Greece the modern version of ethical vegetarianism which 
embodies ideas of animal welfare, human health and morality began to 
appear towards the end of the eighteenth century. The growth in 
21 note that the nature-culture polarity is not one accepted as a universal by all 
anthropologists. Strathern (1980) considers that it is a Western mode of thought. 
As I am considering Western modes of thought, however, I will continue to employ 
it. 
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humanitarianism throughout the eighteenth century had strengthened the 
stance of those in favour of a meat-free diet which was known as 'the natural 
diet' or 'Pythagorean diet'. 
The term 'Vegetarianism' was coined in 1847 when the Vegetarian 
Society was formed in Manchester (Twigg 1983, 20). Why humanitarianism 
and vegetarianism became linked is perhaps reflected in patterns of meat 
eating which also reflect patterns of social inequality. 
During the eighteenth century excessive meat consumption was noted 
amongst the English upper classes. The working class consumption of meat 
also increased due to agricultural advances, but the cost of meat in 
comparison to their wage meant they could buy very little. This continued on 
into the early nineteenth century whilst the affluent could indulge themselves 
in meat consumption, the industrial worker during the early nineteenth century 
very rarely could afford meat and what they could afford went to the worker, 
generally male, and their families were iIInourished (Fiddes 1991, 24). This 
suggests that the working class was seeking to emulate the upper classes 
and trying to buy into the symbolic capital of the cultural product, that of 
power, superiority and civilisation. 
Vegetarianism and radicalism were linked once more after the Indian 
Mutiny of 1857 and the Vegetarian Society in Britain supported the Mutiny 
(Spencer 1993, 268). Spencer contends that although at this time the 
Vegetarian movement was small, its existence was promoted by a change in 
people's perception of suffering, by the middle of the nineteenth century 
people did not want to be reminded that meat involved death and during this 
time slaughterhouses began to be moved from the centre of towns or 
disguised to save giving offence. Vegetarians in particular objected to their 
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presence in the cities as they were frequently sited opposite pubs for the 
wor.<ing man and schools and the Victorian Vegetarian believed that the 'very 
sight and smell of them brutalised people' (Spencer 1993, 269). In his 
discussion of The Civilising Process, Norbert Elias (1978) associates the 
process of civilization with the repugnance felt by certain people concerning 
the association of death and meat. During the process of civilisation people 
begin to suppress their own animal characteristics and that of the food they 
eat. Elias argues that vegetarianism in the West is an extension of this 
attitude and one that is associated with affluence (Elias 1978, 120). 
From the 1840s several middle class societies were formed such as 
the London Dietetic Reform Society, which was affiliated with the Manchester 
Vegetarian Society. The first Vegetarian restaurant founded by Vegetarian 
groups opened in London at 1 Farringdon Road on 22 May 1876 (Spencer 
1993,275) 
During the 1880s interest arose in the vegetarian cause inspired by 
social changes which had begun in the mid eighteen hundreds. Education 
was expanding, the lower-middle class was emerging and socialism was 
finding its voice. The Fabian movement, the idea of the simple life, the myth 
of the rural idyll and the support for vegetarianism by literary figures such as 
George Bernard Shaw and Tolstoy contributed to making the vegetarian way 
more acceptable, but mainly for those within the middle classes who also 
supported social change. (Spencer 1993, 275). 
The most influential vegetarian of this time Mahatma Gandhi, (the 
great pacifist reformer) although coming from an Indian tradition of meat 
avoidance became involved with the Vegetarian Society following a 
conversion to ethical vegetarianism after reading Henry Salt's 'Plea for 
Vegetarianism' (1897). His previous adherence to a meat free diet had been 
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in respect to his mother's wishes, but he had secretly wished that he could 
indulge in a meat diet (Finsen & Finsen 1994, 25-26). When Gandhi arrived 
in England in 1888 he found the food unacceptable and fatefully came upon 
the restaurant in Farringdon Road where he read Shelley and Henry Salt's 
advocation of a meat free diet which they linked with social reform for human 
beings. It was also here that he read the Bhagavadgita, in its English 
translation by Sir Edwin Arnold (Finsen & Finsen 1994, 291). Gandhi 
commented on his enthusiasm for Vegetarianism as that of a convert to a 
new religion and started his own Vegetarian Club in Bayswater with the editor 
of 'The Vegetarian' as its president, Sir Edwin Arnold was vice president and 
Gandhi the secretary. By 1889 Gandhi was a friend of Henry Salt and other 
vegetarian radicals and had become a member of the London Vegetarian 
Society (Finsen & Finsen 1994, 292) 
It was during the 1870s that the Vegetarian SOCiety became involved 
with animal welfare over the issue of vivisection. The original Vegetarian 
Society premised its views in opposition to medical practice. In line with 
Shelley, members felt that given the right food the body would remain healthy 
and would have no need for medicine. Following this train of thought 
vivisection is worthless and unnecessary (Spencer 1993, 285). In the 
Vegetarian Review, the journal of the Vegetarian Society, the plight of 
animals being transported in cattle ships was also raised (Spencer 1993, 
286). 
In 1891 Henry Salt founded the Humanitarian League. The aims of 
the league were to oppose inequality, cruelty and injustice on behalf of all 
living beings (Spencer 1993, 287). Its central tenets were vegetarianism as 
an expression of morality and goodness and a vision of the pre-capitalist 
world as of a higher moral order. The inception of the Humanitarian League 
is truly representative of the times. Industrial society had highlighted the 
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inequality of people and animals and the visibility of extensive cruelty to 
animals impelled society towards a view of a creeping contagion of cruelty 
which extended towards people. 
Another split in the ranks of the RSPCA was also impelled by 
vegetarianism, Lewis Gompertz who had become secretary in 1828 felt that 
his vegetarianism and anti-vivisection views could not be reconciled with the 
RSPCA's lack of action on this front and left to form the Animals' Friend 
Society in 1832 (Garner 1993, 49). 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century Abbotsholme School and 
Bedales had both been founded advocating diet reform and pacifism and the 
abolition of corporal punishment in an effort to prevent domestic violence and 
future war, but war did come in 1914. Pacifism and vegetarianism were very 
closely entwined and the First World War became a moral crossroads where 
ideas had to become actions. Those vegetarians who chose to be 
conscientious objectors suffered a great deal during the war period being 
viewed as traitors and cowards (Spencer 1993,309). 
During the inter-war years the Depression blighted the life of the 
ordinary worker. During the General Strike the Vegetarian Society sent food 
parcels to distressed mining communities and through the 1930s supported 
the funding of food parcels to unemployed areas. The SOCiety had now 
learned that food given without diatribes against meat consumption was far 
more helpful in spreading their message (Spencer 1993, 310-311). 
After the Second World War many vegetarians felt that the shortage 
of meat had helped their cause, but when meat rationing was discontinued 
in the 1950s the symbolic capital of meat was once again elevated and its 
consumption increased (Spencer 316-317). Howeverduetonewresearch 
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into the connections between diet and health, nutritionists began to advocate 
increasing the proportion of vegetables and fruit in the diet. In 1928 a 
vegetarian and animal rights campaigner, Nina Hosali brought the ideas of 
the love of nature and the simple life together with health and opened the first 
Nature Cure Clinic. The clinic was also involved in anti-vivisection and animal 
causes (Spencer 1993,311). 
The Vegan Society was founded in 1944. One of the founders was 
Donald Watson a conscientious objector. Vegans refuse to consume or use 
anything fro ill animal products including dairy products and eggs. Veganism 
is commonly recognised as the rational progression from vegetarianism. The 
Vegans broke away from the Vegetarian Society because the Society refused 
to publicise the views of Vegans. Veganism was regarded initially even by 
vegetarians as extremist, but now is acknowledged by many vegetarians as 
a state to aspire to (Spencer 1993, 317). For many within the Animal Rights 
movement veganism is 'spiritually ideal in that there is no explOitation of 
animals by humans' (Spencer 1993, 318). 
During our own century another revolution has taken place, the 
Counter Culture Revolution of the 1960's when interest in alternative 
lifestyles and interest in philosophies from the East began to spread 
throughout the young adult population. Articles produced by vegetarians 
increasingly began to openly support the animal rights issue and together 
with other new social movements, the Animal Rights Movement began to 
grow with ethical vegetarianism at its core (Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 148). 
3.3 Conclusion 
Throughout this history I have tried to highlight the core concern of the 
debates, that of the search for the authentically human conducted through 
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a continuing discourse over the treatment of animals. Through the modern 
period of British history we see the transition of a rural based society to that 
of an urban based one. The cultural battle of a new class of people to 
establish their world view as the accepted one, their attempts to mould 
society and the individual into a model of that view and how 'using animals 
to think' they constructed a view of the authentically human in their own 
image. Highlighting the fact that the concerns of the protagonists in the 
discourses over animals were a search for the authentically human, the moral 
being, is their involvement with other moral crusades. 
During both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries liberation 
movements on behalf of women and slaves emerged together with concerns 
over animals. Jeremy Bentham was an anti-slavery campaigner as was 
William Wilberforce and Fowell Buxton who were also two founders of the 
SPCA. Frances Power Cobbe in addition to fighting vivisection was a 
suffragist and philanthropist. Henry Salt was a pacifist and humanitarian. 
Later mobilizations on behalf of animals emerged during our century hand in 
hand with the Womens Movement, the Black Civil Rights Movement and the 
Anti-Vietnam Movement. Animal Rights philosopher Tom Regan also 
espoused these movements. 
If we look at these periods of time and step back from the animal view 
that I have used we see that during all these turbulent periods the search for 
the authentically human was prime. As I indicated in my introduction, 
this thesis concerns itself with the Animal Rightists' search for the 
authentically human employing Lionel Trilling's definition of authenticity as ' 
... a polemical concept, fulfilling its nature by dealing aggressively with 
received and habitual opinion .. .' (Trilling 1971, 94). To illustrate this process 
in what follows I will explore the themes hypothesised by Jasper and Nelkin 
in 1992, that involvement in the Animal Rights Movement reflects an 
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oppositional world view and notions of identity and community. As stated 
previously the concept of humanity is one that I take, following Geertz, to be 
a production of • ... time, place, and circumstances, of studies and 
professions, transient fashions and temporary opinions' (Geertz 1973, 35). 
The concept of the authentically human is one which is constructed through 
a polemic directed at what the authentically human is conceived not to be. 
The historical background of the animal movement positively seethes with 
hopes for the moral progress of humanity. In the next chapter I will be 
concentrating on the value and use of history, the social conditions of the 
contemporary world as a background for the emergence of the contemporary 
movement and its implications for notions of community and human identity 
and on what the contemporary Animal Rights Movement conceives the 
authentically human to be. 
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4 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL SA TTLES 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6 I will be examining in depth the concept of identity and 
how it is narratively constructed. But at this point I would like to touch upon 
how an individual and community can locate their personal narratives within 
a larger one thereby giving a sense of authentication and tradition to a 
chosen identity and community. One way in which this can be achieved is 
through the use of history. 
4.2 The Relevance of the Past to the Present 
In the contemporary philosophical writings on Animal Rights and the 
Animal Rights Movement, the writers all invoke the past through reference 
to the historic philosophical debates. History as a validation for thought is 
clearly illustrated in the introduction to the second edition of Peter Singer and 
Tom Regan's book Animal Rights & Human Obligations (1989). The authors 
point out that trawling through historical writings had provided the writers with 
some intellectual authority for their philosophical viewpoints 
The existence of this substantial historical body of thought was, 
from our pOint of view, double fortunate. First, it helped to 
establish the respectability of the issue as a subject of 
philosophical thought: the fact that the ethics of our treatment 
of animals had been discussed previously by key figures in the 
great tradition of Western philosophy made it much more 
difficult for one's conservative colleagues to object to it being 
taught in philosophy classes .. (Regan & Singer 1989, vi) 
In doing this, several objectives are achieved. First there is a 
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validation of their own moral stance by locating it within a historical tradition. 
Their own writings thus become an opportunity for the dissemination of the 
tradition to their readership who can then use it in the construction of a 
community. In establishing a historic precedent, a foundation for the 
Movement is created which can be referred to for legitimacy and cohesion. 
A communal history is a useful 'social glue' which allows the differing strands 
of thought within the community to be expressed whilst remaining true to its 
historical roots. So whilst the differing factions within the contemporary 
Movement can sometimes appear to be in contestation with each other, 
welfarist V6rsus abolitionist, vegetarian versus vegan, the fact that these 
areas of contestation have been part of their history, allows each faction to 
take what it requires from history for validation whilst recognizing that these 
debates are an integral part of the Movement. 
The Animal Rights Movement which emerged in Britain in the 1970s 
has its roots in the eighteenth century and Keith Tester contends that it has 
evolved from its beginnings as an enquiry into the nature of humanity into an 
'immutable natural truth' for its adherents (Tester 1991, 194). 
It is accurate that the Animal Rights Movement considers that its belief 
that animals are due rights which involve being treated by human beings as 
beings of equal moral value is a truth that they have claimed, but the debate 
over the nature of humanity continues. They are involved in constructing 
their own model of what they consider to be the authentically human whilst 
engaging in a polemic against mass society's dominant model of humanity. 
The lengthy historical debate over obligations to animals which was 
inextricably bound up with our obligations to each other, is very much 
removed from the contemporary Animal Rights morality, which is really 
located within the philosophy of its nineteenth century inventor Henry Salt. 
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Contemporary animal 'rightists' are not simply advocating kindness to 
animals, but seek an equalitarian status for animals as sentient beings and 
individuals of inherent value. The only equalitarian relationship that we can 
have with animals is that of leaving them alone. 
Whilst the ancient philosophical debate cannot be dismissed, it has to 
be noted that the debate underwent a 'step change' in the nineteenth century, 
where it was transformed from a debate over cruelty and kindness to animals, 
to an assertion that animals were of equal value to human beings. Animal 
Rights in its original form, born out of utilitarianism and fostered by the spirit 
of the French revolution, had become inadequate by the end of the 
nineteenth century, 'natural science' had elevated animals and denigrated 
people (Turner 1980, 131-132). A greater knowledge of the lives of animals, 
through natural science and pet ownership and the disappearance of working 
animals, together with the greater visibility in the urbanised and industrialised 
world of the working classes (who in their poor conditions and perceived 
uncivilized behaviour may have taken the place of the working animals in the 
middle class mind); led to a theory which acknowledged differences in people 
as well as differences between animals and people; 
If one could deny rights to a dog or an ape, one could also deny 
them to a child or an idiot ... defending animal rights meant 
standing up for human rights ... If inferiority deprived animals of 
rights, could the, same not be said about the 'lower orders' of 
human beings ... the old, restricted utilitarian basis for animals' 
rights no longer sufficed (Turner 1980, 132). 
, Utilitarianism had to be adapted or re-invented to cope with the 
changing pattern of society, and thus the founder of the Humanitarian 
League, Henry Salt with the publication of" Animal Rights in relation to Social 
Progress" invented a theory of Animal Rights for urban, industrial society. 
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From this point of view, the 'ancient tradition' could be said to fall into Eric 
Hobsbawm's theory of 'invented tradition', 
A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past (Hobsbawm 
1983, 1) 
Hobsbawm asserts that there has been a 'clustering' of such 
inventions within the past 200 years as new social institutions were brought 
in to replace older ones 'for old uses in new conditions and by using old 
models for new purposes' (Hobsbawm 1983, 5). Whilst Henry Salt is the 
'inventor' of contemporary animal rights, present day writers reach into the 
pre-history of the movement in an effort to establish its authenticity as a 
traditional concern of right-minded individuals. 
In Hobsbawm's discussion of invented traditions, which have emerged 
since the industrial revolution, he notes three types. Of importance here is the 
type 'establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of 
groups, real or artificial communities' (Hobsbawm 1983, 9), which Hobsbawm 
calls 'communitarian' invented traditions' (Hobsbawm 1983, 10). A sharp 
difference is noted by Hobsbawm between old and invented traditions. He 
asserts that the old were 'specific and strongly binding social practices' whilst 
the invented are "unspecific and vague as to the nature of the values, rights 
and obligations of the group membership" (Hobsbawm 1983, 10). Within the 
animal protection movement, we see a complete inversion of this. Prior to 
Henry Salt, whilst some thinkers such as Rousseau, Ritson, and Shelley, 
advocated removal of human relationships with animals in every way, other 
thinkers preached kindness, but continued to keep pets and eat meat. Henry 
Salt's doctrine laid down the foundation of the present movement where it is 
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ideologically compulsory to abstain from meat eating or any use of animals 
including pet keeping. Salt set out the behaviours and values which are 
expected of group membership within the movement, which have been 
further embellished by writers and activists such as Singer , Regan and 
Linzey. 
In a critique of Hobsbawm, Nicholas Thomas points out that there is 
a tendency in discussions of invented tradition, for writers to presume that 
because a tradition is invented, it is, therefore, inauthentic (Thomas 1992, 
213). The actuality is that these creations are part of the dynamic process 
of cultural transmission during which culture is 'tailored and embellished in the 
process of transmission' (Linnekin 1990 cited in Thomas 1992, 213) and are 
no less 'real' or authentic for this. In his discussion of historical 
anthropology's analyses of colonial history, Thomas pOints out that 
'reifications of tradition have frequently been seen as cultural phenomena that 
stand essentially on their own' (Thomas 1992, 213). But it is his contention 
that culture is essentially responsive, and caught up with the construction of 
identity in opposition to 'others' and that tradition, invented or otherwise is 
similarly constructed (Thomas 1992, 213). 
Hence what is important is not so much the categorical fact that 
difference provides a foil for identity as the actual histories of 
accommodation or confrontation that shape particular 
understandings of others and thus determine what specific 
practices, manners, or local ethics are rendered explicit and 
made to carry the burden of local identity (Thomas 1992, 213). 
Therefore, what any cultural group chooses to adhere to as a 
representation of themselves is a direct result of historical encounters with 
those whom they choose to disassociate themselves. The Animal Rights 
Movement can refer to a historical past populated by people such as 
themselves in contestation with 'others', which confers both identity upon 
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them and legitimises their moral stance. 
4.2.1 The Great and Little Tradition 
All invented traditions, so far as possible, use history as a 
legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion (Hobsbawm 
1983, 12). 
Precisely how this is done by groups who wish to highlight their 
difference from the culture of mass society as do participants in the Animal 
Rights Movement, is the question. Whilst Singer, Regan and Linzey invoke 
the past as a validation of the authenticity of their moral stance which is 
passed on through their writings to their readership, it has been my 
experience during my fieldwork that not everyone has read all of them or any 
of their predecessors. Yet all of my informants had a basic knowledge of the 
philosophical points made by them. None of my informants had even heard 
of such people as Humphrey Primatt, one had heard of Henry Salt and asked 
me if I had read him, as she had not, and she wondered what he had to say. 
One might become interested in the ways in which the high 
tradition is communicated to the common people and how it 
becomes a part of the little tradition (Redfield 1956, 47) 
If history is then to be used as a legitimator of action and cement of 
group cohesion, it would appear that it must not only be transmitted by 
intellectuals to their readerShip, but must be disseminated throughout the 
community by other means. Robert Redfield discusses a similar point in his 
discussion of the Great and Little Tradition (1956). Redfield asserts that; 
liThe great tradition is cultivated in schools or temples; the little tradition 
works itself out and keeps itself going in the lives of ... communities" (Redfield 
1956,42). 
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The tradition of the philosopher, theologian, and literary man is 
a tradition consciously cultivated and handed down; that of the 
little people is for the most part taken for granted and not 
submitted to much scrutiny or considered refinement and 
improvement (Redfield 1956, 42). 
An important point here, however, is that philosophers, theologians 
and literary people are engaged in interpreting the world of the 'little people', 
thus Rousseau and Bentham were philosophising about how people should 
behave against a background of social upheaval and revolutionary thought 
that was being produced by the 'little people'. Their philosophising was a 
response to social conditions. Redfield points out that 'The two traditions are 
interdependent '" two currents of thought and action distinguishable, yet 
every flowing into and out of each other' (Redfield 1956, 42-43). Whilst 
Redfield is discussing peasant society and has been criticized over his 
assertion that peasant culture is a half culture (Obeyesekere, 152), his theory 
that these traditions are informed and moulded by each other is a useful one. 
The existence of an embryonic animal rights movement in Britain, in 
the form of The Band of Mercy, prior to the publication of Peter Singer's 
work, Animal Liberation, would appear to be an instance of this. The 
publication of Singer's book and his notion of liberation was eagerly seized 
upon by members of the Band of Mercy, who adopted his terminology, but 
not his utilitarian stance, and transformed themselves into the Animal 
Liberation Front. Contemporary philosophers also give their readership 
access to historical moral debates which they would probably not access for 
themselves. 
Within the grassroots of the movement, there is no one philosopher 
whose view is adhered to, but a conglomeration of their thoughts constructed 
into a working philosophy for those engaged in the fight for animal rights at 
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a local grassroots level. For those members of the movement with access 
to the Internet, Peter Singer and Tom Regan's thoughts are available in a 
more 'down to earth' language, for a wider readership, again with reference 
to the tradition of concern for animals (Issues of Animals Agenda on the 
Internet, Conversations with Peter Singer and Tom Regan). The thoughts of 
Jeremy Bentham are handed down in 'bite size' chunks inscribed on T shirts 
(BUAV Catalogue 1995-96, 2). 
The question is not, can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, 
can they suffer? 
My conversation with the female informant about Henry Salt is another 
method by which the 'Great tradition' is disseminated throughout the 
community, by those who have read to those who have not. The end result 
of this combination of traditions, is that whilst the grassroots local level 
activist may be in possession of a hotchpotch philosophy made up of different 
strands, a 'little tradition', the Movement as a whole can call upon the 'Great 
tradition' of historical philosophical thought as a form of 'social glue', which 
holds together many and varied beliefs creating a form of 'communal thought' 
and as a validation of a moral principle, which legitimates the action taken by 
the community. 
4.3 THE CONTEMPORARY ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
4.3.1 The Birth of a Movement 
The contemporary Animal Rights Movement in Britain came into being 
in the 1970s with the revival of a long standing debate over the status and 
rights of animals and has resulted in an ever expanding animal protection 
movement engaged in a battle for both improvements in the welfare of 
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animals and the winning of rights for them. Although Peter Singer is 
frequently given the credit for this, the publication of Animal Liberation in 1975 
was preceded by a growing attention to the subject during the 1960s. A 
schism had again arisen within the RSPCA over the lack of action taken by 
the Society to oppose blood sports. The publication of Ruth Harrison's 
Animal Machines in 1964 (which exposed intensive farming practices and led 
to public revulsion) forced the then Labour Government to set up a 
committee led by Professor F W Brambell. The Brambell Report (1965) 
condemned the practices and called for a clearer definition of animal suffering 
which went beyond physical pain. Despite subsequent legislation and 
parliamentary rhetoric, the report was largely disregarded by Government 
(Garner 1993: 110). 
The attention of academia was then drawn towards the subject. The 
publication of Animals. Men and Morals (1971) edited by Stanley and 
Rosalind Godlovitch and John Harris, with contributions from Brigid Brophy 
and Richard Ryder and the publication of Ryder's own book, Victims of 
Science in 1975, where the term 'speciesism' was first coined, were 
instrumental in the revival of the movement (Serpell 1992: 36). However, it 
was the publication of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation in 1975 which 
combined the welfarist concern for animals with the language of 'liberation' 
and moral certitude that provided the impetus for the birth of a community. 
Peter Singer's ideological text emerged at a point in history when 
'rights' and 'liberation' were high on the agenda in both the United States and 
Britain and were being expressed by the Women's Liberation movement and 
the Black Civil Rights movement. There is a direct parallel in this with the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when concern for animals was linked 
with concerns for disadvantaged sectors of human society and when 
industrializing society was using 'animals to think'. Through the counter 
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culture of the 1960s and 1970s post-industrial society was again using 
'animals to think' about being human. The anti-slavery movement, womens 
suffrage and animal protection flowered during the nineteenth century and at 
the latter end of the twentieth century, the terms 'racism' and 'sexism' were 
joined by 'speciesism'. Although this term was originally coined by Richard 
Ryder, Singer adopted it for his purposes in Animal Liberation and it is now 
an accepted term in the vocabulary of the Animal Rights Movement. 
The movement seeks to redefine human relationships to animals, by 
expressing a kinship with animals based on animal sentiency and similarity 
to human beings and rejecting the morality of mass society and replacing it 
with their own which rejects the use and oppression of animals for human 
gain. Singer issued a challenge to 'right-minded' people to change their 
attitudes towards non-human species, by rejecting what he and Richard 
Ryder before him, termed 'speciesism'. His challenge was answered by 
thousands of people across the Western world, as they entered the 
Movement. Jasper & Nelkin contend that this leads to the growth of an 
oppositional world view, involving concepts of identity and community. 
Although the movement has grown tremendously in the West, the 
focus of this thesis is the Animal Rights Movement in Britain. The movement 
grew with an impetus which far exceeded many other social movements 
during the 1980s from very small beginnings at the opening of the decade, to 
become a major news item towards the end (Jasper and Nelkin 1992, 1). 
Singer was attempting to put animal liberation on the political agenda, but 
what he also did was to hand to a certain minority branch of the animal 
advocates a philosophy which appeared to them to legitimise the use of direct 
action in pursuit of the liberation of animals. 
The League Against Cruel Sports, set up in 1924 had begun in the late 
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1950s to go some way towards direct action by laying false trails for fox 
hounds. The Hunt Saboteur's Association (HSA) formed in 1964 took up this 
action by physically disrupting the hunt. In 1972 Ronnie Lee and Cliff 
Goodman disaffected by the HSA's peaceful methods, had formed the 
precursor of the Animal Liberation Front, the Band of Mercy, which began to 
take violent action against property in the name of liberating animals. After 
serving a year's imprisonment for such action Lee formed the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF) in 1976, adopting Singer's language (Henshaw 1989). 
The Animal Liberation Front, are a part, but not the totality of the 
Animal Rights Movement. Keith Tester in particular concentrates too heavily 
on the ALF as being representative of the whole movement, using David 
Henshaw's book, which I have used myself, as a point of reference. 
Henshaw's book, whilst being the only book to be written on the ALF, is not 
academic in its nature, it resulted from a documentary television series, and 
is viewed by some as being flawed by inaccuracy and heavily prejudicial 
towards the whole movement, insinuating that all Animal Rights supporters 
are potential 'terrorists' (Garner 1993: 240n). The ALF have never caused 
serious harm to any individual, mainly confining their activities to action 
against property, yet Henshaw presented the activists as having 'murder in 
mind' in a book which is capitalises on the sensationalist approach of the 
television documentary. 
Many non-violent animal rightists empathise with the ALF. Several of 
my informants expressed feelings of understanding towards the ALF, as 
progression towards the acquisition for rights for animals, or even adequate 
welfare for them, seems to take so long to achieve. As one of my informants 
commented '/ can understand it, you know, you get so frustrated, / can't 
condemn the ALF'. Another of my informants, in a written autobiography, told 
me that she contributed money to the ALF, but did not enter into any actions 
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other than peaceful protest. As the ALF is not 'joinable' through the payment 
of subscription fees, it is likely that she contributed money to the ALF 
Supporters Group which is concerned with the welfare of ALF members 
facing trial or jail sentences for actions and in fundraising . The ALF tends also 
to be used as the 'bogey man' who will come to get you if you don't take care. 
The BBC 2 Public Eye documentary 'Animal Wars' showed footage, 
where a demonstrator was chanting, to the tune of the Red Flag: 'do beware, 
the ALF are everywhere'. The ALF are, however, only one part of a 
movement that comprises those who seek rights for animals and those who 
seek better welfare conditions for them. Many other members of the Animal 
Rights Movement, however, reject the violent methods of the ALF feeling 
that they are damaging and worthless 
Organizations abound for those who wish to become involved with the 
wider animal protection movement, from those such as the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) which has concentrated on many issues 
concerning the welfare of all types of animals to single issue organizations 
such as Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) which is solely concerned with 
agricultural animals, or the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection 
(BUAV), the National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS) (Garner 1993: 39). 
My own fieldwork suggests, that involvement in the Animal Rights 
community, means involvement with almost all of these organisations. All of 
my informants, whilst involved with protesting against the transportation of 
live animals, were members of all the above and even more organisations 
concerned with the animals' 'cause'. It is this multiple involvement that 
makes it difficult to come to concrete conclusions on the membership of the 
movement as a whole. Gamer estimates that there are around 150 national 
organisations. Some may only have a few members, but thirty-one have a 
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large membership (Garner 1993: 42). Of these thirty-one, eight originated 
in the nineteenth century, another eight between 1902-44, but since the 
1960s another fourteen have emerged (Garner 1993: 42). A similar pattern 
has emerged in the United States, with thirty-one organisations formed during 
the years 1950 to 1990, twenty-two of them emerging in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Garner 1993: 42). 
In addition to thirty-one national organisations, there has been a 
growth in local groups. I believe that. it is in the grass-roots local groups that 
the key to building and maintaining the movement and the community lies. 
Gamer reports that in 1991 there were 300 local 'grass roots' groups (Garner 
1993, 46). By April 1996 there were 360 (personal communication Animal 
Rights Coalition) 
Jasper and Nelkin, in their discussion of the growth of the Animal 
Rights'Movement, point to the disappearance of the animal from the everyday 
lives of modern urbanites apart from in the form of family pets as the growth 
of industry and urbanisation in America and Britain progressed, resulting in 
a romanticization of Nature and a growth in anthropomorphism associated 
with the retreat to the home from the vicissitudes of a market driven, 
impersonal society (Jasper & Nelkin 1992: 17). The emergence of these 
trends during the nineteenth century was discussed in my previous chapter. 
Jasper and Nelkin contend that recent research into the b~neficial effects of 
pet keeping has bolstered anthropomorphic notions about animals, by giving 
scientific credibility to it. 
Research into animal cognition, the representations of animals in 
storybooks and cartoons and the use of animals in television commercials, 
however, and the growing attention paid to the animal as a therapeutic aid, 
are considered by Jasper and Nelkin to have contributed to some extent to 
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the growth in the Animal Rights Movement, but are not sufficient to explain 
the explosion in interest which has taken place over the last twenty years 
(Jasper & Nelkin 1992: 20). 
Garner also agrees that increased public knowledge about the 
capabilities of animals has contributed to the growth of the movement, but 
that it is a combination of our new awareness of animals' capabilities and the 
evidence of the harsh treatment of the very same beings under intensive 
farming procedures and the use of them in science that has combined 
powerfully to motivate individuals to join the movement (Garner 1993: 65). 
It is here that Lowe & Goyder's notion of an 'attentive public' has been most 
powerful, that is 'those people who though they do not belong to any of the 
groups, share their values' (Lowe & Goyder 1983: 10). The publication of 
Ruth Harrison's expose of factory farming which resulted in public pressure 
to investigate the conditions of animals is such an instance. Many of these 
individuals will not join a group, but will lend their support, although this may 
be for a short time, whilst an issue is at the forefront of the national gaze. 
There has also been a great growth in pressure groups of all types since 
1945 and exceptionally since the 1960s (Garner 1993: 39). 
In the period following the Second World War, the middle class 
expanded and generations of children in the United States and Britain 
became the recipients of increased opportunities for higher education, 
economic security and the absence of military conflict within their own 
countries. In effect they were given the benefits of an education which 
allowed them to articulate their grievances about a materialistic society of 
which they were the beneficiaries. Economic stability allowed these 
generations to examine the values of society and as a result of this, they 
turned away from the ethos of material gain and towards the politics of 
values (Jasper & Nelkin 1992: 21). 
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Garner terms this a 'post-affluent political culture' and considers that 
it may well explain the growth in the Animal Rights Movement, relating this to 
the growth in concern for the welfare of animals during the affluent period of 
the nineteenth century and then the decline in the period between the two 
great wars at the beginning of this century (Garner 1993: 62). However, 
Gamer does concede that the making of a living is still important for people 
in Britain, and like the nineteenth century reform movements, the present 
movement is still predominantly middle-class in its nature, peopled by those 
who are materially comfortable enough to have the 'privilege of concern' 
(Garner 1993: 62). Unlike Jasper and Nelkin, Garner provides empirical 
evidence to support this argument, using figures from the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds, where in 1979 41 per cent of its membership came 
from the technical and clerical category (C 1) and only 20 per cent came form. 
the skilled working class (Garner 1993: 62). 
The growth in the Animal Rights Movement, then, would appear to 
have several causes; anthropomorphic notions about animals, a greater 
knowledge of animals' capabilities, an expanded, educated middle class with 
the 'privilege of concern' and an ideology provided by academics which has 
given the notion of animal rights a credibility it may have lacked in the past. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have explored the ways in which history is used as 
a referent by groups to give a common ancestry and as a validation for 
present day philosophies. The individual and community can locate their 
personal narratives within a larger one thereby giving a sense of 
authentication and tradition to a chosen identity and community. We have 
also examined how the animal rights movement has grown and evolved 
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through its historical encounters with other whose thinking conflicts with their 
own. Historical encounters with other groups sees the emergence of cultural 
traits which are the result of interaction, they tell us what 'we don't want to be' 
and so we develop cultural traits that distinguish us as what 'we do want to 
be'. 
In the ethnographic section of this thesis, Part II, commencing with 
Chapter 5 I will be exploring the notion of community and how the animal 
rights activists I studied construct, experience and express what they 'would 
like to be' and what they 'would not like to be' through the experience of 
community. 
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PART II 
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY 
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5 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AS COMMUNITY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I look at the 'Animal Rights Movement' as a community 
and adopt an emic approach to this (Redfield 1956: 81). That is, I examine 
this community as it is perceived and experienced by its own members. 
Members of the Animal Rights Movement involve themselves in many 
aspects of animal protection and this part of the study concerns the 
experience of one campaign by the community as an expression of 
community and of a distinctive identity. I consider that this campaign 
represents the diverse views within the Animal Rights Movement which are 
held together by a symbolic notion of community. The experience of this 
campaign by the participants illustrates the ways in which the concept of 
community mobilises diverse individuals who each derive their own meaning 
from Animal Rights and yet create a community which is experienced as 
distinctive yet shared by them and perceived as such by the outside world. 
In order to examine 'Animal Rights' as a form of community, it is first 
of all necessary to justify this position by establishing why I consider the 
movement to display characteristics of community. Whilst researching this 
subject a recurrent theme was a sense of dislocation after what I will call, 
following Giddens, a 'fateful moment'. This was followed by attempts to 
relocate themselves as individuals within a group of like minded individuals 
to support their new world view and support and guide their construction of 
a new identity. 
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5.1.2 Constructs of Community 
The concept of community is a thorny one, in that it means 
many different things to many different people. Redfield in 1956 identified 
'community' by its distinctiveness and seeming homogeneity and the 
problems of maintaining this distinctiveness through self-definition from 
'others' either by distance or difference. Fredrik Barth (1969) built upon these 
ideas when he addressed the question of ethnic boundaries an area which 
had been given little examination by previous anthropologists who had 
addressed cultures in isolation. In doing so, Barth opened up a field of 
investigation of the processes involved in adopting and maintaining a group 
and individual identity, whilst interacting with 'others'. He proposed that 
ethnic groups were 'categories of ascription and identification by the actors 
themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction 
between people' (Barth 1969 (a), 10). 
This being so, it is not difficult to transfer Barth's logic to any set of 
social actors, who choose to ascribe to and identify with a particular social 
group and through this interact with individuals of like mind. Barth removed 
notions of geographical and social isolation as the prime factors involved in 
cultural difference and replaced it with a theory that people actively construct 
and maintain their own sense of difference at the boundaries which define 
them (Barth 1969(a)). This was the first step along the way to a notion of the 
construction of communities of meaning, which was taken up by A P Cohen, 
in Belonging and The Symbolic Construction of Community (Cohen 1982: 
1985). The idea that a sense of community is largely one of thought rather 
than geographical location was also taken up by Benedict Anderson in 1983. 
In his discussion of nationalism, Anderson asserts that 'all communities larger 
than primordial villages of face-ta-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
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falsity/genuiness, but by the style in which they are imagined' (Anderson 
, 
1983, 6). The style which this imagining takes is that of a community of 
'deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson 1983, 7). This way we come 
towards a definition of community that is constituted by a 'meeting of minds'. 
In How Institutions Think (1987), Mary Douglas suggested that a 
theory of institutions was needed that addressed what she called the 
'unsociological view of human cognition' (Douglas 1987, ix), which stresses 
the western view of cognition as an individual process rather than the way 
society informs and moulds the way that individuals think. Douglas applies 
the word institution to social groups proposing that an institution is a 
convention produced by a common interest in regulation to prevent deviation 
and encourage harmony. Thus by definition the institution or social group 
sets up rules to police itself (Douglas, 1987, 46). It becomes a legitimate 
social institution when it acquires a 'parallel cognitive convention to sustain 
it' (Douglas, 1987, 46) either personal in the case of a family, a father figure 
perhaps or 'by common assent on some general founding principal ... the 
way that plants or humans or animals naturally behave' (Douglas 1987, 46-
47). 
Approaching the notion of group solidarity and co-operation Douglas 
(1987) uses the theories of Emile Durkheim (1912: 1976) and Ludwik Fleck 
(1935) who both proposed that these ends are only achieved when a 
collection of individuals share the same categories of thought (Douglas 1987, 
8). Using the combination model of Durkheim and Fleck's ideas Douglas 
produces the idea that a social group 'generates its own view of the world 
developing a thought style that sustains the pattern of interaction' (Douglas 
1987, 32). In Thought Styles (1996) Douglas develops the notion of a 
'thought style' as 'the communicative genre for a social unit speaking to itself 
about itself, and so constituting itself (Douglas 1996, xii). 
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I will be adopting a model which combines ideas from Redfield (1956), 
Cohen (1985) and Douglas (1987: 1996). Both the concept of symbolically 
constructed communities (Cohen) and Redfield's contention that we must go 
beyond the intuitively perceived whole to the particular physical 'entities that 
compose it' (Redfield 1956: 19) share a concern to understand the 
interrelationships or systems which support and create the whole. Traditional 
anthropological analyses of community concentrated on small-scale societies 
which appeared to highlight that 'simpler' societies thought differently to those 
in industrial society. Douglas notes Levy-Bruhl's (1952) contention that what 
brought this about was not that people in small-scale societies were not 
capable of logic, but before logic is applied an 'affective bias' is present which 
precludes the application of logic with 'mystic participation' (Douglas 1996, 
xii). 
Douglas contends that Bruhl is implying that industrial society has less 
affective bias, but what that leaves us with is the impossibility of 
understanding other modes of thought. She encourages us instead of looking 
to oth.er parts of the world to examine different modes of thought, to look to 
those that occur in industrial society and their role in the construction of 
different communities. 
This ·is such an examination. If we accept that community exists in 
meaning rather than locality we can move towards Douglas's idea of 'thought 
communities' and 'thought styles' which allows for several different 'thought 
communities' to co-exist in societies such as our own. This community is 
constructed by individuals who appear to display an 'affective bias' towards 
animals which produces what appears to those outside the community to be 
a 'mystic participation' in a cause and in behaviours which have little 
resonance in the cognitive worlds of those without this 'affective bias'. 
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All discussion of boundaries within this text will be directed at those 
boundaries that are social. These social boundaries do not isolate groups, 
there is rather an interaction, a flow of information across the boundaries and 
a flow of people. The whole purpose of the movement is to recruit and 
persuade; so by their nature, boundaries or points of interaction, are 
discursive negotiations both about the identity of the movement and the 
nature of mass society and views of an improved society and the model of the 
authentically human. 
In his discussion of ethnicity Eriksen (1993) makes the cogent point 
that boundaries between social groups are social productions with an 
importance which is variable and changeable (Eriksen 1993, 38). The 
informants who helped me in this study were all engaged in employment or 
had been and were part of mass society in their everyday lives. Communal 
expressions of being discrete from mass society were what Eriksen calls 
'situational' (Eriksen 1993, 3~). In some situations a discrete identity is of no 
importance, in others such as active campaigns against perceived animal 
cruelty it is of prime importance. Campaigns are crucial foci for the 
negotiation of a particular identity which continually questions the model of 
human supremacy over nature. Nick Fiddes contends that 'Killing, cooking 
and eating other animals' flesh provides perhaps the ultimate authentication 
of human superiority over the rest of nature ... ' (Fiddes 1991, 65). For 
animal rights activists this model is redundant and their own model of the 
authentically human both subverts and inverts this model. Protest sites 
provide situations where activists can interact with each other as part of a 
community and with 'others' outside the community in negotiations of identity. 
In his discussion of The Little Community Redfield (1956) gives us 
several criteria for establishing what is meant by community. His criteria are 
1) the distinctive nature of the community as it is perceived from the outside 
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and experienced within; 2) either the community is in itself small enough to 
be the subject of personal examination or it is part of a whole community, 
which is considered to be homogeneous and can be examined as a 
representative of the whole; 3) that it is homogeneous and 4) that it is self-
sufficient. 
In what ways does 'Animal Rights' as a community fit this 
model? It is distinctive, for several reasons. It seeks to separate itself from 
mass society in several ways. It has a distinctive ideology which influences 
and defines its followers in their everyday lives. This is expressed in several 
ways, pollution avoidance strategies, social interaction as a member of the 
community with the community, a view of mass society as the 'Other' and a 
policy of action by the community against mass society's view of animals 
which involves interaction with mass society. In turn, mass society appears 
to perceive the Animal Rights community as distinctive in that it is frequently 
ridiculed by those not of their persuasion and the members of the community 
stereotyped as a 'terrorist in a stocking mask' or a 'little old lady in tennis 
shoes' (Shapiro 1994: 146). Mass society in its tum is perceived by members 
of the movement as less socially evolved than themselves and either 
apathetic to the cruelty inflicted upon animals or actively engaged as abusers 
of animals. As Eriksen points out stereotypes facilitate the ordering of the 
complex social world and are important in the definition of boundaries. The 
stereotype contains information about the goodness of one's group and the 
vileness of the 'other' and are important in validating one's own affiliations 
(Eriksen 1993, 22) 
The Animal Rights Movement's appearance of homogeneity stems 
from mass society's common perception that its adherents are misguided 
extremists with more regard for animal life than for human life. Its self-
sufficiency results from a belief system and the constant social interactions 
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and behaviours which reinforce its distinctiveness and affirm its members 
identities in opposition to 'Others'. This appearance of homogeneity is also 
used to present a face of solidarity to those outside the community. 
Cohen contends that whilst all communities are in the mind the most 
important component of 'community' is its oppositional or relational 
nature. 'Community' ... expresses a relational idea: the opposition of one 
community to others ... the boundary marks the beginning and end of 
community ... the boundary encapsulates the identity of the community and 
like the identity of an individuat, is called into being by the exigencies of social 
interaction' (Cohen 1985: 12). As Cohen points out, however, a community 
does not simply become aware of its own culture and identity, it attributes 
value or otherwise to itself and to communities recognised as being different. 
'We are not, therefore, merely aware of our distinctiveness, but we tend to 
value it as well' (Cohen 1982: 5). Clifford Geertz as we know, contends that 
'We are ... incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves 
through culture - and not through culture in general but through highly 
particular forms of it: ... ' (Geertz 1973: 49). Geertz goes on to contend that 
cultural knowledge and belief are the referents used in establishing the truly 
human 'To be human ... is thus not to be Everyman; it is to be a particular 
kind of man, and of course men differ .. .' (Geertz 1973: 53). 
The Animal Rights Movement viewed as a community with a particular 
concept of what is authentically human, is an expression of such difference. 
It can be viewed as a moral community, it certainly views itself as such, its 
foundations rest upon an ideology which seeks to change the ways in which 
human beings treat other species and together with its practices indicate the 
construction of an alternative model for humanity. Douglas's notion of a 
'thought style' as a communicative genre through which a social unit 
constructs itself is particularly apposite in relation to the Animal Rights 
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Community. Its attempts to construct itself and disassemble the world view 
of mass society by questioning received wisdom and its efforts to persuade 
others to its own view, flow continuously through its literature, its sites of 
protest and through the everyday practices of its members. 
5.1.3 Defining The 'Other' 
The Animal Rights Community in its pursuit of the rights of animals, 
seeks to distinguish itself from mass society and claims a kinship with 
animals in opposition to human 'others' in this pursuit. This oppositional 
practice operates as a definition of the Animal Rights community. 
A message to activists ... and radicals, idealists and other crazy 
dreamers... For so long as you continue to be a good person 
in a bad society, you will be vilified. Keep at it. You will be 
slandered. Only during your lifetime. You will be called the 
worst person on Earth by people rather neatly fitting that 
description themselves. Take pride in having the right 
enemies. (Animal Rights Internet communication). 
Richard Tapper contends that in every society 'children have to learn 
how to distinguish Self from Other; and 'people not like me' (strangers, 
enemies and witches); 'not people' (usually animals), (Tapper 1994: 49-50). 
The activist quoted above illustrates that in defining 'enemies', 'people not 
like me', comes self-definition. Enemies, 'people not like me', are not truly 
human. 'Not people' (usually animals) are recognized as kin and the Animal 
Rights community, recognizing human animality and identifying kinship with 
animals through this, adopts strategies to protect animal kin , their usage by 
enemies and prohibits the eating of animal flesh. Levi-Strauss in his work 
The Savage Mind (1966 (a)) notes that food prohibitions are often involved 
with close identification with an object 'Ingestion or contact are regarded as 
a sort of auto-cannibalism. The relation between the person and the object 
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is so close that the person possesses the characteristics of the object with 
which he is identified' (Levi-Strauss 1966 (a), 78). Thus vegetarianism or 
veganism is a sine non qua of the community. 
Mary Douglas writes 'the contrast between man and not-man provides 
an analogy for the contrast between the member of the human community 
and the outsider' (Douglas cited in Tapper 1994: 50). For the Animal Rights 
community, the authentically human does not exploit animals, the 
authentically human recognises a kinship with animals and fights for this 
cause against human 'Others', who are outside the community. The Animal 
Rights community, is involved in two aspects of conflict with human 'Others'. 
It is engaged in a battle of persuasion and recruitment to its cause with mass 
society and a battle of opposition to active animal abusers. Mass society 
appears to be viewed, because of its appearance of indifference to the 
suffering of animal kin, as not quite properly human, but the active animal 
abusers, in this campaign, the farmers and farm workers appeared to be 
classified in a different way. Whilst members of mass society may not be 
quite 'properly human', the farm workers, appear to be classified as less 
evolved than other human beings. The farm workers, these particular 
'Others' are the 'dragknuckles'. 'The drag knuckles were noticeably quieter, 
more polite and not half so punchy' (Animal Protesters Bulletin: No 30; 14 
November 1995; p2). The idea of those who do not agree with the Animal 
Rights view of the world as being further down the evolutionary ladder, 
however, was as I found out not just reserved for active animal abusers, but 
illustrated an idea that they held about themselves. Several opinions 
expressed by the group I worked with depicted the Animal Rights self as one 
that was more evolved than others. 
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5.2 Expressing and Experiencing Community 
Following Redfield I have concentrated on one part of a whole, a 
particular campaign against live-exports, using Cohen I use their protest site 
as a ritualistic occasion when they can publicly and communally express and 
experience their distinctiveness whilst entering into a discourse with mass 
society. Douglas's notion of the 'thought style' as a communicative genre 
which constitutes the social group is also highlighted. 
Following Redfield I will look at those aspects of the community which 
he contends are useful to come to an understanding of any community. I will 
examine the social structure of the group, how they mobilise themselves to 
act as a community, and the expression of community through ritualistic 
protest. 
What produces the cohesion of the Animal Rights community which 
enables us to consider it as a whole? Following Cohen I would propose that 
this apparent cohesion is created by using the notion of 'Animal Rights' as a 
symbol 'symbols permit interpretation and provide scope for interpretive 
manoeuvre by those who use them ... they 'express' other things in ways 
which allow their common form to be retained and shared among the 
members of a group, whilst not imposing upon these people the constraints 
of uniform meaning' (Cohen 1985, 18). For my purposes, then I can usefully 
use 'Animal Rights' as the symbol to which members of the community can 
attach themselves, perceive themselves and 'others' whilst each can make 
a separate meaning for themselves. 
115 
Symbols are effective because they are imprecise ... part of 
their meaning is 'subjective'. They are, therefore, ideal media 
through which people can speak a 'common' language, behave 
in apparently similar ways, participate in the 'same' rituals, ... 
and so forth, without subordinating themselves to a tyranny of 
orthodoxy. Individuality and commonality are thus reconcilable 
(Cohen 1985, 21) 
Symbols are also effective recipes for action, which in this case allows 
the diverse individuals amongst the' community to act together. Thus, within 
the community vegans and vegetarians, welfarists and abolitionists can work 
together towards what they perceive is a common aim. It is essential in the 
formation of any viable community that members and prospective members 
'make, or believe they make, a similar sense of things .. .' (Cohen 1985, 16). 
Members of the Animal Rights Movement, regardless of location, consider 
that together with other members of their movement they have made 'a 
similar sense of things'. The movement has evolved from its beginnings in 
the eighteenth century into a social institution legitimised by its history and 
constituting itself through what Douglas would call a 'thought style'. In what 
follows I hope to illuminate the theories which I have discussed by applying 
them to the analyses of the discourse and behaviours of a contemporary 
group of animal rights activists as they construct and experience community 
and a personal and shared identity which reflects their own world view which 
they perceive to be in contestation with that of the world view of mass society. 
When these two world views meet the scene is set for a discourse over the 
true nature of the authentically human feelings of community and negotiations 
for a personal and shared identity are experienced and strengthened. 
5.3 Animal Rights Activists in 1995: Live Exports Opponents 
In the introduction to this thesis I briefly described the core group of 
activists I worked with. At this point I would like to reintroduce the reader to 
them. My core research group consisted of seven women and four men a 
116 
ratio which I indicated in the introduction mirrors the greater presence of 
women in the movement generally (Pious 1991; Jasper & Nelkin 1992, 
Jamison & Lunch 1992). From my observations at protest sites it is also 
obvious that many of the campaigners are middle-aged, middle-class women 
who quite possibly have more free time in which to engage in protest. More 
importantly I feel these women have had the time and life experience to 
reflect on the nature and actions of human beings. 
The male contingent consisted of Alan and John both engineers, Tom 
a retired naturopath and Jack a scientist. The female members of the core 
group were Mary, Victoria, Priscilla and Anna all office workers, Kit a retired 
teacher and Sandy who originally trained as a nurse and who now runs her 
own business and Joan who was a teacher. As can be seen from Appendix 
1 all were members of many different animal rights and animal welfare 
organisations and this multiple membership will be discussed in detail in this 
part of the thesis. 
Below are 'thumbnail' sketches of the core group in which I highlight 
some of the themes which will be discussed in later chapters. 
SANDY 
Sandy was my main informant who accompanied me to the protest 
site and took me on shopping expeditions in vegetarian/vegan style. At the 
time of the study Sandy was 39 and a single parent with one child trying to 
run her own business and living in 'Spatown'. Sandy grew up in the 
countryside and her father kept 500 hens as a sideline to his main job. In his 
youth he had worked on farms when they were still using horses to pull 
ploughs. Sandy ate a meat diet and never associated the hens outside with 
the chicken on the plate for Sunday lunch until she was 11 years old. 
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It was then that Sandy became vegetarian and was surprised and 
pleased that her mother supported her in this. Sandy's father was also 
tolerant of her views without sharing them. After the death of Sandy's father, 
her mother, too, became a vegetarian. During her childhood her mother kept 
'open house' for discarded pets and the family itself had pets of their own. 
Sandy sees herself as in the past rather a champion of the 'underdog', but 
feels as she has got older less inclined that way when it comes to human 
beings. At school she refused to do dissections on frogs in Biology class and 
cook meat in Domestic Science class and instead of being set alternative 
work spent most of her time excluded from these lessons. Sandy's first 
animal rights action was to liberate a white rat from school which her mother 
then had to care for. She admits to feeling very isolated for some years. 
'Even all the way through my nurse training I 
never met a nurse or patient who was vegetarian, 
which another 15 years down the line is no 
longer the case. ' 
After the completion of her training Sandy took up a full-time post in 
Edinburgh where she joined the Scottish Anti-Vivisection Society (now called 
Advocates for Animals). It was at this time that Sandy became a vegan 
because of the perceived cruelty involved in dairy farming. On returning to 
England Sandy became involved in the running of the Testing Action Group 
and later in the protest at Heathcliff. Sandy retired from nursing when her 
child was born and after her divorce has set up a contract cleaning firm in 
which she only uses 'animal free' products. Whilst Sandy is a committed 
animal rightist and vegan, unlike my other informants she does have close 
friends who are meat eaters. 
7 love them to bits, but I have'to say, that I do consider myself 
to be a couple of rungs up the evolutionary ladder from them. ' 
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TOM 
Tom was my one informant that I could describe as coming from an 
'unconventional' background, his parents were both vegetarian (converted to 
vegetarianism by an Indian doctor). Tom was born in 1927. Tom's father 
was imprisoned for two and a half years during the 1914-18 war as a 
conscientious objector. He described his home background as one of 'peace 
and the love of all life'. The family had a pet cat while Tom was growing up 
and he felt that from an early age 'care and kindness to all animals was just 
a part of our life'. Tom attended a boarding school and whilst he was at 
school studying biology he felt that the subject brought a 'sense of wonder 
and increased a reverence for life'. Tom studied Naturopathy in Edinburgh 
where 'I became even more aware of the abuse of human privilege in the 
world of vivisection and medical trials, and the sheer mutilation of living 
organisms in the name of medical science'. Tom went on to practice as a 
Naturopath for forty years. He has had four children and now has ten 
grandchildren, all vegetarian. Tom's children and grandchildren have had no 
vaccinations or medical treatments other than assistance in childbirth and he 
considers they enjoy good health from 'applying the creative principles of life'. 
Tom has been a member of the Vegetarian Society for the greater part 
of his life. 
'Kindness, and positive conSideration, to human 
beings and all other forms of life must be at the 
fore-front of the constructive principle of life. 
Love and kindness generates its kind, hate and 
aggressiveness leads to decline. Sadly, where 
money and the greed for money enters human 
life, standards are perpetually lowered, even 
dropped if it might make a penny more! We are 
in the midst of a moral decline'. 
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KIT 
When Kit offered to complete her life-history for me, she did an 
interesting thing, she called it 'My Life - Part 2', which illustrates Kerby's point 
about narrative We notice change - that things and acquaintances are not 
as they once were(Kerby 1991, 36) 
At the time of the study Kit was 65 years old. Her life as an animal 
activist had commenced at the age of 40 and was brought about she felt by 
her first experience of pet ownership, a small kitten. Kit's children had all 
grown up and left home and she felt that the kitten had initially reawakened 
her maternal instincts which had then appeared to translate themselves into 
a deep empathy with animals and a disillusionment with humanity. Shortly 
after acquiring her kitten Kit moved from an urban environment to a rural one 
which she felt 'brought home' 
ANNA 
7"he cruelties of the countryside - the cows bel/owing all night 
after their calves were removed, the adult pigs trying to protect 
their young, when the transporters came onto the farm, the 
rows of dead crows strung up to deter other birds - to mention 
just a few' 
At the time of this study Anna was 23 years old and had a rural 
upbringing. Her older brother had developed a great empathy with animals 
and had become a moral vegetarian when he was six years old a decision 
she was to make for herself when she was 16. She did not become 
involved with Animal Rights until she was around 18, but this was a false start 
'1 didn't really feel I fitted in, straight away they were trying to 
get my friend and me running stalls and handing out leaflets, 
which we didn't fee/quite ready for so we didn't go again' 
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Anna, lives near the village of Heathcliff and her involvement with the 
group originated after she became a Vegan and a friend asked her to sign a 
petition to Ban Live Exports, she tried to get others to sign it, one of whom 
was a resident of Heathcliff. This person told Anna that she could hear the 
calves crying from where she lived, but that 'that was nature' and the 
protestors outside Victoria Farms every Monday were just a 'nuisance'. This 
person's attitude so incensed Anna that she felt moved to join the 'nuisances' 
outside the farm. 
Which I'm pleased I did because I like being amongst like-
minded people' 
PRISCILLA 
Priscilla was 51 years old at the time of the study and had been an 
Animal Rights activist since the early 1970s. Of all the life histories 
examined, this one was the only one that gave no sense of any other life 
other than that of the activist. Priscilla mentioned no family, no friends, 
nothing except the struggle for animal rights. Priscilla described feelings of 
depression and frustration not only with those who abuse animals or who are 
simply disinterested, but also with other activists. Originally converted to the 
cause by a stall set up by NAVS (National Anti-Vivisection Society), Priscilla 
went on to join the League Against Cruel Sports and to campaign for them by 
going door to door and into pubs with petitions. She then joined the 
committee of her local NAVS group. She became a Vegan in 1974 after 
watching a television programme presented by the Vegan Society. 
'In 1974 veggies were considered rather weird, vegans were 
unheard of ... I joined the Vegan Society and found their help 
invaluable, but I have never felt so alone in my whole life as I 
did during the next 12-18 months' 
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At this time Priscilla could not find suitable products for the vegan diet 
and then discovered the company Plamil who produced soya milk. She could 
only find one shop which stocked soya milk, and a margarine produced for the 
Jewish community which was also suitable for vegans. (Priscilla even 
managed to do a little campaigning in her life-history by inserting a sticker 
advertising Plamil). At the time companies did not list the contents of their 
products, so she was never sure what was suitable. 
'Even now you're not sure what you're getting - for instance 
Safeway tomato sauce, looked to be Vegan, but when I got it 
home it said 'suitable for gluten free diets and cows milk free 
diets', no mention of vegetarians. My next job is to write and 
ask why it is not suitable for vegetarians, which it clearly isn't or 
they would have said' 
Priscilla appears to be a tireless campaigner and her multiple 
membership of animal organisations has pushed her financially and 
emotionally. She wrote at length of her feelings of disillusionment with human 
beings including other activists but also wrote that she was driven by her 
feelings for animals. 
JOHN 
'1 get depressed when I do things which heighten my 
awareness of animal cruelty and guilty when I do nothing. Life 
was simpler, easier and less stressful when I knew nothing' 
At the time of the study John was 49 years old, married and an 
employed engineer living in 'Spatown'. He wrote that he considered that he 
had had a fairly conventional upbringing and conventional relationships with 
animals, both having pets and eating other animals. During his twenties he 
had lived on a kibbutz and although considering himself compassionate 
towards animals he still ate them and in fact helped unloading fishing boats 
and packed chickens into crates. It was whilst he was in Lebanon that he 
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experienced an event that began his conversion to animal rights activism. He 
shot a small bird for no reason at all and at the time of his writing he 
described the effect of this event on his life 
'This was the largest creature I have killed, before, or since that 
time. It now hangs round my neck like an albatross and I still 
don't know why I killed it' 
This event had not changed his dietary habits, but during the late 
1980s because of the various food 'scares' which had gone on he began to 
cut down on meat consumption to the extent that he began to consider 
becoming a vegetarian and joined the Vegetarian Society in 1990. After this 
his attention began to turn to other reasons for becoming a vegetarian 
'Animal rights, the environment, 3rd world issues, economics, 
etc. I began to realise that good health was only one reason 
for going vegetarian and that in many ways the other reasons 
might be more important' 
As the years have gone on John has become increasingly involved in 
animal rights issues and as a result of his interest in animal rights his views 
on vegetarianism became more determined, but less health based. 
John is now a vegan and considers his main aim in life is to convert 
people to a vegan/cruelty free diet and feels that there is a difference 
between himself and people who are non-protesting and non-vegetarian. 
When it comes to animal rights I believe that animals have a 
right to be as 'happy' and uninterfered with (ie unless 
interference is in their best interest) as possible. A basic 
human desire is to feel as little pain as possible and since 
animals strongly appear to have a capacity to feel pain, I, as a 
fellow creature of the universe would not want them to suffer. ' 
123 
MARY 
Mary was the least experienced of the activists, but no less committed 
and was 45 years old at the time of this study and first became an animal 
rights activist in 1994 after seeing news reports of demonstrations at English 
ports and programmes about the suffering of animals during transportation. 
Her first experience in activism was a protest at Hull Docks over the shipment 
of pigs where she met up with a local animal rights group who told her about 
the protest at Heathcliff. 
Since her initial involvement Mary has increased her involvement and 
together with her grown up daughter and her husband spend most of their 
leisure time writing to MPs and others to pressurise the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Vets and the Government in the cause of animals. In addition to 
the protest at Heathcliff, they also travel to Dover to protest at the docks 
there and use their membership of Respect, Animal Aid and Compassion in 
World Farming to monitor the campaign at national level. She has 
increasingly felt her respect for the Government and the Police Force 
diminish due to her involvement in activism. 
~s soon as you join an Animal Rights group you become public 
enemy number one and are treated likewise' 
'It has changed our lives because we are all vegetarian now, 
we know many people across the country who we are in touch 
with who are involved with the protests and have become our 
friends' 
In common with all of my other informants, Mary felt that it was her 
duty to speak for animals and express feelings of disillusionment with human 
beings generally and that animals should be left alone. 
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JOAN 
Vo what you like with animals as long as you have their 
permission in writing to do it. ' 
Joan was 24 years old at the time of this study and living in Spatown 
with her partner. As a child she was brought up in the countryside and her 
mother has told her that when she was young she had a deep affection for 
animals and that if she saw an animal get hurt on television she would cry, 
but if a person was injured 'she didn't bat an eyelid'. As she did live in a rural 
community most of the children she went to school with came from farming 
families, but when she was 14 she came across some leaflets from the BUAV 
and being appalled at the treatment of research animals. 
7 remember being horrified they could do such things to rabbits 
(we had 3 pet rabbits at home)'. 
At 15 she became a vegetarian. She cannot remember one particular 
thing persuading her to become a vegetarian, but remembers reading a lot 
of leaflets and the reality of actually eating animals becoming clear to her. 
'You know, the cute lambs you can see from your bedroom 
window, the cows you stroke over the wall on the way to 
school' 
At 18 she moved to 'Spatown' to go to college and joined her first local 
Animal Rights group and the Testing Action Group becoming involved in 
demonstrations, marches and street stalls. Street stalls she felt were of great 
importance because 
'educating the general public is the way forward, so many 
things are kept quiet, so many things are taboo' 
When she was 20 Joan became a school teacher and remembers 
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being in the staff room with her packed lunch and the 'rest of the staff asking 
her what she did eat because she did not eat meat. She felt that people 
seemed to forget there were many other types of food other than meat. She 
was still involved with the anti-vivisection group and felt that having friends 
within this group and other animal rights groups had the advantage sharing 
the same focus in life. Joan met her partner at this time not at any group 
meeting, but in a pub and he was by coincidence rather than design, a 
vegetarian, although she did express the view that she did not think the 
relationship would have lasted if he had not been vegetarian. 
Around this time Joan heard of the export of animals from Humberside 
and joined the protest there and as the veal trade gained greater prominence 
in the public domain began to feel guilty about drinking milk and eating other 
dairy products and decided to become vegan. She also set up a SOCiety to 
rescue abandoned dogs in 'Spatown'. Her most recent involvement has been 
with the protest at 'Heathcliff, but admits that it has been a distressing 
experience. The proximity of the calves that she believes are in distress has 
had a depressing effect upon her. 
Joan expressed an interest in the research that I had undertaken as 
she felt that animal rights activism had a very negative image with the general 
public and flatteringly felt that somehow I might portray them in a more 
accurate way (which I hope I will have done). 
ALAN 
'/ think the general public think al/ Animal Rights campaigners 
wear balaclavas and bomb laboratories, but a lot of us are 
genuine' 
At the time of the study Alan was 36 years old, single and a resident 
of 'Spatown' where he worked as an engineer. Alan considered that he had 
126 
what he called a fairly typical upbringing and was raised on a 1ypical meat 
with every meal type diet'. His first introduction to what he called the cruelty 
of the meat diet/meat trade came about in 1978. On leaving school he had 
become an apprentice with the Local Authority and had to carry out work at 
the slaughter house where he saw that the animals were not always 
effectively stunned before being slaughtered. At first he claims he simply 
found this distasteful, but it did not raise any moral questions for him, but 
simply affected his appetite. His conversion to vegetarianism for health 
reasons came in 1986 although the fact that he mentioned his experience of 
the slaughterhouse may indicate that it had affected him on a deeper level 
than he recognized. His membership of the Vegetarian Society began what 
he called his education into the 'cruelty free' life style. In 1991 he gave up 
eggs due to the battery hen system and in 1993 became a vegan as he felt 
that being vegetarian was still indirectly supporting the meat industry. 
His first animal rights activity was with the Testing Action Group and 
later he became one of the key organisers of the Live Exports Opponents. 
Alan involves himself with keeping other sites of protest up to date on what 
is happening at Heathcliff through the Animal Protesters Bulletin. Alan is 
opposed to all uses of animals including pet keeping and believes that 
animals are sentient beings who should have just as many rights as humans 
and believes that human beings only use animals for one thing. 
'Human gain - usually financial. ' 
JACK 
Jack was 45 years old at the time of this study and was single and 
employed as a scientist in Local Government. He first became interested in 
the exploitation of animals in his last year at the University of Durham in 
1975. What prompted him to look at the issue was the showing of an anti-
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semitic film produced by Joseph Goebbels by the German Society at the 
University. His attention was drawn to animal cruelty (not anti-semitic 
feelings as he was aware of the propaganda aims of the film), although he did 
not become vegetarian at this time as he felt that he should not until the 
whole of society did. Jack then did some travelling in Spain during 1976 
where he observed more cruelty towards animals which he continued to mull 
over. 
In 1977 he joined the Hunt Saboteurs Association and became vegan 
at the same time. He wrote that the Animal Rights Movement was much 
smaller and more intimate at this time and concentrated on the saving of 
individual animals whilst he was more concerned with changing Society's 
attitude to animals as a whole. It was at this time that he became interested 
in the BUAV (British Union Against Vivisection), Animal Aid, Animal Activists 
and other Animal Rights organisations. He did not agree with or support 
what he called the anarchistic philosophy and methods of the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF) who he felt were in many cases involved in purely 
reactive campaigning with little structure or awareness of where they were 
heading and what limits they set on their style of campaigning ie. The extent 
of using illegal methods, destruction of property to achieve animal liberation. 
He did not feel that those running the ALF were giving a responsible lead to 
impressionable young people, who were not in any way prepared for stiff 
prison sentences and court appearances. 
In 1980 Jack helped set up a new national organization the NALL 
(Northern Animal Liberation League) based in Manchester. The principles of 
this organisation were based on a whole variety of campaigning methods 
including non-violent direct action. The direct actions involved hundreds of 
campaigns not a handful of campaigns as he thought the ALF contributed to. 
These involved taking part in daylight roof top protests at factory farms and 
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laboratories for instance. He felt that their organisation had tried to be very 
democratic and open and had tried to cover all areas of animal abuse. In 
1984 300 animal rights activists invaded ICl's main animal research 
laboratories in Cheshire and 20 campaigners were arrested, Jack being one 
of them. There followed an eight week trial and Jack was sent to prison for 
three months. 
The trial and prison sentence had a traumatic effect upon Jack and his 
partner at that time and their families and on his release he decided to step 
back from his activities a little and subsequently NALL ceased to be. Jack felt 
that in many ways it had succeeded in what it had set out to do - put the issue 
on the political agenda without harming human or animal life in the process. 
Jack felt that his involvement in the Animal Rights Movement had a 
major impact in his personal and social relationships. He found it difficult to 
get secure jobs and his involvement over 18 years had he felt necessitated 
sacrifice in terms of time given to friends, family and partners. 
In 1987 Jack was appointed to an employed position in an anti-
vivisection organisation as a fund raiser and undercover on research on behalf 
of the organisation. One of his projects was an undercover. investigation into 
the primate trade in the Phillippines and Indonesia, the film of which was 
shown by World in Action which resulted in a German film company being 
contacted by the traders to let the researchers know that their lives were 
worth very little if they returned to Indonesia. Jack worked for this 
organisation for eight years, but changes in its structure brought about a 
change in its focus and grass roots campaigning was low on their priority list 
and he felt that they had begun to compromise the principles with which they 
had been established in 1898. Further changes were to come with a split in 
the Executive of the organisation resulting in the dismissal of many staff, Jack 
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being one of them. Jack felt that the organisation had been infiltrated by 
those in the employ of organisations using vivisection because they had been 
too successful in bringing the issue to the public's gaze. 
After this Jack became involved in the anti-live exports campaign and 
initially took a key role at Heathcliff as a media spokesperson and liaising with 
the police. Jack holds a strong spiritual belief 
'All life is connected and to abuse animals for whatever 
purpose results in harm to ourselves as well' 
VICTORIA 
Victoria was 54 years old at the time of the study, married with two 
children. As a child Victoria refused to eat animals such as rabbit and 
pheasant because she reasoned that farm animals were meant to be eaten 
and these were not. She became interested in animal rights during the 
1980s as a result of a cruelty free cosmetic campaign. She joined Animal Aid 
in early 1983 and became a vegetarian at the same time and joined the 
Vegetarian Society. After joining Animal Aid she read Peter Singer's book 
Animal Liberation which 
'made me 'know' that I had made the right choice' 
Where she lived there were no social groups interested in the same 
things as Victoria so she joined the London Vegetarians to meet new friends 
as she found it hard and still does to eat with non-vegetarians. When she 
moved to the US Victoria went to her first ever demonstration against the 
wearing of fur, but otherwise she did. not socialise out of her work 
environment due to the fact that most people did not share her vegetarian 
outlook. Whilst in the US she received the Vegetarian Society magazine. 
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She found it useful in a society that she felt was obsessed with celebrity to 
point out to others the celebrities which the Vegetarian Society use in their 
publication to point to the popularity of the cause. 
Victoria is also a member of the Bom Free Foundation and is involved 
with the fund raising for the Dr Hadwen Trust (A medical trust which 
investigates alternatives to using animals for research). 
In the summer of 1986 Victoria became vegan when inspired by a 
work colleague who was very athletic and also a vegan. Victoria had 
previously been doubtful about the health issues surrounding veganism, but 
this woman proved a role model for her. She found the transition to 
veganism a slower process than becoming vegetarian which had been a 'no 
more' decision, veganism is more complex. She also joined the Vegan 
Society and since then the Movement for Compassionate Living and the 
Ghandi Foundation which she says both continue the process towards a 
more thoughtful way of living. 
Victoria has been involved in the protest at Heathcliff since the 
beginning and also does vegetarian cookery demonstrations, talks and 
supports stalls and distributes leaflets. Her aim in life: 
To live causing as little harm to the planet, other people or 
animals while looking after myself and my happiness' 
These are the core members of the group and below on page 132 in 
Box 5.1 I show a diary of their year of protest against the export of live 
animals to the European continent which was conducted outside the gates of 
a farm in the North of England. 
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BOX 5.1 
*DIARY OF THE COMMUNITY'S CAMPAIGN 
1995 
16 January 
22 January 
4 February 
20 February 
21 February 
2 March 
27 March 
28 March 
5 April 
6 April 
1 May 
25 May 
20 August 
6 November 
1996 
23 January 
22 February 
Having discovered that live animals are transported to Europe for the veal trade 
from Victoria Palace Farms at Heathcliff, hate mail is sent to the farm by certain 
members of the community. 
Animal Rights demonstrators begin protesting outside the home of Victoria Palace 
Farms' Managing Director. 
Letter bomb reported to have been sent to Victoria Palace Farms, Heathcliff, by 
the community. 
Members of the Animal Rights community calling themselves The North Against 
Live Exports commence protests outside Victoria Palace Farms. 
16 members of the community arrested during a demonstration outside Victoria 
Palace Farms. 
The community decide to hold a weekly peaceful vigil outside Victoria Palace 
Farms. 
Victoria Palace Farm staff accuse the community of bullying tactics and 
endangering lives. 
Police accuse the community of inciting young people (children) to get involved 
in angry protest, the police, were in this instance, the community policeman. 
According to the activists the community policeman told the newspapers that the 
protesters were throwing their own children under the transporter lorries - the 
protesters consider the community policeman in the pocket of the farm owners. 
The local MP when requested to meet with the community refuses. 
The community requests round table talks, but Victoria Palace Farm refuses to· 
negotiate with them on the basis that the farm is doing nothing wrong. 
100 protesters take the campaign to the county town to recruit support. 
Agricultural Secretary William Waldegrave gives backing to continued veal exports 
from Victoria Palace Farms. 
120 protesters join a mass rally at Heathcliff and lay wreaths for the exported 
calves. 
The community claim their actions have forced Victoria Palace Farms to stop 
transporting at night. 
The community now calling themselves Live Exports Opponents say peaceful 
protests at the vigil will continue each Monday. 
The community organize a mass vigil to commemorate one year's protest. One 
arrest is made. 
*Infonnation extracted from the local newspaper (Yorkshire Evening Press) and the Animal 
Protesters Bulletin. 
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In what follows I will be examining the Campaign as an Expression of 
Community, the Social Structure of the Group and the Vigil as an Expression 
of Community directed towards their own definition of an authentically human 
identity and community. 
5.3.1 The Campaign As An Expression of Community 
What we are witnessing on the streets of Shoreham, 
Brightlingsea and Coventry is ... a clear expression of a belief 
in a different way of doing things, a different and better kind of 
world (Michael Mansfield QC: The Guardian 14 April 1995) 
The campaign which my informants have been involved with has been 
one against the transportation of live animals to Europe. Whilst the 
community took to the streets, the docks and the airports in the South of 
England, a rural village in North Yorkshire where the trade was being 
supplied also became a target for the grassroots community. The issue of 
live transportation of animals has been one which has not only mobilised 
animal rights activists, but also what Lowe and Goyder refer to as an 
'attentive public', 'those people who though they do not belong to any of the 
groups, share their values' (Lowe & Goyder 1983: 10). This campaign has 
been undertaken at a national level by Compassion in World Farming and at 
a local level by grassroots activists. The national campaign by Compassion 
in World Farming has been going on for the last thirty years, but it is only in 
the past couple of years that a huge amount of public interest had been 
aroused. 
All of my core group informants are grassroots activists, who have 
been active in the Animal Rights Movement for several years. But in the 
course of my fieldwork, I have met several individuals who had been attracted 
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to the movement in the last two years, specifically by the live exports issue. 
The form which the local campaign has taken has been that of a vigil 
outside the gates of a North Yorkshire farm where the animals are collected 
together to be transported for export. 
At the beginning of the campaign in February 1995, around 100 
protesters could be found outside the gates of the farm, but a year into the 
campaign, the 'attentive public' have drifted away and we are left with a core 
group which I consider are fairly representative of the general animal rights 
community, still there. They remain locked in a battle against the 'animal 
abusers' and an 'inattentive public' while expressing and deriving meaning 
from this. 
Some of the core groups members have also been actively involved 
in a campaign in another Yorkshire town against a research laboratory which 
carries out commercial testing on live animals including primates. This 
campaign has been running since 1983, but due to lack of resources is not 
particularly active at this moment. However, it continues in the form of a 
Christmas Day Vigil outside the laboratories where members of the 
community gather and plant white crosses in memory of the animals that 
have died during the experiments. All of the core group of this campaign also 
attend this Christmas Day Vigil, whilst not all of them have been involved in 
the campaign in any other way. 
5.3.2 Social Structure 
As previously discussed, the Animal Rights community is not 
geographically bounded its boundaries are produced through interaction with 
others. It is a community that is supported by an ideology or 'thought style' 
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and activated when it confronts or is confronted by others. Therefore it is not 
the archetypal 'little community' normally studied by anthropology, but more 
representative of interest groups in complex society. Both Animal Welfare 
and Animal Liberation groups operate within the 'thought style' of the Animal 
Rights community. There are great debates over strategies, smaller groups 
spring up and internal disputes result in their disintegration and usually their 
reappearance in another guise. But the human actors in these debates and 
argumentations continue to operate within the 'thought style' of the 
community. 
In the public face, internal variety disappears or coalesces into 
a simple statement. In its private mode, differentiation, variety 
and complexity proliferate (Cohen 1985, 24) 
Garner contends that in Britain today there are 150 identifiable national 
groups concerned with animal protection (Garner 1993, 42). Most national 
organisations, whilst having memberships gained through subscriptions, very 
rarely have local level branches (Garner 1993, 46). They may have a local 
representative as a contact. There is indeed a kind of suspicion expressed 
towards those larger organisations by the smaller voluntary grassroots 
activists. Certainly this is so among the people I have interviewed. Whilst 
the people I have talked to recognise the importance of Compassion in World 
Farming in gaining more welfare provisions for animals, they were suspicious 
of the organisation. 
Sandy felt that Compassion in World Farming was full of careerists 
and sexists who had lost their idealism. One of the members of her small 
activist group had been nominated by the group to stand as a voluntary 
representative for CIWF, but this post had gone to Bill who had been in a rival 
grassroots group in the past. Sandy knows Bill and they have mutual 
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acquaintances who have belonged to both their groups, but their intense 
rivalry has led to both of them denying that they know each other. Sandy also 
felt that Compassion in World Farming, rather than starting the protest 
against live exports, had jumped on the bandwagon and taken the glory.; 
But it was really the small local groups that highlighted this, and 
it captured the public's imagination, then Compassion in World 
Farming stepped in and took aI/ the credit. 
Alan felt that many people were suspicious of Compassion in World 
Farming because of its hierarchical nature and employment of well paid 
executives. 
A rejection of hierarchical groups even when they are operating within 
the same 'thought style' is illustrated by the growth in the number of grass 
roots groups which Garner contends has been 'startling' (Garner 1993, 46). 
In 1993, Garner points to 300 grassroots groups in existence, by Spring of 
1996, this number had grown to 360 (verbal communication from Animal 
Rights Coalition). 
The relationship between national groups and local representatives is 
informal and without obligation other than when the national body may donate 
money to a local group to help on a particular local campaign which fits in with 
their particular agenda at that time (Garner 1993, 46). 
Compassion in World Farming, which has been successful in lobbying 
both the British Parliament and European Parliament and gaining supporters 
there, does so by addressing the cruelties involved in factory farming and live 
animal exportation. Its ultimate goal lies in the abolition of the meat industry, 
but recognises that a mass campaign to convert the population to 
vegetarianism would be unsuccessful. It adopts a 'softly softly' approach. On 
136 
28 February 1995 Compassion in World Farming mobilised 3,000 supporters 
to a mass lobby of MPs (Agscene Spring 1995, 13). It manages the 
activation of its members through its quarterly magazine and newsletters 
issued to Compassion in World Farming Supporters. 
How do local groups with no particular structure manage to mobilise 
supporters for various events? They normally rely on a system of personal 
contacts (Gamer 1993, 46). Barnes refers to this as the social network 'a set 
of concrete interpersonal relationships linking individuals with other 
individuals' (Barnes 1968, 113). 
The weekly vigil outside the farm contains a core of around 10-12 
people who consistently attend. Some have attended for longer than others. 
Alan attends every week and contends that for this reason he will be 
endeavouring to arrange an anniversary vigil in mid-February to mark the 
anniversary of a year's protest, as he has been in constant attendance since 
the beginning. 
It tends to be the people who have been attending for the 
longest who are looked to, to organise things. There aren't any 
leaders 
Alan will discuss what to do and try to come to a consensus with the 
people at the protest. Then he and they will all contact people that they know 
who are involved in other animal-issue projects, who will then contact others, 
to mobilise support for the event. Once this procedure has begun, Alan 
contacts the Animal Protesters Bulletin office. The Animal Protesters Bulletin 
is distributed at each of the protest sites throughout the country each week 
and since the beginning of 1996 has also arrived on the Internet. This keeps 
all the protesters up to date with what is happening and any coming events. 
Alan's telephone number is printed in the bulletin so that people can contact 
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him. In addition to this, the event is published regularly in the ARC News 
(Animal Rights Coalition News), this publication is crucial to the grassroots 
movement as it publishes events going on all around the country, identifies 
new protests, the names of animal rights prisoners and the names of animal 
abusers. This publication is available to anyone who wishes to start up their 
own group or simply wishes to find out what is going on. It is sent out 
monthly. 
All of the people I have interviewed are currently involved with the live 
animal transportation issue,- many have also been involved with a local long 
running antivivisection protest run at different times by Sandy and Bill. Mike 
ran the original antivivisection protest with Bill, then Sandy started another 
one which ran alongside and there was some tension between them. Alan 
moved between the two, but was more involved with Mike and Bill. Now 
there is only one antivivisection campaign, run by Sandy. Over the years a 
friendship has grown between them, Sandy and Mike have supported Alan 
in the campaign against live exports and Sandy and Alan have supported 
Mike when his girlfriend left him and he made a suicide attempt. This is an 
example of interaction through network links. Bill is only really friendly with 
Mike now, as Bill has defected to Compassion in World Farming and left 
grassroots activism behind. 
Through their co-involvement with animal rights issues over a period 
of around ten years, this collection of people have developed a mutual 
support system which has come from a common aim and infiltrates other 
areas of their lives. They not only use this system to gain support for their 
objectives in pursuit of animal rights and affirming their membership of the 
community, but also for emotional support and friendship. 
The use of a social network in this case is a deliberate policy. A more 
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formal organisation is actively avoided because of the way that Parliament, 
through such legislation as the Criminal Justice Act, is at the moment taking 
steps to regulate public protest. Alan pointed out 'If there is no leader, then 
they can't be hassled by the police'. 
There is also a great deal of exchange of information at the weekly 
vigil. The vigil is attended by members of the animal rights community from 
all over Yorkshire, and on occasion beyond, information exchanged and then 
taken back to their local groups. The community also use a network for 
policing the activities of the lorry drivers who move the animals, in doing so 
they adopt the methods that the police have used on them. The protesters 
began to record the registration numbers of the lorries transporting the 
animals. Alan felt that this kept the lorry drivers from exceeding journey times 
and 'kept them on their toes'. The collection of registration numbers and a 
passing on of information to other protester sites allows the protesters to 
monitor journey times and locate where the animals are being transported to 
and from, as well as affirm their membership of the community. 
The use of a network, then becomes an effective method of organising 
a type of community which uses constant social interaction with fellow 
members in creating and maintaining their community. 
5.3.3 The Vigil As A Ritualistic Expression of A Symbolically 
Bounded Community 
Boundaries are marked because communities interact in some 
way or other with entities from which they are, or wish to be 
distinguished ... The boundary may be perceived in rather 
different terms not only by people on opposite sides of it, but 
also by people on the same side (Cohen 1985, 75) 
Anthony Cohen contends that 'ritual is an important means through 
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which people experience community' (Cohen 1985: 50), operating in a way 
that increases sensitivity and heightens awareness of the experience of 
community. 'It should not be surprising, therefore, to find ritual occupying a 
prominent place in the repertoire of symbolic devices through which 
community boundaries are affirmed and reinforced' (Cohen 1985: 50). 
It is through ritual that action and thought commingle and present 'a 
veritable window on the most important processes of social life' (8ell 1992: 
28). The enacting of a ritual not only highlights their own 'sense of difference 
'to the participants, but also signals it to 'others'. Whilst illuminating the 
central concerns of a community, it presents the participants with an 
opportunity to experience 'the world as it should be' transformed during ritual 
time to the 'world as it is'. 'In a ritual, the world as lived and the world as 
imagined, fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out 
to be the same world .. .' (Geertz 1973: 113). 
It is my concern here to discover what the central concerns of this 
community are - is it the winning of rights for animals which will elevate their 
position in the minds of human beings or is it more concerned with human 
identity? Are the animal rights community, seeking to project and experience 
an identity which confirms their superiority to human others, using the 'animal' 
as a metaphorical vehicle for this expression? 
Animals are used by human beings in almost every part of our lives. 
They are not only used as a source of food and clothing, they live with us in 
our homes as part of our families, they are used in the testing of cosmetics, 
drugs and weapons, whilst being presented to our children in their nursery 
books as furry clad human beings with many morality tales to tell us. Given 
this situation, the animal rights movement are engaged on a utopian mission 
with relatively little possibility of success, other than increased standards of 
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welfare for the animals who will ultimately be slaughtered or experimented 
upon. Therefore, given the utopian nature of their quest and the unlikelihood 
of their success, whilst I would not deny that concern for animals is involved, 
I would consider that animal rights is not the only 'name of the game'. I 
believe that what we are seeing is a search for human perfectibility expressed 
through animal rights, that perfectibility being that of the authentically human. 
In my description of the vigil I will discuss my reasons for contending 
this. But for the moment, I will go on to discuss the ritual process. 
5.3.4 The Ritual Process 
Edmund Leach (1961) contends that in the doing of ritual, special food, 
behaviours and dress are involved, as well as a changed status for the 
individuals involved. This involves a conception of time that is not 
continuous, but oppositional in its nature. 'With a pendulum view of time, the 
sequence of things is discontinuous; time is a succession of alternatives and 
full stops' (Leach 1961: 134). For Leach, the ritual process involves four 
stages, separation from the secular-profane world to the realm of the sacred, 
marginalisation where 'ordinary social time has stopped', desacrilization or 
aggregation where the individual returns to the sacred-profane world, and a 
fourth phase where the 'normal' life is resumed, until the pendulum swings 
back to 'sacred' time (Leach 1961: 135). 
Victor Turner (1969), following Van Gennep's earlier work in 1909, and 
Leach (1961) also contends that ritual involves the removal of the individual 
from ordinary life and space and its accompanying codes of conduct and 
rules. Turner's definition of ritual involves three stages, separation from 
ordinary life; a state of Iiminality or anti-structure where, like Leach, he 
considers that the normative order of things has been removed and a 
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reversal of 'norms' becomes the 'norm'. For Leach the wearing of 'funny hats' 
and 'false noses' becomes de rigeur (Leach 1961: 132-134). During this 
liminality stage Turner contends that an intense feeling of 'communitas' is 
achieved among the participants, a profound feeling of affiliation between the 
participants. This is followed by a reintegration phase when the individuals 
return to ordinary life. The vigil, as it is referred to by the members of the 
community, from my observation is all of this, and is also considered as such 
by other outside observers 'Residents of ....... a normally quiet village, had 
to accept the weekly ritual of protest .. .' (Yorkshire Evening Press 19 
February 1996: 5). Having argued that the vigil is a ritualistic happening, I 
shall now go on to discuss Turner's concept of 'communitas' in relation to this 
particular ritual. 
5.3.5 Communitas 
In his discussion of the ritual process, Turner argues that in complex 
industrial societies the search for communitas is not a search for the type of 
easy comradeship which arises through friendship or that experienced by co-
workers, but a search for a 'transformative experience', existential in its 
nature, and experienced communally (Turner 1969: 138). In search of 
communitas, the animal rights community experience what Turner calls 
'ideological communitas', an experience where their view of how 'men may 
best live together in comradely harmony' in this case with the animal world, 
is felt by the participants. The 'world as it should be' becomes the 'world as 
it is', and the underlying ethos of the community is expressed. 
Communitas is achieved when participants leave the life of 'structure' 
where obligations have to be fulfilled, obstacles overcome, decisions made 
and personal inclinations subsumed to that of the greater community, and 
become at one with the other participants in the ritual. A sense of power is 
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created through this feeling of communitas, but this must be transformed into 
practical application. 'It is no substitute for lucid thought and sustained will. 
On the other hand, structural action becomes arid and mechanical if those 
involved in it are not periodically immersed in the regenerative abyss of 
communitas' (Turner 1969: 139). 
This type of analysis gives us an insight into why the vigil takes place. 
The larger organisations concerned with animal protection, such as 
Compassion in World Farming, involve themselves in the lobbying of 
parliament in an attempt to have legislation on animal welfare improved, but 
the members of the community need face to face interaction and experience 
of communitas to refresh themselves, empower themselves and express their 
identity. The vigil also becomes a space for negotiation and discourse over 
what constitutes the authentically human. 
The animal rights community, could be classified as a peripheral 
community, but in the process of ritual, they become central and mass society 
operates on their periphery, and within that centrality they come to express 
feelings of power and communitas. I will now go on to describe what I have 
observed, and how I interpret the 'happenings' whilst hopefully conveying how 
the participants themselves feel. 
5 .. 3.6 The Vigil as Ritual 
A social unit speaking to itself about itself, and so constituting 
itself (Douglas 1996, xii) 
The vigil takes place each Monday and begins at midday, when 
members of the community begin to gather outside the gates of the farm. In 
the doing of this ritual, two purposes are served. Representatives of the 
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animal rights community are gathered together to affirm their identity, their 
sense of belonging and their oppositional stance to 'others' by giving a 
physical expression of 'difference' to an ideological 'difference', whilst at the 
same time inviting 'others' to ascribe to their 'thought style'. At ritualistic 
protest sites such as these the identity of the community is reinforced and 
affirmed and negotiated within the boundary activated by their interaction 
with those who they feel represent 'others' who are in direct conflict with 
them. At the same time as the very nature of the word 'vigil' implies, they are 
'keeping a watch' both over the behaviour of human 'others' and the 
treatment of their animal 'kin'. 
I have witnessed three types of vigil, which have differed in size and 
'success'. The campaign has now been going on for over a year and the 
numbers attending have dropped from around 120 at one point, to a regular 
attendance of around 20. 
I shall begin with a description of the nature of the vigil at the beginning 
of the campaign. In February 1995, the community decided to maintain a vigil 
outside the farm gates, a vigil which contained the ritualistic properties 
discussed above. The ritual of the vigil was enacted within a 'sacred' space 
demarcated by the participants. The arriving participants marked out the 
space by decorating the physical boundaries of the farm with the purple 
ribbons which are worn to indicate that an individual is a part of the 
community involved in the campaign against the transportation of live 
animals. Placards and posters were positioned around the gates of the farm, 
where the police occupied a space between the community and the 
community of 'animal abusers'. It is within this 'sacred' space that the ritual 
takes place. At this moment the participants are removed from ordinary life 
and space and its accompanying codes of conduct and rules and the donning 
of the 'funny hats' and 'false noses' can begin. To illustrate this, what better 
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than a song composed by a member of the community, originally to be used 
at Coventry, but now distributed by the community all over the country. 
On the first day of protest to ***** we did give, ... 
A hedge full of purple ribbons. 2 banging drums. 
3. Loud hailer calls. 4. Whistle blasts. 5. Out, out, 
outs! 6. Police cars wailing. 7. Cameras filming. 
8. Placards waving. 9. Torches shining. 10. 
Banners flying. 11. Songs a singing. 12. Cars a 
hooting... and a hedge full of purple ribbons. 
(Tune - The Twelve Days of Christmas) 
The participants involve themselves in meeting each other again, from 
my observations, affectionate embraces and 'kidding' begins amongst the 
participants and many discussions of how life is faring for them, not ordinary 
social life, but how battle for animal rights in their location. Amongst the 
participants are those closely involved with running animal sanctuaries, as well 
as those who have little direct contact with the welfarist part of the Animal Rights 
Movements and are solely concerned with the advancement of rights. Some 
participants, in fact, show very little liking for animals. On one occasion, I 
witnessed an encounter between one female participant and another's dog, the 
woman recoiled and later told me that she could 
'see no difficulty with not being particularly keen on 
animals and being part of the Animal Rights Movement, I 
don't see the problem, I usually say I can't touch them 
because of my eczema, liking them and not wanting to see 
them abused are two different things'. 
As Cohen comments 'people can participate wi~hin the 'same' ritual yet 
find quite different meanings for it' (Cohen 1985: 54). 'The boundary represents 
the mask presented by the community to the outside world; it is the community's 
public face' (Cohen 1985: 74). 
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It is difficult to reconcile an attitude of revulsion towards animals which 
is displayed by participants such as the woman above and the dedication of a 
life to the pursuit of their rights. For some of the participants in this ritual, the 
meaning would seem more to do with their own identity rather than empathy with 
the plight of animals, whilst for others who are actively engaged in the 'hands 
on' welfare of animals, meaning is derived from both, so that claiming an 
identity as part of the community and empathy with animals conjoin. Like 
Cohen, Turner contends that during the liminal phase distinctions between 
participants tend to dissipate and the group appears homogenized. (Turner 
1969: 95). In reality amongst the activists at the protest site, in addition to the 
woman who appeared not to like animals particularly, yet was a vegan and an 
animal rights activist, there are others who may like the woman I mentioned in 
Chapter 1 continue to eat animals, but campaign for better treatment of them. 
These individuals are not animal rights activists, but may appear so to the 
outside eye simply because they are supporting the activists. These individuals 
will stand together with strict animal rights activists who follow the vegan or 
vegetarian paths in protest and yet will have very different motivations for 
participation. 
In addition to a prohibition on the discussion of 'normal' life, the 
participants behave in ways in which 'normal' life is inverted. In the 'normal' 
course of every day 'structured' life, there are severe prohibitions on the way 
that we interact with 'others'. The liminal phase in which the participants caught 
up, allows those prohibitions to be dropped, hence the participants are allowed 
to give vent to their feelings of outrage against 'animal abusers', by verbal 
insults, spitting and swearing at them. The rules of personal safety are also 
dropped, and behaviours such as lying down in front of transporter lorries are 
indulged in. The intrusion of 'others' who are not of the community, into the 
'sacred' space results in action by the community. The transporters coming 
through are met with cries of 'shame on you', angry gestures and attempts to 
146 
remove them from the space the community occupies. All of these actions 
embody those feelings of power which Turner argues emerges through 
communitas. 
It is during these events, that the participants appear to feel an 
empowerment that is absent in 'structured' normal life, where they are 
considered by many to be eccentric and are given little credence and little voice. 
Another way in which 'normal' 'structured' life is inverted, is the way in which the 
community uses the tactics used on them by the police, back to the police. The 
police would video the participants as they arrived and as the vigil went on, the 
participants then began to bring their own camcorders and as the police videoed 
them, they would be videoing the police. This also seemed to give them a 
certain amount feeling of power. As one participant laughingly observed of the 
police 
They don't know what's happening'. 
As the vigil continues, food sharing amongst the participants is indulged 
in. It is, however, a particular food sharing, which affirms identity and allows 
the participants to act in a transformed world. The 'world as it should be', 
during this time becomes the 'world as it is'. The participants no longer have to 
eat in the presence of those who indulge in the eating of the flesh of animals. 
During ritual time human beings are no longer carnivorous, all traces of animal 
are removed from food. This may in fact be even more symbolic, since some 
would contend that the Animal Rights Movement seek to remove animals from 
all parts of human life. This was voiced to me by Anna 
Sometimes I wonder what the world would be like without 
animals, at least they wouldn't be mistreated, abused and 
killed'. 
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As pointed out earlier Levi-Strauss (1966(b)) notes that food prohibitions 
are often involved with close identification with an object 'Ingestion or contact 
are regarded as a sort of auto-cannibalism. The relation between the person 
and the object is so close that the person possesses the characteristics of the 
object with which he is identified' ( Levi-Strauss 1966(b): 78). Central to the 
ideology of the Animal Rights community is an identification with 'animals', a 
recognition of animals as sentient beings and that the animal rights model for 
authentic humanness is a superior model for humanity. It comes as no 
surprise then that food sharing of a very distinctive kind is used in this ritual. 
This echoes the pOint made by Bell with regard to ritual providing an opportunity 
to see in microcosm the most important tenets of a particular social life (Bell 
1992: 28). 
The most important tenet of this particular community's life is 
vegetarianism or veganism as an expression of the animal free or cruelty free 
life. The food shared is generally vegan as veganism appears to be the highest 
state of authenticity at the moment. Lengthy debates take place over the 
ingredients of food stuffs to ensure that they are truly vegan or vegetarian. One 
lady had brought some home made cakes and offered them round. Questions 
were thrown in the air 
'Have they got eggs in them, because I can't eat them if 
they have, I'm a vegan'. 
'If they've got eggs in them, are you sure they are free 
range? Where did you get them?' 
If someone brings along some new food there is great interest over it, 
where it came from and how to get it and what is involved in the production. 
These discussions and deliberations over the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of food 
are also examples of negotiations of identity. 
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As night falls, the participants demarcate their sacred space with candles, 
and I observed many discussions over the difficulty of obtaining vegan candles, 
how does one know they are vegan, is there a regular supplier of these? As the 
vigil winds towards its end, usually around midnight, the conversation, begins 
to change and the participants prepare to return to normal 'structured' life, but 
in a regenerated state. The talk centres around what to do next to advance the 
campaign, when they will next meet. I have witnessed the Singing of the old 
song 'We'll meet again', which was used during the Second World War to create 
a feeling of communitas in Britain in the face of the enemy. It evokes the view 
of a community at war with others, but also regenerated and transformed into 
taking positive action in structured life after their experience of communitas and 
what Turner refers to as 'anti-structure' (Turner 1969) . 
The return to 'structured' life is marked both by the community removing 
their placards and candles, and also the police who whilst the participants are 
'packing up', tear down the purple ribbons, symbolically removing the community 
and as the·last participants drift away, the farm workers emerge from the farm 
into the space the community have occupied and join in the removal of the 
traces of the community. 
In line with Turner's contention that ritual and the resulting feeling of 
communitas may result in a feeling of regeneration, Moore suggests that at the 
least it produces is an 'attentive state of mind' (Moore & Myerhoff 1977: 7-8). 
This implies that there are 'more successful' and 'less successful' rituals. The 
ritual described above would be considered to be 'successful'. There were a 
large number of participants and as a result of this, there were large numbers 
of mass society there, represented by the police, spectators and farm workers, 
to witness this expression of identity and opposition. The presence of the 
representatives of mass society facilitates a greater expression of power during 
the liminal state and a greater feeling of communitas is achieved through this 
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expression. 
As the campaign has worn on, however, I have witnessed 'less 
successful' rituals. The numbers of the community have depleted, due I would 
think, to the 'attentive public' becoming less attentive, leaving only the core 
members of the community. As a result, whilst the community has had the 
opportunity of affirming itself, but it has had less opportunity of experiencing 
empowerment, as the opposition has depleted. 
Therefore, whilst an 'attentive state of mind' has been achieved, the 
feeling of empowerment has lessened and the community has had to take steps 
to increase the feeling of communitas, by appealing to other members of the 
community from farther afield to join them at intervals. When this has 
happened, instead of a small crowd of slightly dejected and cold looking people 
outside the farm gates, they have been transformed. On one occasion, 
protesters from Brightlingsea attended. They had arrived on a coach, dressed 
outrageously in bright colours and full of tales of disrupting a hunt and annoying 
the local vicar by appearing in the church to pray for the animals. The vigil on 
this occasion took on a celebratory tone amongst the participants and the verbal 
abuse of the police increased, particularly by the Brightlingsea protestors. At 
the end of this particular vigil, there was a great deal of singing and laughing, 
hooting of horns and the participants agreed that 1t was really fantastic!' 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the construct of community, the social 
structure of this group and their protest as an expression and experience of 
community. The vigil has been analysed as its ritualistic expression where it 
enters into a discourse with its own members and 'others' in the negotiation of 
a discrete identity. We have determined that a sense of community for the 
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animal rights movement is constructed through a perceived faculty of 'making 
the same sense of things'. In order to do this they ascertain that 'others' do not 
and use protest as a method of persuasion and condemnation and their 
'rightness' to distinguish themselves from the 'wrongness' of the 'other'. In their 
ritualistic behaviours they negotiate and maintain their distinctiveness. 
Following on from this examination of the concept of community and how 
the animal rights community finds public expression and meaning through social 
interaction with others at the boundary of their community, in my next chapter 
I intend to narrow my focus to that of the individual. Individual life-histories of 
activists have been examined to analyse the process of individual recruitment 
to the movement and the processes involved with the discarding elements of 
a particular personal and social identity. 
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6 
The Project of The Self 
Becoming An Animal Rights Activist - New Beginnings & Discard in 
The Construction of Identity 
6.1 Introduction 
I wish now to turn to how individuals enter the community and the 
processes which are involved in producing an animal rights identity, based on 
their own model for the authentically human. Personal identity appears to 
have assumed a greater importance under what some authors call postmodern 
conditions and others modernity or late modernity. Whilst discussing these 
authors' viewpoints, I will retain their terms, but prefer to place myself in no 
particular pOint of history other than the post-industrial phase of the late 
twentieth century. 
It has been contended that members of the contemporary animal rights 
movement have a strong awareness of 'self which is linked to the European 
Romantic tradition and that in this they follow in the footsteps of their historical 
antecedents, such as Rousseau and Shelley (Tester 1991, 146). Although I 
would contend that they have a strong desire for a sense of self rather than an 
awareness of self and a desire for structure. In order to explore this, it would 
appear necessary to understand what this notion of 'self is. 
In 1938 Marcel Mauss proposed that the European notion of the 'self is 
both a recent phenomenon and the result of a historical social process which 
began with the social role player (the personnage) (Mauss 1990). The 
'personnage' was a product of 'traditional' small scale society, created and 
bound by social duties and kinship ties alone with no assumption of an inner life. 
Under Roman influence the 'personnage' gave way in European history, to the 
'persona' , the site of legal obligations and citizenship and later with the 
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influence of the Stoics to the development of the "personnel! or 'person'. The 
meaning of the 'personne' was now not only the individual with legal obligations 
and rights to citizenship, but also a moral agent. Through the development of 
Christianity the 'person' was imbued with not only legal and civic obligations, but 
an inner spiritual life and conscience, or soul, considered unique to them 
'persona - substantia rationalis individua ... The person is a rational substance, 
indivisible and unique' (Cassiodorus, Psalmum VII cited in Mauss 1990, 20). 
At the commencement of his essay Mauss sets aside any consideration 
of the essential inner or psychological self which he refers to as the 'moi' and 
contends that what he is concerned with is the development of legalistic and 
moralistic notions of individuality and how this has contributed to Western 
understandings of the 'self. Through ethnographic examples he compares this 
with other societies' understanding of 'self, to illustrate that notions of the 'self 
are constituted by a particular set of social and cultural relationships which we 
refer to as 'Society'. Having at t,he commencement of the essay eschewed 
investigating the psychological essence of 'self, Mauss reintroduces the 
concept when he discusses the growth in sectarianism during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries a point in history when the 'personne' began to be 
equated with 'the category of 'self' (moi), the site of thought and action, a 
process which was completed during the nineteenth century 'From that time 
onwards the revolution in mentalities was accomplished. Each of us has our 
'self (moi), an echo of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, ... ' (Mauss 1990, 
22). 
In a response to Mauss, Carrithers (1985) takes up the notion of the inner 
self and following Mauss uses the term the moi. He, however, contends that 
whilst Mauss's analysis of history is interesting, he has reduced a complex plot 
to a single narrative of the 'self or the 'moi' which is inherently flawed. 
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Carrithers points to a narrative with perhaps many strands, but picks up two of 
them, the notions of the 'person' and the 'self. For purposes of clarity he 
employs "two terms of art", that of 'personne' and the 'moi'. The 'personne' he 
defines as a notion of the individual as a member of a recognised social group 
with legal and social obligations and rights. The 'personne' carries with it a 
social and legal history because these are necessary elements of its 
construction. The 'moi' he defines as; 
(1) the physical and mental individuality of 
human beings within (2) a natural or spiritual 
cosmos, and (3) interacting with each other 
as moral agents (Carrithers 1985, 236). 
Carrithers points to the essential distinction between these two concepts. 
The 'personne' may as a member of any collectivity have certain rights due from 
and be aware of duties towards that group but these may conflict directly with 
the 'moi' and their own view of how human beings should behave. Carrithers 
traces another historical narrative unfolding, a narrative not just of the person 
as a legally defined individual which restricts persons to merely being 
automatons, but a separate narrative that recognizes that human beings are 
psychosocial beings. We think about our being and our social relationships. In 
his discussion of the 'moi', Carrithers points to systems of thought which result 
in action which are not merely 'Society' driven, but based on individual 
deliberation and choice. 
Parallel to the narrative of the society-guided legal definition of the 
person, is the narrative of moral systems based on the individual. Carrithers 
uses the examples of Stoicism, Christianity and Buddhism. These are 
predicated not on the individual as a product of Society, but; 
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they expressly set out some reflective and argued view of 
human mental and physical individuality, of how the 
individual should act, these systems cannot be considered 
apart from that individuality ... (Carrithers 1985, 248) 
From this point of view, we cannot then dismiss the notion of an intrinsic 
and essential self, merely as a product of European recent history, a legalistic 
tool which resulted in the birth of a never-before encountered phenomenon, the 
human self. Even Mauss did not dismiss the existence of an essential self, 
unique to the individual; 
there has never existed a human being who has not been 
aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of 
his individuality (Mauss 1990, 3). 
I believe that what Mauss is arguing is that the notion of the 'self is 
constructed at different times and by different societies in different ways and for 
different purposes. For some societies the dominant notion of the self will be 
that of the 'personnage', the role player dependent on existence on interwoven 
social relationships. The 'personne' may dominate in societies where individual 
legal and moral responsibilities are of importance, societies where property and 
money are dominant economic spheres. In societies such as our own, I believe 
Mauss is saying that this legalistic model has become conflated with the inner 
self as the source of action and belief and that this 'self is 'Society' driven. 
Following Carrithers I consider that in societies such as our own, both notions 
of the 'personne' and the 'moi' coexist; 
These sorts of complex society make available such rich 
and disparate experiences to their members that both moi 
and personne theories can flourish in them (Carrithers 
1985,255). 
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In Steven Lukes discussion of Western individualism he pOints to three 
aspects of the concept, the inherent worth of the individual, that the individual 
is socially autonomous and measures social requirements and responds in a 
reflective manner and that the individual is essentially a private entity. 
This concept is rooted both in Modern and Romantic notions of the self. 
The Modernist as exemplified by philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham 
stressed the rationality of human beings as individual moral agents but who 
were moulded by the demands of 'Society'. The Romantics stressed the 
perfectibility of human beings through self development which was predicated 
on the notion of the individual human being set apart from 'Society' which was 
fundamentally flawed and living their lives according to their own moral code. 
This combination of understandings of the notion of the 'Self, of the 
public and the private is, I believe, the basis of a common notion that is shared 
by most people in British society at least. As Carrithers has pointed out, 
however, there may be some considerable dissonance between the 'personne' 
and the 'moi', the public and the private. Some things which are legally and 
morally acceptable in 'Society's' view are unacceptable privately. 
This is a central problem for the animal rightist, who in order to reconcil.e 
this dissonance must engage in strategies to negotiate a viable social identity, 
which authenticates the inner self. Herzog (1993) in ~ study of the psychology 
of American animal rights activists commented that within the movement there 
were inconsistencies between public beliefs and private behaviour, but certain 
committed individuals did try to reconcile these differences. He together with 
Pious (1991) based this observation on people who attended public 
demonstrations. The problem with this observation is that individuals who 
attend marches against the use of animals are not always animal rights activists; 
many will be welfarists, people who are anxious to promote better conditions for 
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animals or merely the 'attentive public' who are part of the larger animal 
protection movement. However, Herzog goes on to describe more committed 
individuals as undergoing a transformative process after committing themselves 
to animal rights (Herzog 1993, 110). It is this transformative process which is 
of interest. 
There is a notion that in Western society, the inner 'self or 'moi' has 
secured primacy over the social 'self, but in the construction of personal identity 
that personal identity must be recognized as socially viable, or it will fall within 
a continuum that flows from eccentricity to pathology. In essence, the notion 
of identity must be a shared one, which in no way detracts from the individual, 
but substantiates the individual by validation . 
. Writers such as Gergen (1991) suggest that in what he calls 'the 
postmodem world' the bombarding of the self with increased knowledge of the 
world and the opening out of the social world through technology, results in a 
'socially saturated' self with no vocabulary for its discussion. Gergen paints a 
world where both Romantic notions of the self which stressed individual depth, 
passion and morality and the Modernist notion which stressed the capacity for 
reason and continuity are fast disappearing. Under the conditions of 
postmodernism or social saturation, a continuous knowable, or authentic self 
disappears, and is replaced by the 'multiphrenic' self, the self which is more and 
more populated by the images and opportunities for 'being', through the 
increasing social relationships brought about by technologies. The postmodern 
multiphrenic self, is populated with many selves which may be called upon in 
response to differing situations and relationships. 
These relationships pull us in myriad directions, inviting us 
to play such variety of roles that the very concept of an 
'authentic self with knowable characteristics recedes from 
view. The fully saturated self becomes no self at all 
(Gergen 1991, 7) 
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Gergen contends that within this postmodern consciousness we see the 
loss of deeply held beliefs about the nature of the self. Truth, authenticity and 
continuity are replaced by a 'chameleon' self. This picture of post-traditional 
life is a picture first painted by Durkheim (1952) in his study of Suicide, and can 
appear bleak and empty. If individuals are perceived to be ever changing, then 
mistrust develops and a sense of meaninglessness can overwhelm. This sense 
of meaninglessness, which Durkheim termed 'anomie' and attributed to the loss 
of traditional norms and values, however, is something that can be combatted, 
precisely by the conditions which have produced it. The conditions of 
contemporary Western society create opportunities to construct an identity 
which do not preclude incorporating a search for authenticity and meaning into 
that identity, in response to the conditions of perceived meaninglessness. 
Anthony Giddens in his discussion of this particular historical point refers 
to the present period as "high' or 'late' modernity" (Giddens 1991, 2) terms 
originally coined by Tonnies in 1887 (Tonnies 1963). Whilst his picture of post-
traditional life coincides with that of Gergen, Giddens points not to a resulting 
'multiphrenic' self, but an increasing desire for an authentic and knowable self 
in response to these conditions. Where the conditions of pre-modern societies 
may have presented individuals with a 'fixed' identity, self identity in post-
traditional societies becomes 'a reflexive project' (Giddens 1991, 32). The 
reflexive project of self-identity, Giddens proposes, stems from a need for 
'Ontological Security: a sense of continuity and order in events ... ' (Giddens 
1991, 243). In terms of self-identity, this continuity is not Simply based upon 
'sameness' over time or a 'given' self, but upon the individual constantly creating 
and sustaining a self-identity which is 'reflexively understood by the person in 
terms of her or his biography (Giddens 1991, 53). To contend, however that 
this type of relational self is unique to post-traditional SOCieties, may be 
mistaken. Fred Myers in a study of Pintupi speaking Aboriginals notes that 
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personal identity is negotiated through social relationships which involves 
autonomy and shared identities. The individual consents to engage in 
relationships which confirm a particular identity, whilst rejecting others (Myers 
1988, 55 ). 
Ontological security also involves possessing answers to basic existential 
questions, and in the course of day to day life enacting these answers on a 
behavioural level, although self-identity is not simply behaviour, it is behaviour 
located within a particular narrative 'the ongoing 'story' about the self (Giddens 
1991,54). 
A person with a reasonably stable sense of self-identity 
has a feeling of biographical continuity which she is able 
to grasp reflexively and, to a greater or lesser degree, 
communicate to other people (Giddens 1991, 54) 
In his discussion of individualism, Lukes points out that central to the 
Romantic's view of the self was the idea of self-development (Lukes 1973, 67), 
Griswold suggests that for the postmodernist this idea is absent and contends 
that postmodern life has seen the 'decline of the meta narrative' which has been 
replaced by 'a growing cynicism based on the sense that life is meaningless and 
culture only a play of images without reference to some underlying reality' 
(Griswold 1994, 110). 
I would suggest that the emergence of the animal rights community and 
the animal rights self is a reaction against such a world. The animal rights 
activist seeks structure and incorporates both Romantic and Modernist notions 
of the self using the conditions of post-industrial life in the construction of an 
identity where the narrative project of the self is of great importance. 
It is my intention to illustrate how the animal rights activist engages with 
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the opportunities presented by contemporary post-industrial society in the 
construction of an identity, which is predicated upon the notion of 'authenticity'. 
This 'authenticity' is made up of two strands. One strand is the search for the 
'authenticity' of a self which is knowable and constant based on moral values 
and self-development and is narratively coherent. The second type of 
authenticity they seek is that of authentic humanness, not based on the 
existentialist notion of criterion-less choices of the individual, but based on a 
moral code and practices which define the authentic human from the lesser 
socially evolved human being; who is perceived to be cruel and blood thirsty and 
not in control of these aspects of their nature. This second strand is also part 
of the narrative of the social history of the animal protection movement. This 
narrative reached a hiatus during the period after the last World War and was 
taken up again in the 1960s. 
In pursuit of this authenticity, animal rights activists must engage in 
practices which confirm personal identity and set up social relations with others 
of similar mind. This they do through bodily practices involved with notions of 
pollution and through ritual activity and the use of material culture to set up 
social relationships with others which confirm a shared and personal identity. 
Central to the construction of the animal rightist's identity is a point of 
reformation, the beginning of a particular narrative. Jasper & Poulsen (1992) 
refer to the recruitment of animal rights activists as being through a 'moral 
shock'. Giddens would term these 'fateful moments', moments which require 
the individual to confront existential questions (Giddens 1991, 203). After 
experiencing a 'moral shock', the individual is confronted with the questions 
'How shall I live my life?', 'Should I change how I live my life? 'For Turner 
(1974) this would be a liminoid experience, the opportunity to step outside the 
norms of everyday life and question. If the answer to those questions is the 
abandonment of one lifestyle and the taking up of another, it is also part of the 
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ongoing narrative of the self. 
Carrithers (1992) points to narrative thought as the means of interpreting 
and predicting the intentions of others, the present conditions of social life within 
a landscape of the past and a predicted future and mediating our actions and 
responses to situations. These responses will be culturally and historically 
specific and supply us with an orientation within which we can act in a way 
which makes sense in our particular life 'story'. 
For Douglas (1987), this involves cognitive choices and thought styles 
which, when conjoined with the similar thought styles of others, form thought 
worlds or communities. This involves Carrither's notion of the ability of human 
beings to mind read the thoughts of others and the stories of others in a logical 
way. The human ability to mind read is one that was investigated originally by 
Schutz who termed it a 'scheme of interpretation' (Schutz 1972, 86). This 'mind 
reading' is illustrated by Cohen's theory that community exists in the minds of 
its members who 'make, or believe they make, a similar sense of things' (Cohen 
1985, 16). At the point of reformation, the animal rights activist engages with 
others whose thinking they believe is similar to their own, in the construction of 
both a personal and shared social identity. 
In so far as it is dominated by the core perspectives of 
modernity, the project of the self remains one of control, 
guided only by a morality of 'authenticity' (Giddens 1991, 
225) 
Social life in Britain and elsewhere in the Western World since the 
Second World War, presents individuals' with multiple choices of how to live 
their lives. Some people are content to answer the existential questions thrown 
up by contemporary conditions by the superficial multiple self. Others have a 
desire for the constant, essential and knowable. As Giddens points out: 
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Some individuals find it psychologically difficult or 
impossible to accept the existence of diverse, mutually 
conflicting authorities. They find that the freedom to 
choose is a burden and they seek solace in more 
overarching systems of authority ... an authority whose 
rules and provisions cover most aspects of his life 
(Giddens 1991(196). 
It is at this point that 'authenticity' becomes central. Members of the 
animal rights community are not part of a geographically located community, but 
a relational community of meaning. In order to protect the integrity of the 
community, traditional face~to-face communities engage in the mutual 
monitoring of individual behaviour. Within relational communities, the 
maintenance of an authentic self is the preeminent medium for monitoring 
behaviour to protect the integrity of the individual and the community. Whilst in 
relational communities the opportunities for face-to-face mutual monitoring of 
behaviour can only be engaged in under the circumstances of ritual activity, the 
self, in order to maintain its own integrity and authenticity, must continually 
engage in a process of eliminating any dissonance between itself and the 
community. 
In order to examine these processes I would firstly like to turn to how the 
individual enters the community. 
6.2 Entering the Community 
Pre-existing social networks for the recruitment of new members to social 
movements have, in recent years, been regarded as a prime factor for 
recruitment. James Jasper suggests, however, that unlike other contemporary 
social movements, the Animal Rights community relies heavily upon the 
recruitment of 'strangers' and that in recent surveys it was shown that only one 
third of animal activists were recruited through a personal network (Jasper 
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1992}. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald's (1988) theory that those who belong to 
several protest movements will be more liable to join another was only upheld 
by three of my core group of activists. Previous involvement in non-animal 
rights issues, however, was not a question which I addressed to them, but 
information which they volunteered and this would be an interesting topic to 
pursue, because the Animal Rights Movement has a its history of concern for 
humanity as well as animals. This dual concern, however, is one that is taken 
up by grassroots groups rather than the larger national organisations. The 
slogan used in many major demonstrations illustrates this dual concern 'Human 
Freedom, Animal Rights, One Struggle, One Fight'. 
Jasper and Poulsen assert that there has been an over-concentration on 
the recruitment of individuals to protest movements through previous and 
existing social networks and an under-concentration on the role of cultural 
meanings which pervade wider society (Jasper & Poulsen 1995, 493). In a 
survey of animal rights and anti-nuclear protestors, Jasper and Poulsen 
distinguished two discrete patterns of recruitment, one appeals to 'strangers' 
whilst the other to 'friends' or pre-existing social networks. 'Strangers can be 
recruited because of the beliefs and feelings they already have' (Jasper & 
Poulsen 1995, 494). If these beliefs and feelings are already in place without 
being mobilised, what is it which triggers that mobilisation? During my fieldwork, 
I was interested in what led people to subscribe to this community. What leads 
the members of the animal rights community to reject the morality and ideology 
of mass society and to take up a new identity or re-birth into a new community? 
Jasper & Nelkin (1992) contend that the animal rights community recruits 
new members through the use of 'moral shocks', the use of appalling images 
such as vivisection upon familiar domestic animals such as cats and dogs and 
animals which are closely related to humans, such as primates. They contend 
that these images 'appeal to anthropomorphic sympathies' (Jasper & Nelkin 
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1992: 44). They also go on to contend that, in the animal rights literature, these 
morally repugnant images are frequently contrasted with happy contented, 
'uninterfered' with animals. This is certainly well demonstrated in the literature 
provided by Compassion in World Farming, for instance whose glossy 
brochures usually have a front cover with a beautiful picture of contented 
animals (the world as it should be ) and whose back cover reveals the world as 
it is. See for example Agscene No 117, with a cover picture of a beautiful 
Guernsey cow and her little calf, cosily lying together in clean straw, the 
mother's eyes looking out at the reader - 'The bond we break for veal .. .', 
contrasted with the back cover where the awful truth is revealed and the world 
as it is confronts us with the solitary calf in a veal crate. 
Compassion in World Farming, however, uses very restrained images as 
part of its' softly, softly' approach, combined with the fact that it is preaching to 
the converted through this literature. To receive the literature one must be a 
member of Compassion in World Farming. In contrast to this a leaflet 
distributed by the Veggies Catering Campaign, a workers co-operative, wishing 
us a Happy Christmas carries a cover with the 'Grim Reaper' holding a dead 
turkey on a plate, complete with blood dripping from its throat 'How would you 
like your Christmas turkey - strangled? Knifed? Brutally slaughtered?'. This 
much more forceful tactic, is one which is used far more by the grassroots, 
egalitarian groups and are most frequently used when recruiting for the 
community from the outside when stalls are set up in town centres for the 
distribution of information and leaflets. 
From those informants who completed autobiographies, all except one 
had been recruited through some sort of 'moral shock'. This evidence was 
backed up by others I interviewed during the course of my fieldwork at the 
protest site. Most of my informants, had a tale to tell of their birth into the 
community through such an event. 
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At 14, whilst doing an English assignment I came across 
some leaflets about vivisection, (a draize test on a rabbit). 
I can remember it vividly. I think it was from the BUA V. I 
remember being horrified they could do such things to 
rabbits... I remember reading a lot of leaflets and being 
horrified at realizing you are eating animals ... 
I was out shopping when I suddenly came across a 
promotion on behalf of NA VS. There was a large poster of 
a monkey in a ZEIGLER chain. A metal chain to which the 
monkey is clamped with metal hand and leg cuffs, belt and 
head clamp to monitor the brain. I was horrified and went 
away with leaflets and application form, I was now a 
member of NA VS. It was 1972 and I was 27 years old. 
Not everyone is recruited through the community. Sometimes the 
attitudes of mass society provide a moral shock which promote an individuals 
entrance into the community or a direct life experience, becoming a vegetarian 
can also propel someone into the community through the Vegetarian Society's 
magazine. For one of my informants, Alan it was a direct life experience. 
Around 1978-79 the local authority with whom I was 
seNing my time, owned a local slaughter house and I had 
occasion to carry out installation and maintenance there. 
One frequent job was the repair of the electric stunning 
tongs. These failed frequently, so in retrospect, I believe 
many animals probably were not properly stunned. I was 
able to watch the whole process from the animals in pens 
to ending up as 'sides' on the hook' 
It was this experience which appeared to plant a seed of doubt in the 
Alan's mind about the 'rightness' of mass society's attitude towards animals. 
Alan, became a vegetarian some time after this and through reading vegetarian 
magazines and discovering more about what he perceives as the cruel 
practices carried out in the farming industry and vivisection propelled him into 
becoming an activist. Alan has also told me that after his conversion to the 
animal rights cause and vegetarianism, the other 'lads' he worked with used to 
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delight in sending him out to the slaughterhouses, which merely confirmed his 
moral stance and his disapproval of mass society's practices. 
I didn't mind, it just gave me more ammunition, more proof 
that this was all wrong and evidence to show other people 
what goes on 
Moral shocks are not only administered through visual images, but 
through the rhetoric which flows through the protest literature and the verbal 
rhetoric used at protest sites. 
As opposed to former theories that protest arises from a common 
grievance shared by an existing network of people, moral shocks "serve as the 
functional equivalent of social networks, drawing people into activism by building 
on their existing beliefs" (Jasper & Poulsen 1995, 498). It is here that I would 
disagree with Jasper and Poulsen who appear to be saying that activists were 
already concerned with the fate of animals. I have not found this to be so clear 
cut and prefer to think that recruits have perhaps· a previously unrecognized 
'affective bias' towards animals that makes them susceptible to these tactics. 
Moral shocks are 'condensing symbols ... that neatly capture - both 
cognitively and emotionally - a range of meanings and convey a frame, master 
frame or theme' (Jasper & Poulsen 1995, 498) which facilitate the recruitment 
of strangers. Jasper and Poulsen make an important point that 'Although some 
symbols are more powerful than others, they still do not resonate to the same 
extent or with the same meanings for everyone' (Jasper & Poulsen 1995, 498). 
This perhaps highlights the notion that some individuals have an 'affective bias' 
towards animals whilst others do not. 
Most of my informants had been pet keepers either in childhood or prior 
to their recruitment to the movement and so many had had the experience of 
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relationships with animals which may have facilitated their reaction to a moral 
shock. However, in the course of my fieldwork I had the opportunity to talk to 
people who were residents of the village where the protests were taking place 
and the symbols and rhetoric had no meaning for them whatsoever, their 
'affective bias' lay elsewhere. 
6.3 Seeking Belongingness in Practices of Immersion and Discard 
Bodily discipline is intrinsic to the competent social agent; 
it is transcultural rather than specifically connected with 
modernity; and it is a continuous feature of the flow of 
conduct in the duree of daily life. Most importantly, routine 
control of the body is integral to the very nature both of 
agency and of being accepted (trusted) by others as 
competent (Giddens 1991, 57) 
The most essential element of community, is the fact that people 
consider themselves to be part of a community. How is this sense of belonging 
achieved, Giddens points to the key. A sense of belonging to a distinct 
community has been evidenced in my fieldwork, by the people themselves. 
Many people felt that they no longer wanted to associate with individuals who 
were not part of the community, if they did not have to and many expressed the 
opinion that they felt more comfortable with the Animal Rights community than 
any other. This is also reflected in some of the literature. John Callaghan in the 
Vegan magazine offering advice to new vegans points out that 'Veganism may 
have changed your life to the extent that you can be friends only with people 
who don't sanction animal exploitation ... ' (Callaghan 1995, 12). 
Several of my informants expressed the same view. John, who has been 
involved with the moveme~t since the early 'eighties said '1 now feel more at 
ease when in the company of animal rights protestors, especially when they are 
vegan'. A couple of the younger women informants were also worried about the 
lack of marriageable young men there were for them as they felt they could not 
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tolerate marriage with someone who did not feel the same way as them. They 
appreciated the difficult position this put them in 
'Since becoming a vegan I thought that obviously my 
relationships just weren't getting anywhere and the best 
thing would be a vegan boyfriend ... it does slightly limit 
your options!' 
The sense of belonging, of what it means to belong is 
constantly evoked by whatever means come to hand; the 
use of language, the shared knowledge of genealogy or 
ecology, joking, the solidarity of sect, the aesthetics of 
subsistence skills (Cohen 1982: 6) 
From my observation and analysis of the autobiographies of my 
informants a sense of belonging appears to be achieved through three strands, 
immersion through multiple membership, pollution avoidance and the use of 
material culture all directed towards the building of cultural 'competence'. The 
first strand opens the way for the second and the third strand follows after a 
sense of loss has to be overcome. In what follows it is my intention to examine 
the first two strands, multiple membership and pollution avoidance strategies. 
The use of material culture in the building of cultural competence will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 7. 
After initial recruitment to the movement it became obvious through both 
autobiographical notes and their conversation that a pattern of multiple 
membership of different animal interest agencies takes place. As can be seen 
in Appendix 1 all of my informants were involved with several agencies. 
The effect of multiple membership is fourfold. (1) All the agencies have 
their own literature which reinforce the awareness of animal cruelty and the 
ways in which mass society is culpable in this. (2) Membership of the 
Vegetarian Society and the Vegan SOciety provides access to literature which 
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gives guidance on the avoidance of products which are tainted by cruelty or 
'inauthenticity'. (3) Multiple membership also increases interaction between 
activists reinforcing their belief in the 'rightness' of their affiliation. (4) Most 
importantly multiple membership reinforces the need for the individual to take 
steps to make their personal identity reflect their social identity, to engage in 
processes to eliminate cruelty from their lives in a process of evolution towards 
the state of authentic humanness. 
6.3.1 Who Moi? 
The reality of community in people's experience thus 
Inheres in their attachment or commitment to a common 
body of symbols. Much of the boundary-maintaining 
process ... is concerned with maintaining and further 
developing this commonality of symbol (Cohen 1985, 16) 
As we can see from the above, boundary maintaining processes 
translate themselves into processes of further immersion in the movement. It 
also involves processes of removing any dissonance between the individual 
and the community. This involves the building of a personal identity. We have 
already examined the way in which ritual serves as a public expression of the 
experience of a symbolic community. This boundary came into being when the 
community interacted with others. In this section I wish to examine how the 
commitm~nt of individuals to the community is created through boundary 
maintaining processes on an individual level which increase a feeling of 
belonging and a sense of identity. These manifest themselves initially in 
processes of discarding a set of conceptual tools which have previously 
supported a world view of the human dominance and exploitation of other 
species as 'taken for granted'. 
Just as nonhuman animal suffering pervades SOCiety, so 
every aspect of activists' lives - diet, dress, diversions - is 
designed to expunge the taint of animals exploited for 
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human ends. They embrace caring for animals by bearing 
witness at every mundane turn to the possibility of living 
their caring within a mutually supportive community 
(Shapiro 1994, 162). 
Pierre Bourdieu's work on how societies reproduce and maintain 
themselves as groups in relations of power with other groups introduces us to 
the notion of the 'habitus' 
A system of lasting, transposable dispositions, which 
integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as 
a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and 
makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified 
tasks, thanks to analogical transformations of schemes 
permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems 
(Bourdieu 1977, 83) 
The habitus is shaped by socialization within the family and through 
education during childhood and the internalization of the material world. The 
habitus involves notions of competence and knowledge, but it is also embodied. 
According to Bourdieu the habitus is imprinted on the body of the individual, 
ways of walking, sitting, gestures, facial expression, ways of eating, drinking, 
body size, shape, posture amongst many other things are representations of the 
individual's habitus. For Bourdieu, the habitus operates within a coherent logic 
which he calls the 'logic of practice' and is organized by a system of 
classification. What happens when that system of classification changes? 
After recruitment to the community of animal rights activists, new recruits 
turn to the community for guidance on the personal behaviours which will 
reinforce a sense of identity and community. The recent history of the 
movement has produced a convention to regulate the behaviour of its members 
and protect the integrity of the community. It has acquired a 'parallel cognitive 
convention to sustain it' (Douglas 1987,46). This is based on the Romantics 
notion that humans have been corrupted by society, that left in their natural 
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state human beings would live in peace with other species. This is twinned with 
a belief in self development towards a goal of perfectibility expressed through 
living a cruelty free life which stresses the Modernist notion of the individual as 
a free moral agent. Thus to become authentically human is to make a moral 
choice to live an animal free life in which all traces of the products of 
oppression or cruelty to animals or of slaughtered animals are removed from 
one's life. It is at this point that an alternative set of practices is brought into 
action, practices which are the processes of disassembling certain aspects of 
a previous self and its social relationships. 
Attendance at protest sites introduces them to the discursive nature of 
the community and to its practices and allows them to interact with others who 
share their newly acquired views. Literature produced by animal interest 
agencies educates and informs the individual both about animal interest causes 
and the personal practices which are required from the activist to invoke 
personal boundaries of negotiation or marks of identity. The personal boundary 
of negotiation, is that which is in force all the time, through practice, although it 
is not always apparent. It is most visible when engaged in social interaction. 
Whilst the public boundary is raised at sites of protest as a ritualistic expression 
of group identity and community in contestation with mass society it is 
essentially a permeable boundary of negotiation which allows 'others' outside· 
the community to join with them. Thus, while protesting against specific animal 
abusers, against whom the boundary is raised, they distribute leaflets and 
engage in persuasion tactics to recruit for the community from the general 
public whilst negotiating their own identity as a community. The personal 
boundary of negotiation is enacted upon and through the body using the body 
as a personal metaphor for the community and individual practices as the logical 
application of a new world view. 
The Animal Rights Community is faced with a problem common to many 
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ethnic minorities and minority interest groups in urban industrialised society, that 
of maintaining separateness and difference, whilst in everyday contact with the 
mass society. In Judith Okley's ethnographic study The Traveller Gypsies 
(1983), Okley points out that; 
One way of remaining different is by invoking pollution 
beliefs which both express and reinforce ... boundary 
(Okley 1983, 77) 
In her discussion of symbolic boundaries, OkJey points out that pollution 
beliefs 'cannot be seen independently of those of larger society, mainly because 
they create and express symbolic boundaries between the minority and the 
majority' (Okley 1983, 78). If we consider that members of the Animal Rights 
Community are engaged in actively constituting a particular and separate 
cultural identity whilst engaging with mass society's culture, the question of how 
they construct a boundary of negotiation is central. There is a certain similarity 
between the case of the Gypsy and the case of the Animal rightist. Each group 
can be considered as peripheral and in both cases, the body is used as an 
effective negotiating boundary. Each of these cultural groups transforms the 
everyday practices of living into a constituent of that boundary. I concede that 
the Gypsy may not be consciously aware of constructing this boundary, having 
been ascribed a Gypsy identity at birth and subsequently been socialized into 
it. The Gypsy can perhaps be considered as part of an ethnic group ascribed 
by birth, whilst the Animal rightist may fall into the classification of an adherent 
to a particular 'thought style'. The use of the body as a site for negotiating 
identity is common to both. 
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6.4 The Body as a Boundary of Negotiation 
Regularised control of the body is a fundamental means 
whereby a biography of self-identity is maintained; yet at 
the same time the self is also more or less constantly 'on 
display' to others in terms of its embodiment (Giddens 
1991,57-58) 
Ethical vegetarianism is a theory people enact with their 
bodies (Adams 1990, 147) 
Analyses of the social meanings of the physical body have in the main 
followed a Durkheimian model, that of SOCiety ~ritten upon the individual 
(Polhemus 1975, 26). Marcell Mauss (1935) stressed that bodily practices are 
cultural and social products of social learning processes based on shared social 
thought. Levi-Strauss coined the phrase 'socio-Iogic' to explain this shared 
cognitive concordance (Levi-Strauss 1968, 76). In his essay 'The Techniques 
of the Body' Mauss concludes that 'In every society ... everyone... has to know 
and learn what ... to do in all conditions' (Mauss 1935 (trans 1973), 85). As we 
have already examined, Bourdieu translates this into a system he calls the 
habitus which is embodied. 
Mary Douglas developed the notion of the body as a metaphor for 
society through which the body social and the body physical experience and 
exchange meanings which are driven towards the removal of any dissonance 
between the two in order to reinforce each other (Douglas 1970, 65). 
Following Douglas's reasoning then, an examination of attitudes towards 
the body physical and its use in boundary definition should result in a greater 
understanding of the body social. Polhemus regards the body 'as a tool - a 
native-made model or image of society - which the social scientist cannot afford 
to ignore' (POlhemus 1975, 28-29). Polhemus also points out, following 
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Durkheim that societies exist through the individual exertions of people in 
creating, changing and maintaining them and that continuity can only be 
achieved through individuals learning what their society is (Polhemus 1975, 31). 
Polhemus discussing why the modem age seems to be living with a 'Cult 
of the Body' suggests that anthropologists and sociologists have tended to 
compare 'The organic wholeness and formfulness of the primitive world with the 
anomic disintegration of form ilJ the West ... two factors would seem to 
contribute to this disintegration of form and the subsequent disintegration of the 
consonance of physical and social levels of experience ... We are faced with 
social change so rapid that the physical body cannot catch up '" There is a 
multiplicity of social systems which our bodies are called on to reflect' 
(Polhemus 1975, 31-33). 
If animal rights activists are reacting against such a world, as I have 
suggested previously, then it is of no surprise that the bodily practices of the 
activist become so meaningful. 
At this point I should like to return to Mary Douglas as I wish to discuss 
the notion of pollution avoidance in the life of the activist. Mary Douglas 
contends that 'The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. 
Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or 
precarious' (Douglas 1969, 138). The body symbolizes society and 'the powers 
and dangers credited to social structure' are 'reproduced in small on the human 
body' (Douglas 1969, 138). 
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6.4.1 Pollution Avoidance 
Pollution ideas work in the life of society at two levels, one 
largely instrumental, one expressive (Douglas 1969, 13) 
The social structure and the boundaries of negotiation of the animal 
rights community are predicated on distancing themselves from cruelty to 
animals in every way and highlighting their difference from human 'others'. The 
ingestion of animal flesh or the use of any materials derived from or tested on 
animals are a pollution of the identity of the animal rightist and through this a 
danger to the community's integrity. Mary Douglas points out that 'We would 
expect to find that the pollution beliefs of a culture are related to its moral values' 
(Douglas 1975, 54). The vegetarian or vegan body is a vehicle for the moral 
ideology of the movement and pollution avoidance is an expression and 
reinforcement of the boundary of negotiation of the animal rightist body and thus 
the community. As I have already pointed out some members of the community 
become animal rights activists after joining the Vegetarian or Vegan Societies 
for others it is through some sort of 'moral shock'. For those who join after 
undergoing a 'moral shock' there follows a period of removing from their lives 
the products of animal cruelty specifically meat and its by-products. As Sandy 
pointed out to me: 
It would be pointless to be any sort of 'campaigner' if you 
couldn't see that breeding, rearing and killing living 
creatures just to satisfy your taste buds is about the worst 
abuse' 
During one of our conversations which had veered off onto other 
subjects, as conversations do, we were discussing the obsession of 
contemporary Western society with achieving a slim body, Sandy pointed out 
one of what she considered the aesthetic gains of her way of life: 
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You should become a vegan, you'll never see a fat vegan' 
Tester contends that the Animal Rights community is one of the 'slim and 
moral watching over the flabby and violent' (Tester 1991, 178). There is 
certainly an expectation that the vegetarian or vegan body will be slim and 
healthy as a result of leading a moral life. There is also a suggestion that the 
diet affects morality and that the rewards of this are manifested physically. 
The decomposition of animal proteins in the unsuitably 
long gut of our species creates poisons that affect both 
mind and body ... vegetarians are second to no meat-eater 
in strength, stamina, good health and longevity (Wynne-
Tyson 1988,71). 
In the course of my fieldwork, a rather overWeight lady and her equally 
overweight daughter attended the vigil. After they had left, there was quite a lot 
of sniggering about the size of these two ladies and one young woman 
commented Well, I've never seen a fat vegetarian before'. These two 
unfortunate women had transgressed the boundary of expected vegetarian 
embodiment. 
6.4.2 Inner Body Pollution Avoidances 
The central tenet of the animal rightist, is that cruelty to animals must be 
eliminated from human life. This finds expression in many pollution avoidances. 
Central to this is the avoidance of ingesting animal flesh. The animal rights 
community is engaged in claiming a kinship with animals based on animal 
sentiency and similarity to humans and effort~ to widen the human moral 
community to include animals, thus producing a new model for human 
authenticity predicated on their notions of the morally and physically pure. It is, 
therefore, not unexpected that avoidance of moral and physical pollution is 
essential and enacted through and by the body. 
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Meat eating ... is indefensible ... it is not now necessary to 
feast on the bodies of dead animals in order to be healthy 
(Linzey 1987, 72). 
In fact for the animal rightist, it is not only physically unhealthy to eat 
dead flesh, but physically and morally polluting. However, vegetarianism is not 
the only signifier of the animal rightist body. Many people in the Western World 
are renouncing the meat diet, not on the basis of ethical vegetarianism, but 
simply for their physical health and will certainly share cultural traits with the 
animal rights activist, but these vegetarians are not of interest for my purpose. 
It is not important that animal rightists share cultural traits with 'others', it is only 
important for my. purposes and their own purposes that they consider 
themselves to be culturally distinct. 
Many activists in order to emphasize their cultural identity become vegan 
in their efforts. There is an element of implied hierarchy within the 
community, that vegetarianism is the first step on the ladder to purity, but 
veganism is a higher stage. This is often denied in print, 'I don't believe that 
vegans are infinitely superior to vegetarians - nor do I believe that vegetarianism 
is only a stepping stone on the road to the ultimate goal of veganism' (Callaghan 
1995, 12), but in the process of carrying out fieldwork, I found that not being a 
vegan appeared to need justification and veganism appeared to be the 'ideal'. 
This was illustrated to me by Alan particularly clearly. 
I'm vegan and now the girl that works for me has become 
vegan too. She used to be vegetarian, but I think I might 
have influenced her, I used to call her 'dirty' because she 
wasn't vegan 
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Sandy considered that a 'real' vegetarian is a vegan: 
When I gave up dairy products and became properly 
vegetarian (vegan) I rediscovered my sense of well being 
and that feeling is worth a dozen banquets' 
In addition, the ethical vegetarian or vegan who takes up the identity of 
animal rightist goes far further than simply avoiding easily identifiable products 
of the animal, such as the flesh. They seek out the presence of animal products 
in foods that many of us are 'blissfully' unaware of, such as the presence of 
animal products in breakfast cereals, bread, confectionery, vitamin capsules, 
cosmetics. As an illustration of how insidious the presence of animal products 
is both in food sources and other products and how hard it is to avoid animal 
products in our day-to-day lives, I reproduce in Appendix 3, a table compiled by 
The Times newspaper and modified by myself, listing the uses of beef by-
products only. 
This is a simple illustration of how complex pollution avoidances become 
for the animal rightist. Many of my informants recounted to me that their weekly 
shopping time became greatly extended as they had to carefully scrutinize the 
ingredients lists on packets as they became more aware of the 'scientific' names 
of animal ingredients in food. Many had given up supermarket shopping in 
favour of using health food shops. In one instance, the contents of a shopping 
basket had been identified by Sandy and had led to the recruitment of the 
shopper into a local Animal Rights group; 
I said to him, that's a good vegan shopping basket you've 
got there, and he said, Oh are you the woman who runs 
the local Animal Rights group, I've been trying to contact 
you. That's how I met Alan. 
But this is the beginning of another aspect of achieving a competent 
identity and the core of belonging to which I will return in the next chapter. To 
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retum to the subject of pollution avoidance, Mary Douglas asserts that in 
Westem culture, pollution is more regularly defined as dirt, which was illustrated 
quite neatly by Alan and the pressures he brought to bear on the employee to 
become a vegan. 'Dirt avoidance is a process of tidying up, ensuring that the 
order in extemal physical events conforms to the structure of ideas' (Douglas 
1975, 53). Whilst mass society does not define animal flesh as 'dirt' or polluting 
to the human body, the thought style of the Animal rightist defines it in this way 
in order that the structure of ideas of classification which operate within the 
thought style of the community remain unambiguous. 
6.4.3 Outer Body Pollution Avoidance 
Together with avoiding potentially polluting animal products in food, the 
animal rightist actively avoids using any substance which has been part of an 
animal or which has been tested on animals being used on the surface of the 
body. The most obvious of these avoidances is that of the wearing of leather, 
in the form of coats, trousers or footwear. Another problem is that even when 
footwear is not leather, the solutions for keeping the footwear together may 
have animal products in them. Also avoided are lotions and potions for 
application to the skin which may contain products from an animal or which have 
been tested on animals. The use of detergents for washing clothes or washing 
cooking utensils which contain animal products or have been tested on animals 
is also potentially polluting and is avoided. 
Now when I go out shopping I refuse to buy any products 
containing gelatine, animal oillfat, I do not eat eggs, 
cheese (unless vegetarian) and I will not buy anything that 
does not state it has not been tested on animals, or is 
completely 'animal ingredient free' 
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6.4.4 Pollution of the Immediate Environment 
Pet-keeping is supposedly ideologically unsound within the community, 
but many individuals who are animal rightists do keep pets or 'companion 
animals'. Many of these 'companion animals' have been rescued from 
unsuitable environments and as such become ideologically acceptable as they 
have been 'saved'. But pet keeping is an issue within the animal rights 
community which highlights an issue that anthropologists often observe - that 
what people say they do and what they actually do is different. 
Keith Tester insists quite wrongly, in my view, that animal rights is not 
about animals at all and that animal rights activists do not keep animals because 
they do not like animals. As Steve Baker points out Tester's analysis of 
pollution avoidance strategies by animal rights activists interprets them as 
avoidance of animals themselves, rather than give credence to the theory that 
these avoidance strategies are actually a refusal to join with mass society's 
behaviour towards animals which they consider to be cruel (Baker 1993, 212-
213) Tester contends that animal rights activists are trying to remove animals 
from the human sphere because their presence threatens human identity, 
however, I would contend that the view of the animal rights activist is that it is 
the pres~nce of cruelty to animals that threatens the authentically human. 
Animal rights activists in the main do keep animals and do like animals, they do 
have a slight problem with this though. 
The problem of carnivorous 'companions' is one that needs to be tackled. 
Depending on how strong one's ideological stance is, one either allows one's 
companion to follow their 'natural inclinations to eat meat which involves the 
presence of a potentially polluting substance in the home, or one tries to convert 
them to vegetarianism. This enterprise can be quite successful with dogs, but 
carnivorous cats are more difficult to convert. Although some will try. The 
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Vegan Society import the only animal-free cat food into the United Kingdom and 
ask its readers 'Is feeding your cat your.last link with the SLAUGHTERHOUSE? 
This preparation provides complete meals for vegan cats (Vegan 1995, 29) 
Whilst ideologically unsound to live with carnivores in their personal 
environment, opinions do vary amongst the activists. Sandy felt that some 
activists went too far when trying to modify the 'natural behaviour' of their animal 
companions and recounted an incident when she who is a committed vegan and 
animal rights activist was told off by another. A fellow activist (a vegetarian) 
offered her some chocolate, which she refused as she is vegan, but she thought 
she would give the chocolate to another activist's dog at which point; 
'He said 'Don't give that to my dog, he's a vegan!' Have 
you ever heard anything so ridiculous, does the dog know 
he is a vegan' 
Horse riding was another issue where Sandy departed from some of the 
activists. Ideologically it is unsound to use horses for riding and all the activists 
were diametrically opposed to horse racing, but Sandy could see no reason why 
she should not allow her daughter to learn to ride. 
There's a huge difference between forcing a horse to run 
to the point of exhaustion for entertainment and a little girl 
pootling around on a pony' 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined how the individual enters the 
community very often through a 'moral shock' that profoundly disturbs the 
individual and leads to an alteration in that individuals way of seeing the world . 
. That which was once familiar becomes disconcerting and unwanted. The 
individual then enters into practices which involve a deeper immersion into an 
animal rights identity through multiple membership of animal focussed 
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organisations which increases their contact with like minded others and 
reinforces their sense of identity, belonging and 'rightness'. 
From this multiple membership and membership of the Vegetarian and 
Vegan Societies they gain information on what practices are required from them 
to begin the ~onstruction of a new identity. Their first steps along that road 
involve the disassembling of certain aspects of a previous identity and habitus. 
These manifested themselves as processes of discard. The material props 
such as meat and animal-cruelty related products which supported their 
previous world view were rejected. These steps were analysed as pollution, 
avoidance strategies on an individual basis which created the boundary of 
negotiation for a personal identity and the first steps towards competence. 
In my next chapter I wish to turn to what I consider to be the very core of 
building a successful personal and shared identity for the animal rights 
community, a further process of negotiation which involves acquiring a new 
habitus and becoming competent in its use. This is the third strand of the 
construction of identity and belonging, increased competence and how it is 
gained through the use of material culture. 
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7 
Consumption, Construction & Competence 
( It's Getting to Be A Habit) 
7.1 Introduction 
In what ways is a sense of belonging evoked for this community? In 
Chapter 6 I discussed the process of immersion and the process of discard 
expressed through pollution avoidance, which were entered into after 
recruitment. Pollution avoidance continues on as part of the construction of 
identity, but is joined by another aspect of identity construction and a strategy 
for belonging. 
In this chapter I wish to concentrate on the practice of a new system of 
classification which informs the new animal rights activist in the building of an 
'habitus' and how this leads to a competency which allows them to express 
tQemselves confidently as individuals both within the community and in 
interaction with those outside the community in their negotiations of identity. 
Marilyn Strathern (1981) in her analysis of 'belonging' in Elmdon pointed 
to the sense of 'real' or authentic Elmdonness being found in patterns of 
kinship, Clement Harris in his analysis of the village of Hennage found that 'real' 
Hennage people were those who achieved a level of competence in cultural life. 
'To be 'competent' in the village context carries a host of implications and is a 
portmanteau word covering a whole ideal of life' (Harris 1974, 19). For the 
animal rights community 'competency' is also at the core of belonging. 
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7.2 Consuming Culture 
To continue to think rationally, the individual needs an 
intelligible universe, and that intelligibility will need to have 
some visible markings ... goods in their assemblage 
present a set of meanings ... They are read by those who 
know the code and scan them for information (Douglas & 
Isherwood 1979, 5) 
The concept of what Giddens terms a "fateful moment" was discussed 
in the previous chapter. In the life of the animal rightist, this moment, as we 
have seen, has generally been provoked through a 'moral shock' which 
resulted, for them, in a refiguring of the conceptual world. For the animal 
rights activists with whom I worked, the force of the 'moral shock' which they 
had experienced prompted a fundamental change in their conceptualisation of 
the world and a process of reformation was set in train. 
This led to a rejection of the world view that the exploitation of other 
animals for human benefit is a 'natural' and proper ordering of the world. This 
world view had been replaced by one that highlighted the similarities between 
human beings and other animals and implied an equality between the species, 
which rendered the treatment meted out to other species by fellow members of 
our own society anathematic. The material commodities which symbolised and 
supported that previously lived in world, were now seen as cruel and 
exploitative and were discarded. Those tools of meat, leather, animal derived 
products and products which involved cruelty to other species no longer 
symbolised a right and proper ordering of their newly acquired conceptual view. 
But, as has been pointed out by Douglas and Isherwood, the conceptual 
world requires material expression. In the course of analysing the 
autobiographies of the group which I had worked with, a pattern of discard of the 
products of cruelty was clearly laid out. What I had not concentrated on was 
184 
a pattern of appropriation. But it was a chance telephone conversation with 
Sandy which widened my field of attention beyond the processes of discard, to 
include the processes of appropriation and to explore the meanings involved 
with both. Sandy recounted the story of how she met Alan, a fellow activist. 
I was in the supermarket, at the checkout 
and there was a guy in front of me. I noticed 
his shopping and said That's a good vegan 
shopping basket you've got there' and he 
said to me Oh, are you the woman that runs 
the local animal nghts group. I've been 
trying to contact you'. That's how I met Alan 
The tale of Sandy and Alan, two of the activists I worked with, 
demonstrates that the conceptual world of the animal rightist is not merely 
constructed through practices of immersion, discard and avoidance, but 
involves expression through material means. The material contents within a 
supermarket shopping basket had signalled a possible identity that had been 
scanned and decoded and through this, contact made with an individual who 
shared a similar social identity, which highlights the point made by Douglas and 
Isherwood that in applying analysis to the objects purchased by individuals it is 
useful to; 
Forget that commodities are good for eating, clothing, and 
shelter; forget their usefulness and try instead the idea that 
commodities are good for thinking treat them as a 
nonverbal medium for the human creative faculty (Douglas 
& Isherwood 1979, 62) 
Throughout this thesis, Levi-Strauss's suggestion in his discussion of 
totemism, that animals are 'good to think', has been explored in the context of 
a group of 'modern' people. Levi-Strauss highlighted totemism as a mode of 
conceptual ising 'self and 'other' between human groups and human and animal, 
using a process of conformity and opposition. This process he suggested was 
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a universal process, but one more obviously displayed in the world of the 
'primitive', or non-technological societies. In this chapter I wish to explore the 
ways that material objects are used 'to think' in much the same way in Western 
society. Marshall Sahlins suggests, that the "totemic operator' articulating 
differences in the cultural series to differences in the natural series, is no longer 
a main architecture of the cultural system (Sahlins 1976, 176). But he further 
argues that 'capitalist production stands as an exponential expansion of the 
same kind of thought, with exchange and consumption as means of its 
communication' (Sahlins 1976, 176). Following Baudrillard (1972) he asserts 
that 'consumption itself is an exchange (of meanings), a discourse - to which 
practical virtues, 'utilities' are attached only post facto' (Sahlins 1976, 177). 
In this chapter I follow Douglas & Isherwood (1979) in treating food and 
clothing as conceptual tools and consumption as both a medium for the 
affirmation and construction of personal identity and a means of engaging in a 
discourse over a shared identity. In doing so, I do not deny their practical utility 
and necessity, but in many cultures across the world we can see evidence that 
utility values and cultural values are mutually reflective (see for example 
Bourdieu's analysis of the Kabyle house (1973)). I do not deny, also, that utility 
values become paramount in situations of social chaos or deprivation where the 
imperative to survive overwhelms. 
I will explore the ways in which material objects are used as a vehicle 
both in a discourse over the nature of civilized humanity or authentic 
humanness as conceptualized by animal rights activists and the way in which 
objects are used in the construction of personal and shared identity thus building 
a material world to support a conceptual world for animal rights activists to 
operate within. 
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7.3 Becoming Authentically Human 
In the construction of their new identities, the animal rightists I worked 
with all evidenced practical efforts to 'knit together' the three elements of the 
social, personal and corporeal in the transformative process of achieving an 
authentic identity and in the process of becoming authentically human. 
In a psychological investigation of animal rights activists in America, 
Herzog (1993) noted that all of his respondents had to reconcile 'their ideals and 
their actions' (Herzog 1993, 103). As Herzog notes, 'the animal rights 
movement was not simply an isolated set of ideas or philosophical beliefs; it 
entailed a transformation of their daily lives' (Herzog 1993, 110). The central 
point of that transformation was diet. Transformation of the diet has implications 
for all aspects of identity, in particular through the concept of 'control' both of the 
private self through individual bodily control, the social self through public 
enactment and as a tool for the building of a conceptual world. Elsewhere I 
have discussed the process through which the meat diet is discarded. Here I 
wish to explore the appropriation of material culture as a discursive medium 
through which personal identity is negotiated and new meaningful social 
relationships set up which affirm both self and social identity between those 
who share the same conceptual world in opposition to 'others' who do not. 
We have already noted that the notion of the reflexive project of building 
a personal identity according to Giddens, stems from a need for 'Ontological 
Security: a sense of continuity and order in events ... ' (Giddens 1991, 243). In 
terms of self-identity, this continuity is not simply based upon 'sameness' over 
time or a 'given' self, but upon the individual constantly creating and sustaining 
a self-identity which is 'reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or 
his biography' (Giddens 1991, 53). 
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A person with a reasonably stable sense of self-identity 
has a feeling of biographical continuity which she is able 
to grasp reflexively and, to a greater or lesser degree, 
communicate to other people (Giddens 1991, 54) 
We have seen that animal rightists communicate their sense of identity 
to each other and 'others' in a variety of ways, through protest, individual bodily 
pollution avoidances through processes of discard. Our attention now focuses 
on the use of material culture. As noted before, Fred Myers in a study of Pintupi 
speaking Aboriginals observed that within their culture personal identity was 
negotiated through social relationships. The individual consents to engage in 
relationships which confirm a particular identity, whilst rejecting others (Myers 
1988, 55). According to Myers this was done through material culture. 
Similarly we see these processes at work within the culture of the animal rightist. 
Following a moral shock comes a point of refonnation, the animal rights activist 
answers the question of 'How should I live my life?' in a particular way and, in 
order to maintain a biographical continuity, has to follow this decision through. 
This they do by rejecting certain social relationships and engaging in others. In 
the building of a reflexive self-identity as an animal rightist they must trarisfonn 
themselves, and to confinn this identity, engage with others whose thinking they 
believe is similar to their own. 
This does not prevent the animal rightist from engaging with others who 
do not share that identity. All of the people I worked with were engaged in 
employment and led a life which at times had nothing to do with their animal 
rights activities (although several expressed the opinion that in the best of all 
possible worlds they would rather be engaged in animal rights activities all the 
time). They still, however, managed to negotiate and maintain their own self-
identity through the control of their diet and bodily practices and affinned their 
social identity through this and by engaging in ritual and as we shall see in 
particular consumer relationships whilst rejecting others. 
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In a culture whose worldview holds that animals are subservient to 
humans and are there to be used for human benefit, one of the most powerful 
conceptual tools to be used is that of the animal as an appropriate food for 
human beings in the form of meat. Such is the dominant world view in the 
Western world. Meat is a powerful symbol within British culture, we have the 
'Roast Beef of Olde England', and if the French to the English are 'frogs' then 
to the French we are the 'rosboeufs', but to many animal rightists all meat eaters 
are classified as 'cannibals' or as we know 'drag knuckles' . 
The term 'dragknuckles' represents many of the attitudes displayed by 
the anima! rightists I worked with, that a culture that depends on death and 
cruelty for sustenance and profit was one that was less socially evolved. Both 
Sandy and Alan expressed this openly. Sandy whilst having friends who were 
meat eaters pointed out; 
I love them to bits, but I have to say, that I do consider 
myself to be a couple of rungs up the evolutionary ladder 
from them 
Alan expressed the view: 
I believe that human beings evolve at different rates and 
that people who support animal rights and protest have 
evolved further and more quickly than other people 
This point is underlined by John Callaghan in an article in the Vegan 
magazine where he points out that in contemporary Western SOCiety 'you don't 
have to exploit and commit murder' in order to survive 'This concept isn't weird 
just civilized' (Callaghan 1995, 13). What marks out the animal rightist from the 
cruel and exploitative human being then, is control, the civilized human being 
controls those aspects of human life which involved cruelty to and exploitation 
of animals. 
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It is interesting to note that even the concept of civilization is one that is 
inverted amongst those who advocate animal rights. In Nick Fiddes' recent 
examination of 'meat' as a natural symbol, he suggests that within the Western 
worldview, dominated by Christianity and science, meat-eating is legitimated by 
the concept of civilization, which is represented as the ability to control and 
dominate nature and animals. Given then that the dominant Western worldview 
is that of 'civilized humans, ... as predators and conquerors' (Fiddes 1991, 63), 
the animal rightist's view of human beings and animals being part of a 
continuum rather than oppositional poles represents a complete inversion of this 
worldview, where even the concept of 'civilisation' is inverted. In the view of the 
animal rightist, to be truly civilised or authentically human it is necessary to 
invert the practices and products of mass society. 
In this chapter I illustrate the ways in which animal rightists negotiate their 
personal and social identities through consumption of material objects which 
symbolise this inversion and how material objects provide a discursive medium 
for the construction of personal and shared identity. Marshall Sahlins suggests 
that human beings 'reciprocally define objects in terms of themselves and 
themselves in terms of objects' (Sahlins 1976, 169). If animals are objects in 
the world view of a meat eating culture, in the worldview of the animal rightist, 
there is a complete inversion. Animals become subjects and the natural world 
is not there for human exploitation. Most people in Britain today buy their food 
from supermarkets. Meat in supermarkets is packaged in such a way that any 
connection to a live animal is disguised and sanitised and many people do not 
relate a steak to a cow or a pork chop to a pig. 
After undergoing a moral shock, people who become 'converted' to 
animal rights activism increasingly make these connections and other wider 
connections to what they regard as the cruelty involved in intensive farming, the 
effects upon the ecology of the planet and other peoples' lives due to the 
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expansion of Western capitalism. These connections are facilitated through a 
process of education through the different organisations that are joined and 
through contact with other animal rightists. Meat, in a meat eating culture 
symbolises life and strength, within the culture of the animal rightist, meat 
symbolizes cruelty, death, poison and greed. 
Vegetarianism and veganism are the vehicles of expression for the 
animal rightists. The material objects manufactured for their consumption also 
become vehicles by Which meanings are exchanged and identity affirmed. The 
animal rights worldview renders what is considered edible in the meat eating 
culture, inedible. It dismantles the props of the meat eating culture, replacing 
them with their own. Most of the animal rightists that I worked with were 
vegans, although some were vegetarians. Although vegans reject all animal 
products and by-products, vegetarians can consume dairy products. But 
among the group I studied, even the vegetarians had rejected cows milk, as a 
result of their involvement with the live export protests which had highlighted for 
them the cruelty inherent in milk production. It is at this point that we must turn 
our attention to the material props which support the abstract conceptualisation 
of the animal rightist's world. 
In an autobiography completed by one member of the core group, a 
sticker advertising a product had been inserted. The sticker has a 
representation of a cow and its calf looking at a bill board advertising Plamil, 
soya milk. The cow is saying to her calf, 'No dear, that's for humans'. Here we 
see a complete inversion of the meat eating culture, where cow's milk is 
considered to be a valuable dietary component for human beings, in particular 
children. TVP (textured vegetable protein), the soya bean and other pulses, 
tofu, vegetables, grains and milk substitutes become the material products 
which support the conceptual world of the animal rightists as foods fit for human 
consumption. 
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These foods become cultural objects which are surrounded by clusters 
of social relations which promote and affirm both personal and shared identity 
and we begin to see Levi-Strauss's theory of the oppositions of self and other 
conducted through objects 'with exchange and consumption as means of its 
communication' (Sahlins 1976, 177). By this I mean that those products which 
we buy and use very often symbolise what we think about ourselves and others 
and signal this to others. By buying and consuming meat, we engage in social 
relations with the meat eating culture, if we refuse to do so, we have broken 
those social relationships and must set about establishing new social 
relationships. If our new social relationships involve a rejection of the meat 
eating culture, then the objects which we use to communicate our identity within 
these relationships must be identifiable and oppositional to the meat eating 
culture in order to have any power of expression. As Nick Fiddes points out; 
The foods we select reflect our thought, including our 
conception of our actual or desired way of life and our 
perceptions of the food choices of people with whom we 
wish to identify(Fiddes 1991, 33) 
In the world of the animal rightist for every animal-based food product 
there is a cruelty-free product to replace it. For the novice this is not always 
apparent. Many of my informants reported a sense of loss as to how to proceed 
after deciding to adopt the animal rights lifestyle, simply cutting out meat from 
the diet did not fulfil their need for a particular sense of self; 
I started cooking meals for the family and I would just not 
have the meat. They would be having meat and potatoes 
and vegetables and I would just eat the potatoes and 
vegetables, because I didn't know what to eat. It felt really 
odd, there didn't seem to be a central bit of a meal. I didn't 
feel I was eating meals, just snacking all the time and I 
didn't feel I was part of it really, you know somehow 
excluded 
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Not being part of it, points to the centrality of meat in the Western diet 
and also points to the phase following a 'moral shock' and the discard of certain 
materials - that of not being one thing or another, neither 'fish nor fowl' a severe 
sense of dislocation. Pierre Bourdieu posits; 
the objects of knowledge are constructed , not passively 
recorded, ... the principle of this construction is the system 
of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is 
constituted in practice and is always oriented towards 
practical functions (Bourdieu 1984, 52) 
Bourdieu conceives of the 'habitus' as a collectively shared set of 
classificatory structures which is absorbed by the individual, enabling that 
individual to transfer and apply these structures to every avenue of life. Daniel 
Miller's interpretation of the 'habitus' leads him to describe it as 'learnt through 
interactive practices, as the acts of living within a world which is composed of 
this same order are continually reinforced in different domains. In fact, this is 
a process of familiarity rather than learning.' (Miller 1987, 104). Following 
Bourdieu, Miller also links shared classificatory structures to shared identity 
These closely woven principles are specific to certain 
groups ... and lead also to a sense of identity between 
those who share habitus (Miller 1987,104). 
The habitus is our ability to function confidently in all situations, knowing 
what is right, wrong, how to move, think, feel and speak, and what to eat, what 
not to eat, what to wear, what not to wear, in our own particular culture. It is 
second nature to us. However, at the point of reformation, the animal rightist 
discards the familiar habitus and undergoes a process of acquiring another. I 
feel that without further prevarication then we should proceed to examine one 
of th.e processes of increasing familiarity which the animal rightist must 
experience to construct an habitus which is competent enough to operate within 
the shared habitus of the group. The process to be examined is that of 
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becoming familiar with cultural objects. 
It was at the point after discard that most of my informants decided to join 
either the Vegetarian Society, or the Vegan Society. Joining these societies 
performs several functions. Alternatives to the meat diet are introduced, which 
results in the setting up of new consumer relationships. An awareness of new 
risks is introduced through education into the pervasive presence of animal by-
products in consumer goods. This education endows them with a degree of 
competence in discourse when amongst other animal rightists and with the meat 
eating culture. 
Many of my informants spoke of a learning process involved with 
becoming an animal rights activist. One described her discomfiture upon finding 
out the truth about the pervasiveness of animal products in food and clothing 
as - Ignorance was bliss. Shopping became like a maze, full of risks. Another 
referred to vegetarianism and veganism as a continuing learning process. 
These comments underline the process of continual construction and the theme 
of competence involved in the construction of personal and shared identity 
which is discursively achieved and represented through the medium of material 
objects. 
Daniel Miller pOints out that 'objects may not merely be used to refer to 
a given social group, but may themselves be constitutive of a certain social 
relation' and 'may also themselves be manufactured as objectification of the 
relationship between different societies (Miller 1987, 122~ 123) 
In what follows we can see clearly, through the actions of animal 
rightists, the constitution of particular social relations and the creation of cultural 
objects which reflect the particular culture of the animal rightist. In rejecting first 
of all the meat diet, animal rightists reject a method of production and through 
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this reject the social relationships involved with the consumption of these 
products. They then seek to set up new social relationships which conform to 
their newly acquired conceptual worldview. It is principally through this that they 
begin to become competent in their new identity and begin to invert the world 
of the meat eating culture. Through joining the Vegetarian Society or Vegan 
Society a process of induction into a new world where the animal rightist can 
control those substances which support the physical body, the social body and 
the body of the community is facilitated, through the acquisition of knowledge. 
One of my informants, Jack, also pointed out another way in which novices are 
guided toward competence. Often after deciding to join the animal rights 
movement, an individual will attend a protest or meeting, and; 
experienced vegetarians and vegans will try to help new 
people out by recommending books, or if its at a protest 
site and we have all brought food, then we can tell them if 
their food is OK and if its not then we'll tell them about an 
alternative 
Jack, who is an animal rightist and vegan of some twenty years standing, 
also told me about yet another form of education, ridicule. This can be directed 
at anyone, whether they are a novice or an 'old hand'. It is administered by 
what he referred to as the Vegan Police. 
They don't wear a unifonn, and you can't see them coming, 
but before you know it, they've got you by the ears. They 
sneak up on you. You could just be standing there eating 
some kind of snack and they'll say 'Don't say you're a 
vegan when you're putting that stuff in your mouth'. Then 
they'll proceed to tell you about what's in it at great length 
and at great volume. They are the ayatollahs of the vegan 
movement and make sure you stick to its principles 
Jack liked the idea of competence, when I put it to him, he felt it 
expressed very well the processes that went on. He also felt that the 'Vegan 
Police' represented many vegans who were constantly; 
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afraid of slipping back. You know if you let one thing slide, 
before you know it you've lost the faith completely 
This fear of slipping back is well represented by the great stress there is 
upon learning. This learning is constitutive of the habitus and 'constituted in 
practice and is always oriented towards practical functions' (Bourdieu 1980, 52). 
I am not, therefore, referring to the learning involved should an individual 
decide to 'bone up' on the philosophical roots of the movement, but one which 
facilitates the practical nature of gaining a competent habitus. Vital to this 
learning is the reading of literature which points the way. The Animal Free 
Shopper, published by the Vegan Society, is an encyclopaedic source of what 
is available to the ethical vegetarian and vegan consumer. This shopper's guide 
lists products which are both free from animal ingredients and are not tested on 
animals. Knowledge of the mysterious E numbers in food and cosmetics is also 
essential to building up a competence. 
You have to learn your E numbers, one of my informants told me. It is 
a legal requirement for the manufacturers of food to indicate on labelling the 
additives present in any food. These additives can either be listed using the full 
name or due to the length of names use a number. Numbers listed with a 
capital 'E' in front are additives that have passed the legal requirements for use 
in food within the European Union. The 'E' number does not indicate that an 
additive is 'artificial', many are natural substances which are of vegetable or 
animal derivation (Connor, GoodFood Vegetarian, 19). The decoding of E 
numbers is essential in the search for cruelty free products which may h~ve no 
other marking on them. This is particularly important for vegans. Much food 
retailed in supermarkets may be marked as suitable for vegetarians, but little 
attention is paid to vegans as yet. Gaining a competence in recognizing the E 
numbers or their chemical names is a time consuming business. This was 
highlighted in autobiographies where informants stressed the amount of time 
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that shopping took after they had become part of the movement. 
Where I used to spend an hour maybe shopping, I was 
spending two or more, wandering round studying all the 
packets and bottles 
This is unsurprising, when one realises, that for example of the permitted 
46 food colours alone, there are 21 which are 'natural' and are derived from 
animal or vegetable sources. However, when competence is gained; You 
become very quick at scanning ingredients and shopping becomes far less time 
consuming, the habitus becomes strengthened enabling the individual to engage 
more with other animal rightists when attending protest sites or meetings, where 
food is often consumed and discussed and sharing in the social relationships 
created through material culture. Given the religious themes introduced by Jack 
when he talked of the ayatollahs of the vegan movement and keeping the faith, 
I asked him if it would be acceptable to talk of some goods being 'kosher' and 
others not. When I mentioned this, Jack laughed and explained; 
Years ago when I first became involved with animal rights 
and became a vegan, the only margarine around that was 
suitable for us was one called, Tomar, I think. This was a 
Jewish kosher margarine and in those days, I'm talking 
twenty years ago or so, vegans used to talk about things 
being 'kosher'. Nowadays, though, it would not be an 
acceptable term because of the association of cruel 
practices and kosher meat 
The introduction of the 'V Approved by the Vegetarian Society' symbol 
has actually simplified life a little for those seeking to avoid animal products in 
food. The actual form of the 'V sign, is a form of symbolic inversion. It appears 
like a 'tick' mark that a teacher would make when a pupil's answer is correct, 
yet it is a reflected or inverted image. The long stroke of the tick mark is on the 
left, whereas it is normally on the right and the short stroke is on the right rather 
than the left. This stresses both the practices of inversion and the learning 
197 
process. In picking out the product which bears this sign, the searcher had 
made the correct choice, by recognising and acting upon the inverted symbol. 
Most of my informants made reference to this sign when searching out 
appropriate foods. 
The sign is withheld from some products which may appear to the 
uninitiated as ethically correct. In order to be allowed to package products with 
the 'V' Approved by the Vegetarian Society' mark, companies must submit a 
product specification, listing details of all their ingredients. The product must 
meet with the Society's criteria, which involve both that the products must be 
-free of products resulting from the death of an animal, or if products contain 
such substances as eggs, they must fit the ethical criteria of coming from a 
source which is not cruel. For example, battery eggs are unacceptable although 
they fit vegetarian dietary principles, they fail on the ethical front. If products 
pass these criteria, the manufacturers are allowed to display the mark, which is 
a trade mark, and companies must pay for the privilege of using it. 
The 'V' sign is also significant in approving products which may appear 
anomalous. The most problematical area being that of margarine. E471 
(mono- and di-glycerides of Fatty Acids) is present in many margarines, the 
problem is that it can come from either a vegetable or animal source (Connor, 
GoodFood Vegetarian, 19). The 'V' sign indicates to the consumer that if it is 
present, it is of vegetable origin. There are 44 accepted additives in food which 
are of this anomalous condition, where manufacturers anxious to reassure 
consumers may apply to the Vegetarian SOCiety for approval. Having discussed 
some of the ways that an individual can gain competence by seeking out and 
becoming familiar with the hidden dangers involved with food substances. I 
should now like to turn to the more obvious ways in which the meat eating 
culture is inverted through the consumption of certain products. 
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Certainly we can see an inversion of the meat eating culture when we 
look at the plant-based products which replace meat. Fiddes suggests that the 
increased availability of meat substitutes points to the importance of the 
'concept of meat' within our own culture (Fiddes 1991, 16), whilst acknowledging 
that across the world within different times, cultures and contexts 'meat is 
supreme' (Fiddes 1991, 13). Having said this, although many vegetarians and 
vegans do buy these products, some of my informants did not, because of the 
'realistic'taste. I, myself, was surprised that anyone who had given up meat 
would want to use a product that emulated its taste and appearance. When I 
asked Sandy about this she told me; 
Well, its not really surprising. I mean I gave up meat from 
an ethical point of view. I think people eat them (meat 
substitutes), simply because people like savoury tastes. I 
don't eat them, but my mother who is also a vegan does. 
I find them too much like meat and that makes me feel 
nauseous, it reminds me of when I used to eat meat. But 
many people like them and find them an easy replacement 
for familiar things 
Meat can be replaced by TVP (Textured Vegetable Protein) which is 
made from soya flour, air and water. VegeMince and VegeSteak (based on 
wheat gluten and produced by Realeat) reproduce the flavour and of meat 
without the use of animal products. The name 'Realeat' also implies that this 
soya based food is real food for properly civilized human beings as opposed to 
the products based on a 'blood diet'. The terms VegeMince and VegeSteak can 
be perceived to have a duality of meaning. To the passing consumer, it can be 
an invitation to indulge in a taste for meat without the risk (particularly in the light 
of both the SSE and E-coli crises of recent years), or to animal rightists, 
vegetarians and vegans it represents an inversion of the meat-eating culture by 
being Mince and Steak produced for Veggies'. The 'reality' of this food adheres 
in its 'authenticity' in relation to the principles of the animal rightist. Its 
'authenticity' is also stressed by the mark of approval of the Vegetarian Society 
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, the 'V' sign. 
An example of these principles which emphasizes that these products are 
not merely an alternative to meat from the health angle are the different 
treatment of the Realeat products and Quorn. Realeat's Vegemince and 
Vegesteak acquire a 'tick' mark whereas the product 'Quorn' another 
replacement for meat, does not. Quom, originates from a fermented mushroom-
like fungus and whilst it does not violate the vegetarian's principles of not eating 
meat, it contains the whites of eggs which are not from free range hens, so it still 
has an association with cruelty. The consumer is told by the absence of the 
'tick', that this choice would be incorrect from an ethical point of view. Realeat's 
products, however, contain egg whites from free range eggs and so are 
deserving of a 'tick' mark. Realeat, however, is unsuitable for vegans due to the 
use of eggs, as vegans eat no dairy or egg products. 
'Seitan', based on wheat gluten, is also a replacement for meat in the diet 
and is used sliced up in sandwiches in much the same way that cold meats are 
used. 
All these products after manipulation, closely resemble meat's texture 
and appearance, so whilst inverting and contradicting the meat eating culture's 
notions of what is appropriate sustenance for the human body, they emulate the 
products of the meat eating culture whilst doing so. The 'Goodlife' range of bean 
based burgers and soya based sausages also invert and emulate, and reflect 
their ideological stand through their name, like the 'Realeat' company. However 
they do not reproduce the taste of meat 
Nick Fiddes (1991) points out that globally, meat is surrounded by 
different taboos and avoidances and following Twigg (1983) uses the device of 
the loathsome witches' brew from Macbeth as containing predominantly animals 
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and animal parts which produce a feeling of disgust in our own culture, to 
illustrate (Fiddes 1991, 18-19). Forbidden foods are the substance of the brew 
within the cauldron. The significance of mass society's suspicion of animal 
rightists and those of vegetarian tendencies and the oppositional nature of a 
culture that dissents from meat eating has not been lost on the manufacturer's 
of 'Cauldron Foods'. The use of the marketing device of a cauldron implies that 
these too are forbidden foods for the uninitiated, a 'witches brew' only for 
members of the 'coven'. Cauldron Foods also emulate and reproduce foods 
consumed by the meat-eating culture, but are based on a 'witches brew' of tofu, 
soya bean curd, nuts and herbs. Cauldron Foods products also have the 
approval of the Vegetarian society 'V sign or tick. 
Replacements for the Sunday 'roast' are available from Granose Foods 
Limited in the form of Lentil Roast Mix and Nut Roast Mix and approved by the 
Vegetarian Society. Gelatine is replaced by Gelazone an approved vegetable 
gelling powder. Kallo Foods produce vegetarian gravy powder and stock cubes 
to replace the animal based products and are approved by the Vegetarian 
Society. 
Certain products which are of obvious non-animal origin are very often 
not approved by the Vegetarian Society, simply because there is no need for 
such approval, for example Soya Milk. On the other hand, certain supermarkets 
retailing salad leaves have seen the arrival of packets of vegetable leaves with 
the 'V sign. The Vegetarian Society will approve these products whilst 
recognizing that there is no need for it, the producers simply want it as a 
marketing device. 
The concerns of the manufacturer regarding the type of consumer they 
are trying to attract are very often revealed in their source of approval. 'Whole 
Earth', who manufacture wholefoods, predominant concerns are ecology and 
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human health, whilst producing such substances as Organic Tomato Ketchup 
which appears to be vegetarian, seek approval from the Soil Association and 
not the Vegetarian Society. 
In his discussion of industrial manufacture Daniel Miller uses William 
Morris's nineteenth century arts and crafts movement as an illustration of how 
products are meaningful through opposition and proposes that; 
when manufacture as the signified of the object, becomes 
reified as having a separate and particular connotation it is 
not the actual process of manufacture which is of 
importance, but the ability of the object to stand for a 
particular form of production and its attendant social 
relations (Miller 1987, 115). 
The consumer behaviour of animal rightists, however, stresses the 
importance of manufacture in conjunction with the symbolic nature of products 
and their uses in social relations. From this point of view, manufacturers who 
are engaged in the production of meat products who introduce vegetarian 
ranges may capture consumers who may be anxious to replace certain elements 
of the meat diet, in particular for their children in the light of the many of the 
recent food scares surrounding animal based foods. They are, however, 
unlikely to capture ethical vegetarians and vegans who are involved in 
promoting the rights of animals. For the committed animal rightist, there is not 
only the problem that in buying products from these ranges one is still 
supporting the meat industry, albeit indirectly, there is also the real problem of 
pollution of food, as processing and packaging of vegetarian ranges may be 
done in the same premises. 
An illustration of these concerns are the steps taken by the Linda 
McCartney range (following a scandal when it was alleged that meat had been 
found in the range). Whilst the Linda McCartney range is a very personalised 
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product, it bears the name and photograph of the late Mrs McCartney on the 
packaging, the manufacturers are in fact (at the time of writing) MacVities 
Prepared Foods and part of the United Biscuits Company which manufactures 
products with animal derivatives. 
The unique way in which this was tackled was the opening of a 
vegetarian factory in Fakenham, Norfolk in 1995 where only Linda McCartney 
foods are produced (Personal communication Linda McCartney Foods Careline, 
4 March 1997) The Linda McCartney range of vegetarian foods illustrate the 
process of inversion and emulation, and is suitable for those with a busy lifestyle 
who are too short of time to use raw products. The range emulates and inverts 
many of the ready made meals which are sold through supermarkets. Linda 
McCartney sausages, kievs, country pies, lasagne, canneloni are all inversions 
and emulations of the meat eating culture's diet. An important point to be made 
here, is that whilst many manufacturers of meat based products are producing 
'vegetarian' ranges, for example the manufacturer's 'Birds Eye', these are not 
cultural objects in the world of the animal rightist because they are made by 
manufacturers who are associated with the meat trade. To the animal rightists 
these are merely products produced to try to capture a niche in the market and 
not indicative of social relations which accepted cultural symbols are. 
The fact that Linda McCartney was a known vegetarian and advocate 
of animal rights, plus the fact that the above steps have been taken to protect 
the products from possible pollution by animal substances would appear to point 
to the fact that these products are authentically vegetarian. However, there is 
no 'V sign on these products, only the in-house assurance on the product that 
the products are suitable for vegetarians. Curious to understand how it is that 
these products which are prima facie vegetarian, do not have a 'V mark and 
yet have the backing of a known vegetarian and animal rights advocate, I 
contacted the company to discover why this would be. A spokesperson for the 
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company informed me that it was precisely because Linda McCartney's views 
were so well known , that it was felt unnecessary to apply for the 'V mark 
together with the fact that they did not want to pass on the extra cost of this to 
the consumer. However, during discussion with the Vegetarian Society, it was 
alleged that the Linda McCartney ran.ge of foods does riot carry the 'V mark 
because some of the range contains eggs from battery hens (Personal 
communication The Vegetarian Society, 4 March 1997). It is interesting to note 
that both Linda and Paul McCartney are sponsors of The Vegetarian Society, 
which is opposed to the keeping of hens in batteries, and this brings into 
question the reality of the Linda McCartney range and their authenticity as 
cultural objects within the culture of animal rights activists. 
In fact, most of my informants did not refer to the McCartney range in any 
way other than as suitable food for children. The only product from this range, 
I found that was frequently used by them was the Linda McCartney vegetarian 
sausages, which those who had children, fed to them. Childhood is frequently 
perceived as a time spent in gaining 'competence', it may be that the McCartney 
range is viewed as a range for those who have yet to gain a competent habitus 
as an animal rightist, or for those merely 'flirting' with vegetarianism. It is 
certainly true that the range plays upon a perceived 'naivety' of the consumer, 
suggesting that these are personal family recipes devised and supervised by Ms 
McCartney, when it is actually produced by McVities Prepared Foods. It is 
interesting that Birds Eye's vegetarian range, is in the main very child-oriented 
too, 'Vegetable Fingers' and 'Vegetable Quarterpounders' are produced as 
replacements for 'fishfingers' and 'burgers' 
Realeat have no connection with the meat industry, other than to oppose 
it, and actively promote vegetarianism from an ethical and health point of view, 
Goodlife products also are involved in promoting alternative lifestyles based on 
plant products. It is the goods produced by these and similar manufacturers 
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that constitute a world of material objects within which social relationships are 
entered into by animal rightists with both the manufacturers and each other. 
The meat eating culture's dependence upon cow's milk for sustenance 
is another instance which to the strict animal rightist is an illustration of a lack 
of civilized behaviour and to some, evidence of infantile characteristics. Jack 
commented; 
the inability of some people to wean themselves off the 
. breast 
The soya milk range of products, produced by the Plamil manufacturing 
company are another range of products used as cultural objects within the 
world of the animal rightist. Plamil introduced their soya milk replacement for 
cow's milk into the market in 1965. Whilst other companies do produce soya 
milk, Plamil advertises its authenticity by informing the consumer that 'Plamil is 
the Only Soya Milk Made by A Vegan Company' (Plamil advertisement in the 
Vegan Magazine). By informing the consumer of this, the consumer is assured 
that the product is manufactured u~ing no animal produce or derivatives and is 
cruelty-free and that the manufacturers are engaged with the consumer in the 
promotion of a cruelty free diet. Plamil also stress their authenticity by only 
selling their products through health and wholefood shops. The Plamil range 
offers alternatives to a diet which depends on the dairy industry, inverting and 
emulating the common products which the meat eating culture consume. Apart 
from the cow's milk substitute of soya milk, the range offers chocolate bars 
which are derived from soya, egg-free mayonnaise, veeze an alternative to 
cheese spread, carob bars and spreads made from soya. Here again we see 
that the animal based products have all been replaced by plant products. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
The use of material culture in the construction of a personal and shared 
identity is central to the animal rights community in their efforts to become 
authentically human. Through this analysis of the relationship between the 
conceptual and material world of the activists we see that becoming and 
belonging within this community are simultaneous and mediated through a 
gaining of competence in the knowledge and use of material objects. I have 
concentrated on the replacement of one cultural object that of meat. In this 
analysis I could have gone much further to illustrate the ways in which most of 
the material world is manipulated, cosmetics, clothing, toiletries, alcoholic 
beverages, one can go on vegan holidays and feed companion animals with 
specially prepared plant derived food, but rejection and replacement of meat is 
central to this all. The processes involved with seeking replacements for this 
one commodity build up a body of knowledge about the presence of its 
byproducts in many other commodities. 
This knowledge translated into the application of practical skills 
contributes to the gaining of competence through the building of a new habitus 
which can competently transfer these skills to all areas of life. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conflict between animal advocates and animal 
users is far more than a matter of contrasting tastes or 
interests. Opposing world views, concepts of identity, 
ideas of community, are all at stake (Jasper & Nelkin 
1992, 7). 
This study began from a decision to explore the above hypothesis and 
was conducted through an examination of the activities and narratives of a 
group of British animal rights activists. There is a paucity of social scientific data 
on animal rights activists in Britain, in fact I could find very little British 
anthropological work addressing the subject. This was mirrored in the United 
States until the late 1980s and mid 1990s when social scientists turned their 
attention towards the subject, although these were mainly sociologists and 
psychologists. As a result of this, the studies which were available for 
examination as background for this research were those based on 
contemporary social scientific data on American animal rights activists. My own 
data parallelled those from the American studies. 
There is strong evidence to suggest that animal rights activism expresses 
more than feelings about animals. The activists in this study did display strong 
attachments to animals many being motivated to join the movement through an 
experience of what Jasper and Nelkin (1992) termed a 'moral shock' which 
involved a revulsion from cruelty towards animals. Animal rights then became 
a consolidating symbol for other thoughts about the nature of humanity. From 
analysis of the data I conclude, along with Jamison and Lunch (1992) , that 
compassion and concern for animals does not fully explain activists enduring 
constancy to the movement. Work by Thomas (1983) illuminates the symbolic 
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role of animals for human beings in times of social and technological change. 
This is clearly illustrated in the historical background of how human beings have 
thought about animals and debated the true nature of humanity through a 
continuing discourse from the beginnings of the huge social and technological 
changes brought about through industrialisation and urbanisation in Britain. 
Anthony Giddens refers to the present post industrial era as "high' or 
'late' modernity' which through the increasing opening out of the social world has 
created a social landscape of shifting and changing social relationships which 
facilitates conditions that are considered to increase opportunities for 
experimenting with and expressing different identities which are both relational 
and situational. The animal rightists search for an authentic identity is in 
essence a response to these conditions using the very conditions of post-
industrial society in its creation. They take the opportunity of using a relational 
and situational identity in their own efforts to create, construct and express their 
personal identity and morality publicly whilst using their lifestyles to authenticate 
their public relational and situational identity. Therefore, to say that identity for 
animal rights activists is only meaningful or successful in interaction or in public 
performance would be to minimise its importance to them. They create 
situations for themselves for the public display of a discrete identity as part of 
their polemic against mass society where they can hold up for view a different 
model for the authentically human, and express a desire for the constant and 
knowable or authentic, in its lived-inness. 
Giddens (1991) points to the conditions of 'late' or 'high' modernity as a 
creator of opportunities for a relational identity, but allows room for those who 
wish to construct a relational identity which can also be directed towards 
authenticity, in effect, a knowable and consistent identity achieved through the 
construction of a narratively coherent and reflexive biography using the 
conditions of contemporary society in its construction. 
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Giddens characterizes contemporary society as a risk society. 'The 
notion of risk becomes central in a society which is taking leave of the past, of 
the traditional ways of doing things, and which is opening itself up to a 
problematic future' (Giddens 1991, 1110. Trust and rejection are fundamental 
features of every society. The opening out of the social world confronts the 
individual with a changing landscape of conflicting information and multiple 
opportunities of experience. This highlights the notion of risk and promotes a 
yearning for structure. 
Who and what do we trust? Who and what do we reject? Who do I want 
to be? Who do I not want to be? The 'fateful moments' produced by 'moral 
shocks' are moments when these questions are asked. Initially the activists 
answered the question What do I reject?, by choosing to reject those aspects 
of a world and a human identity which are apathetic to or condone animal 
oppression or cruelty. The question of Who do I not want to be?' is answered 
by this rejection. The notion of animal rights becomes a consolidating symbol 
for all the wrongs of human beings. 
The question of Who do I want to be? appears to be 'I want to be 
better, better than those 'others' who feel animal exploitation for the benefit of 
human beings is a natural and acceptable behaviour. Who do I trust?' Is 
answered by '1 trust myself and others who feel the same way as me'. What 
do I do now? The answer to this question becomes another step in constructing 
a narratively coherent identity. The polemical nature of the search for 
authenticity is illustrated by the questions that the activist asks in an inner 
discourse and in the discourse they conduct with mass society. 
Their initial steps following practices of rejection became deeper 
immersion into the movement through multiple membership of animal interest 
agencies and the Vegetarian and Vegan Societies. Their beliefs translate 
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themselves into practices structured by the existing animal rights community, 
and the individual practice of animal rights becomes a structuring practice in the 
construction of a personal and shared identity predicated on authentic 
humanness; which in tum constitutes the community through practice. These 
practices are facilitated by the opportunities created by contemporary social life. 
Material culture has been used to express social affiliations and create 
social bonds in many traditional societies. In post-industrial society the choice 
of affiliations is greater and the manipulation of the material world through 
consumer choice enables those affiliations and bonds to be made with unseen 
others of a like mind. This places the stress of construction and maintenance 
of identity on the individual who has to reconcile individual practices with what 
the community of unseen others expects. Thus can personal identity be 
reconciled with the expectations of the community in a shared identity and be 
competent enough for that identity to be scrutinised when in shared ritual 
activity. 
All aspects of a previous identity cannot be rejected. We cannot reject 
the biological facts of family or the existence of a previous life, but when 
processes of rejection and construction are contextualised within the biography 
of a person then the life narrative remains coherent and provides individuals 
with security. I believe that the animal rights activists in this study reflect a 
desire for a sense of structure and security in an ever changing world but 
combine this with a desire for change, to create a better world and a better 
human being, the authentic human being and choose to do this by thinking with 
animals. 
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Appendix 1 
PROFILE OF CORE GROUP (All names pseudonyms) 
Illustrating multiple membership of animal protection and rights 
groups and dietary ideology 
ALAN: (36) Heavily involved in organising the vigil and recruiting support 
from other sites through the Animal Protestors Bulletin. Member of Animal 
Protestors, Vegan Society, Vegetarian Society, League Against Cruel 
Sports, RESPECT, British Union Against vivisection. Amnesty 
International, Greenpeace, Live Exports Opponents. Former member of 
Testing Action Group and still supports the Christmas vigil outside the 
Laboratories. VEGAN No Pets 
ANNA: (23) Attends the farm vigil every week. Member of Animal 
Protestors Vegetarian Society, Live Exports Opponents and other protests 
against Live Exports. Helped publicise the Jill Phipps Memorial Fayre in 
Coventry. VEGAN 
MARY: (45) Attends the farm vigil every week. Member of Animal 
Protestors, Live Exports Opponents, RESPECT, ANIMAL AID, 
Compassion in World Farming. VEGETARIAN 
JOHN: (49) Attends the farm vigil every week and sometimes keeps a lone 
vigil on other evenings. . Member of Animal Protestors, Live Exports 
Opponents, Secretary of a local Vegetarian and Vegan Society, member 
of the League Against Cruel Sports and The Protestors. VEGAN 
PRISCILLA: (51) Attends the farm vigil every week .. Member of Animal 
Protestors, Live Exports Opponents, National Antivivisection Society, 
League Against Cruel Sports, Vegan Society, Compassion in World 
Farming, Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the 
Vegetarian Society. Attends the Christmas vigil outside the laboratories. 
VEGAN 
KIT: (65) Attends the farm vigil every week. Member of Animal Protestors, 
National Antivivisection Society, Compassion in World Farming, the 
League Against Cruel Sports, Animal Vigilantes, The Catholic Society 
Against Animal Cruelty, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, HAPPC, SPANA, Human Research Society, Live Exports 
Opponents. VEGAN 
JOAN: (24) Attends the farm vigil every week, also rescues dogs. . 
Member of Animal Protestors, British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, 
Compassion in World Farming, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, 
Testing Action Group and Live Exports Opponents. 211Attends the 
Christmas vigil outside the laboratories. VEGAN 
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TOM : (69) Attends the farm vigil every week. Member of Animal 
Protestors, British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, Vegetarian 
Society, Soil Association and Live Exports Opponents. Attends the 
Christmas vigil outside the Laboratories. VEGETARIAN 
VICTORIA (54) Attends the farm vigil every week .. Member of Animal 
Protestors, Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, League 
Against Cruel Sports, Beauty Without Cruelty, Canine Defence League, 
National Antivivisection Society, Animal Aid and Live Exports Opponents. 
Attends the Christmas vigil outside the laboratories. VEGAN 
SANDY (38): Attends the farm vigil every week. . Member of 
Animal Protestors, British Union Against Vivisection, Testing Action 
Group, Vegan Society, Animal Aid, League Against Cruel Sports, Live 
Exports Opponents. VEGAN 
JACK (45) Attends the farm vigil every week. . Member of Animal 
Protestors, British Union against Vivisection, Testing Action Group, Vegan 
Society, Animal Aid, League Against Cruel Sports. VEGAN. 
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Appendix 2 
Guidelines Issued With Autobiography Note Books 
Thank you so much for agreeing to write an autobiographical account of 
your life and experience with the animal movement. I wonder if when you 
are doing this, you could keep in mind certain things -
When did you first become interested in the cause - your age? 
What prompted your interest? 
Prior to your involvement with the animal movement, were you active with 
any non-animal issue pressure groups? 
What has membership of the movement meant to you - that is - how and 
if your life has changed as a result - in what way? What do you now do 
or not do as a result? Have your social relationships changed for 
instance? 
What practical steps have you taken to further the cause in your own eyes 
and for you what are your aims? 
What groups have you belonged to? 
I wonder if at the end of your autobiography, you could make a statement 
about whether or not you feel animals should have 'rights'. What those 
'rights' should be and what those 'rights' should be based on ego 
sentiency? 
PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THIS IS COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL 
AND YOU MAY USE A PSEUDONYM IF YOU WISH - ALL I REALLY 
NEED TO KNOW IS YOUR GENDER AND AGE. 
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Appendix 3 
BY -PRODUCTS OF A COW* 
Skin, tendons and ligaments: boiled to make gelatin, used in 
jellies, biscuits, pies, ready meals and sausage skins. Also in 
capsules, glue, match heads and photographic processes. 
Hide: leather, vellum 
Vertebrae: can be used in gelatin and suet. 
Bones: China 
Tallow(beef fat): soaps 
Elastin(a protein uniting muscle fibres in meat): Moisturisers 
Glycerol: cleansers 
Keratin(Protein in hair, horns and hooves): used in shampoos, 
conditioners and fertilisers. 
Lactose (the sugar derived from milk): tablet fillers, sweeteners 
and carrier for flavouring agents in crisps. 
Oleoic oil (liquid from pressed tallow): margarines 
Oleostearin (solid from pressed tallow): soaps and candle 
making 
Rennet (extract of calf stomach): Used in cheese making 
Stearic acid: Organic acid used to soften skin in lipstick, 
moisturiser, eye shadow 
Stearate: Salt of stearic acid, used in body building supplements 
and mint sweets 
* Reproduced from The Times Newspaper, Thursday, 21 March 1996 
(with modifications) 
214 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, Carol J., (1990) The Sexual Politics of Meat; A Feminist 
Vegetarian Critical Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities, United Kingdom, 
Verso 
Agscene Spring 1995: 13 
Animal Protesters Bulletin:30: 2 
Appadurai, Arjun (1990) 'Disjuncture and difference in the global world 
economy' in Featherstone, M. (Ed) Global Culture: Nationalism, 
Globalization and Modernity, London Sage 
Baker, S. (1993) Picturing The Beast: Animals, identity and 
representation, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press 
Barnes, J A (1968) 'Networks & Political Process' in Swartz, M. C. (Ed), 
Local-Level Politics, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company 
Barth, Fredrik (1969a) 'Introduction' in Barth, Fredrik (Ed), Ethnic Groups 
and Boundaries, The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Oslo, 
Scandinavian University Press 
Barth, Fredrik (1969b) 'Pathan Identity and its Maintenance' in Barth, 
Fredrik (Ed), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, The Social Organization of 
Culture Difference, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press 
Baudrillard, J. (1981) For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, 
Louis, Telos 
Bell, C. (1992) Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Bell, J. (1993) Doing Your Research Project, Buckingham:Open 
University Press 
Bentham, Jeremy (1960) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, First published 1789 
Bourdieu, P. (1973) 'The Berber house or the world reversed', in 
Douglas, M. (Ed), Rules and Meanings, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Nice, R. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
214 
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Bulmer, R. (1967) 'Why is the Cassowary not a Bird? A Problem of 
Zoological taxonomy among the Karam of the New Guinea Highlands' 
Man (N.S.)2: 5-25 
Callaghan, J. (1995) 'Weirdo Alert! Part 2' The Vegan, 11(2), 12-13) 
Carrithers, M. (1985) 'An Alternative Social History of the Self, in 
Carrithers, M., Collins, S., Lukes, S., (Eds.), The Category of the Person. 
Carrithers, M. (1992) Why Humans Have Cultures: Explaining 
Anthropology and Diversity, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Cohen, A. P.(1982) Belonging: identity and social organisation in 
British Rural Cultures, Manchester, Manchester University Press 
Cohen, A. P. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of Community, 
Chichester, Ellis Harwood Ltd. & Tavistock Publications Limited 
Cohen, A. P. (1986) 'Of Symbols and Boundaries, or, Does Ertie's 
Greatcoat Hold the Key?' in Cohen, A. P. (Ed), Symbolising 
Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press 
Douglas, M. (1969) Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Douglas, M. (1970) Natural Symbols, London, Barrie and Rockliff 
Douglas, M. (1975) Implicit Meanings, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
f 
Douglas, M. & Isherwood, Baron (1979) The World of Goods, London, 
Allen Lane 
Douglas, M. (1987) How Institutions Think, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 
Douglas, M. (1996) Thought Styles, London, California and New Delhi; 
Sage Publications 
Driscoll, J. W. (1995) Attitudes toward Animals: Species Ratings. 
Society & Animals, 3(2), 139-150 
Durkheim, E. (1952) Suicide: A Study in Sociology, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. First pub. 1897 
215 
Durkheim, E. (1976) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Ufe, 
London, Allen and Unwin. First pub. 1912. 
Elias, N. (1978) The Civilising Process, New York, Urizon. First 
published 1939. 
Eriksen, T. H. (1993) Ethnicity & Nationalism, Anthropological 
Perspectives, London, Pluto Press 
Fiddes, N. (1991) Meat, A Natural Symbol, London, Routledge 
Finsen, L. and Finsen S. (1994) The Animal Rights Movement in 
America, New York, Twayne Publishers 
Fleck, L. (1935) The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. 
Trans. 1979, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
Friedman, J (1991) 'Narcissism, roots and postmodernity: the 
constitution of selfhood in the global crisis' in Lash, S. and Friedman, J. 
(Eds), Modernity and Identity, Oxford, Blackwell 
Galvin, S. L. & Herzog, H. A. (1993) Ethical Ideology, Animal Rights 
Activism, and Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Animals. Ethics & 
Behavior. 2(3),141-149 
Gans, H. J. (1962) The Urban Villagers, New York, The Free Press 
Garner, R. (1993) Animals, politics and morality, Manchester, University 
of Manchester Press 
Garner, R. (1995) The Politics of Animal Protection: A Research 
Agenda. Society & Animals. 3(1),43-60 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Harper Collins 
Geertz, C. Local Knowledge: Furlher Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology, New York, Basic Books 
Gellner, E. (1978) 'Scale and nation' in Barth, Fredrik (Ed), Scale and 
Organisation, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press 
Gergen, Kenneth J. (1991) 'Social Constructionist Inquiry: Context and 
Implications in The Social Construction of the Person, Gergen, Kenneth 
J. & Davis, Keith E. (Eds), New York, Springer-Verlag 
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self Identity, Self and Society in the 
Late Modem Age, Cambridge, Polity 
216 
Gluck J. P. & Kubacki S. R. (1991) 'Animals in biomedical Research: 
The Undermining Effect of the Rhetoric of the Besieged'. Ethics & 
Behavior. 1: 157-173 
Godlovitch, Stanley and Rosalind, and John Harris (Eds) (1971) Animals, 
Men and Morals, London, Victor Goillancz Limited 
Gold, R. L. (1958) Roles in sociological field observation. Social Forces 
6. 
Griswold, W (1994) Cultures and Societies in A Changing World, 
Thousand Oaks California, Pine Forge Press 
Hannerz, U. (1992) Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social 
Organization of Meaning, New York, Columbia University Press 
Harris, C. (1974) Hennage: a Social System in Miniature, New York, 
Irvington Publishers Inc 
Harrison, R. (1964) Animal Machines, London, Vincent Stuart 
Henshaw, D. (1989) Animal Walfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation 
. Front, London: Fontana 
Herzog, H. A. 'The Movement is My Life':The Psychology of Animal 
Rights Activism'. Journal of Sociallssues.49(1): 103-119 
Hobsbawm. E. J. (1983) 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in 
Hobsbawm, E. J. & Ranger, T. (Eds.) The Invention of Tradition, 
Cambridge, New York, Victoria, Cambridge University Press 
Jamison, W. V. & Lunch, W. M. (1992) Rights of Animals, Perceptions 
of Science, and Political Activism: Profile of American Animal Rights 
Activists. Science, Technology & Human Values, 17(4),438-458 
Jasper, J. (1992) Recruiting Intimates, Recruiting Strangers: Building 
The Contemporary Animal Rights Movement. (Unpublished Manuscript) 
Jasper, J. & Nelkin D. (1992) The Animal Rights Crusade: The growth 
of a moral protest, New York, The Free Press 
Jasper, J. & Poulsen, J. (1995) Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral 
Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests. 
Social Problems. 42(4) 493-511 
Jasper, J. & Poulsen, J. (1993) Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, 
and Countermobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights 
Campaigns. Sociological Forum, 8(4), 639-657 
217 
Johnston, H. & K1andermans B. (1995) 'The Cultural Analysis of Social 
Movements' in Johnston, H. & K1andermans B. (Eds) Social Movements 
and Culture, US, UCL Press 
Kerby, A. P. (1991) Narrative and the Self, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press 
Lawrence, E. A. (1994) Conflicting Ideologies: Views of Animal Rights 
Advocates and Their Opponents. Society & Animals.2(2)175-189 
Leach, E. R (1961) Rethinking Anthropology, London: The Athlone 
Press 
Leach, E. R (1964) 'Anthropological aspects of language: animal 
categories and verbal abuse' in Maranda, P. (Ed) Mythology 1972 edn, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966(a» The Savage Mind, London: George 
Weidenfield & Nicholson 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966(b» Totemism, trans. Needham, R, London, 
Merlin Press 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1970) The Raw and The Cooked, London, Cape 
Levy-Bruhl, L. (1952) 'A letter to E. E. Evans-Pritchard', British Journal 
of Sociology, 111(2): 117-23 
Linzey, A. (1987) Christianity and the Rights of Animals, London, SPCK 
Lofgren, 0 (1985) Our Friends in Nature: Class and Animal Symbolism. 
Ethnos: 3-4: 184-213 
Lowe, P. & Goyder, N. (1983) Environmental Groups in Politics, London, 
George Allen & Unwin 
Lukes, S. (1973) Individualism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Limited 
Lury, C. (1996) Consumer Culture, Cambridge, Polity Press 
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1988) 'Social 
Movements' in Smelser, N. J. (Ed) Handbook of Sociology,. Beverley 
Hills, Sage 
McNeill, P. (1990) Research Methods, London and New York, 
Routledge 
218 
Maehle, A-H. (1994) 'Cruelty and Kindness to the 'Brute Creation', 
Stability and change in the ethics of the man-animal relationship 1600-
1850' in Manning, A. and Serpell, J. (Eds), Animals and Human 
Society, London, Routledge 
Mauss, M. (1990) The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in 
Archaic Societies, New York, W. W. Norton. First pub. 1938. 
Midgeley, M. (1983) Animals and Why They Matter, USA, University of 
Georgia Press 
Midgeley, M. (1988) 'Beasts, brutes and monsters' in Ingold, T. (Ed) 
What is an animal?, London, Routledge 
Midgeley, M. (1993) The Four -Leggeds, The Two-Leggeds and the 
Wingeds - An Overview of Society and Animals. Society & Animals, 1: 
9-15 
Miller, D. (1987) Material Culture and Mass Consumption, Oxford, 
Blackwell 
Moore, S. F. & Myerhoff B. G. (1977) Secular Ritual, Amsterdam:Van 
Gorcum 
Myers, F. (1988) 'Burning the truck and holding the country, property, 
time, and the negotiation of identity among Pintupi Aborigines' in Ingold, 
T., Riches, D and Woodburn, J. (Eds) Hunters & Gatherers: Property, 
Power and Ideology, Oxford, New York, Hamburg, Berg Publishers 
Limited 
Nash, M (1988) The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modem World, Chicago, 
Chicago University Press 
Obeyesekere, Gananath 'The Great Tradition and the Little in the 
Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism' in The Journal of Asian Studies 
Okely, J. (1983) The Traveller-Gypsies, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Orwell, G. (1937) The Road to Wigan Pier, 1984 edn, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin 
Passmore, J. (1974) Man's Responsibility for Nature, London: Gerald 
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2nd Edition 
Pernick, M. S. (1985) A Calculus of Suffering: Pain, Professionalism, 
and Anasthaesia in Nineteenth Century America, New York, Columbia 
University Press 
219 
Pious, S (1991) An attitude survey of animal rights activists. 
Psychological Sciences, 2, 194-196 
Polhemus, T. (1975) 'Social Bodies' in Renthall, J. & Polhemus, T. 
(Eds) The Body as a Medium of Expression, London, Allen Lane 
Primatt, HumphreY,(1992) The Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to 
Brute Animals, London, Centaur Press, First published 1776 
Redfield, R. (1956) The Little Community: Peasant Society and Culture, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
Regan, T. (1984) The Case for Animal Rights, London, Routledge 
Regan, T. & Singer, P. (Eds) (1989) Animal Rights and Human 
Obligations, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. 2nd Edition 
Ritvo, Harriet (1987) The Animal Estate; The English and Other 
Creatures in the Victorian Age, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University 
Press 
Ritvo, Harriet (1994) 'Animals in Nineteenth Century Britain; Complicated 
attitudes and competing categories' in Manning Aand Serpell J. (Eds), 
Animals and Human Society, London, Routledge 
Ryder, Richard D. (1975) Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in 
Research, London, Davis-Poynter 
Ryder, Richard D. (1989) Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes 
Towards Speciesism, Oxford, Blackwell 
Sahlins, Marshall (1976) Culture and Practical Reason, Chicago and 
London, University of Chicago Press 
Sahlins, Marshall (1985) Islands of History, Chicago & London, 
University of Chicago Press 
Salt ,Henry S. (1980) Animal Rights Considered in relation to Social 
Progress, London, Centaur Press, First Published 1894 
Salt, Henry S. (1921) Seventy Years Among Savages, London, George 
Allen & Unwin 
Schutz, A (1972) The Phenomenology of the Social World, London, 
Heinemann Educational Books Limited. First published 1932. 
Serpell, James (1986) In the Company of Animals, Oxford, Blackwell 
220 
Serpell, J. (1992) 'Animal Protection and Environmentalism: The 
Background' in Ryder, R. D. (Ed), Animal Welfare and the Environment, 
London: Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd 
Shapiro, K (1994)The Caring Sleuth: Portrait of an Animal Rights 
Activist. Society & Animals. 2, 145-165 
Singer, P. (1995) Animal Liberation, London, Australia, New Zealand, 
S Africa, Random House, 3rd Edition 
Slater, D (1997) Consumer Culture & Modemity, Cambridge, Polity Press 
Sorabji, R. (1993) Animal Minds and Human Morals - The Origins of the 
Western Debate, New York, Cornell University Press 
Spencer, C (1993) The Heretics' Feast: A History of Vegetarianism, 
London, The Fourth Estate 
Sperling, S. (1988) Animal liberators: Research and morality, Berkeley, 
University of California Press 
Strathem, M. (1980) 'No Nature, No Culture: The Hagen Case' in 
MacCormack C. and Strathem, M. (Eds), Nature, Culture and Gender, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Strathem, M. (1981) Kinship at the Core: An anthropology of Bmden a 
vii/age in north-west Essex in the Nineteen Sixties, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Tambiah, S. J. (1969) Animals are Good to Think and Good to Prohibit 
Ethnology 8(4): 424-59 
Tapper, R. L. (1988) 'Animality, humanity, morality, society' in 
Ingold, T. (Ed), What is an Animal, London, Unwin Hyman 
Terkel, S. (1977) Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day 
And How They Feel About What They Do, Penguin, US 
Tester, K. (1991) Animals & Society, The humanity of animal rights, 
London, USA Canada, Routledge 
The Vegan, (1995) 11 (2) 
The Vegan, (1995) 11 (3) 
The Vegan, (1995) 11(4) 
The Vegan, Spring 1996 
221 
The Vegan, Summer 1996 
Thomas, Keith (1983) Man and the Natural World. Changing Attitudes 
in England 1500-1800, London, Allen Lane 
Thomas, Nicholas (1992) 'The inversion of tradition' American 
Ethnologist, 19 (2): 213-231 
Tonnies, F. (1963) Community and Association, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 
Trilling, L. (1971) Sincerity and Authenticity, London, Oxford University 
Press 
Tuan, Y. F. (1984} Dominance and Affection, New Haven: Yale 
University Press 
Turner, James (1980) Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and 
Humanity in the Victorian Mind, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University 
Press 
Turner, V. (1969) The Ritual Process Structure and Anti-Structure, New 
York:Cornell University Press 
Turner, V. (1974) Dramas, Fields and Metaphors, New York, Cornell 
University Press 
Twigg, J. (1983) 'Vegeterianism and the Meanings of Meat' in Murcott 
A. (Ed) The Sociology of Food and Eating: Essays on the Sociological 
Significance of Food, Aldershot, Gower 
Van Gennep, A. (1960) The Rites of Passage, London:Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. First Published, 1909 
White, Lynn (Jr), (1967) 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis', in 
Science, 155:1203-1207 
Willis, T (1974) Man and Beast, London, Hart Davis MacGibbon 
Wynne-Tyson, J. (1988) Food Fora Future: How World Hunger Could 
Be Ended by the Twenty-first Century, Wellingborough, Northants., 
Thorsons 
222 
